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Abstract 
The contemporary phenomenon of the global rush for farmland has generated 
intense debate from different actors. While the proponents embrace it as a 
‘development opportunity’, the critics dub it ‘land grabbing’. Others use a neutral 
term: ‘large-scale land acquisitions’. Whatever terminology is used, one fact remains 
indisputable – since 2007 vast swathes of farmlands in developing countries have 
been sold or leased out to large-scale commercial farmers. Ethiopia is one of the 
leading countries in Africa in this regard and, as a matter of state policy, it promotes 
these investments in peripheral regions that are predominantly inhabited by 
pastoralists and other indigenous communities. So far, the focus of most of the 
studies on this phenomenon has been on its economic, food security and 
environmental aspects. The questions of land rights and political implications have 
been to a great extent overlooked. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to this 
knowledge gap by drawing upon the experience of the Gambella regional state – the 
epicentre of large-scale land acquisition in Ethiopia. To this end, this thesis argues 
that large-scale land acquisitions in Ethiopia is indeed redefining indigenous 
communities’ right to land, territories and natural resources in fundamental ways. By 
doing so, it also threatens the post-1991 social contract – i.e. ethnic federalism – 
between the envisaged new Ethiopian state and its diverse communities, particularly 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
1.1. Research Problem  
 
Our policy is that in the lowland areas where we have abundant and unutilized land we would 
lease that to private sector. In the highland and where there is land shortage we would allow 




On 20 April 2010, Mr. Tefera Deribew, Minister for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MOARD), and Mr. Soroj Procol, Chief Executive of New Delhi based 
Verdanta Harvests PLC, signed a land lease agreement for 3,012 hectares (ha) of 
land in the Gambella region, Majang zone, Godere district/woreda, Gumare and 
Kabu villages/kebeles (Appendix – 1)2. This particular piece of land in question 
happened to be one of the protected community forests under the ‘Participatory 
Forest Protection Project’ supported by an international Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) (Interview – 1IND, 22 Mar. 2012)3. Upon hearing the rumours 
that their communal forest had been leased out to an investor, the communities of 
Gumare and Kabu kebeles went to their immediate administrators at Godere woreda 
to get clear information. The woreda officials stated that they did not know about this 
deal and that they would make enquiries about the matter to the regional 
                                                          
1
 The ‘lowland areas’ here refer to the Afar Regional State, Beneshangual-Gumuz Regional State, 
Gambella Regional State and Somali Regional State. 
2
 The Ethiopian administrative structure from the highest to the least is: Federal – Region/Killil – Zone 
– District/Woreda – Village/Kebele.  In this thesis ‘district and woreda’ and ‘village and kebele’ are 
used interchangeably. 
3
 This interviewee was the coordinator of the ‘Participatory Forest Protection Project’.  
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government (FGD – 9, 14 Apr. 2012).4 The communities of these two villages were 
not satisfied with this answer and they did not want to wait until it was too late so 
they immediately sent their representatives to the regional government in Gambella 
town. At the regional government level the villagers were informed that the rumours 
were true but, since the deal was concluded at the federal government level, there 
was nothing the regional government could do about it (FGD – 9, 14 Apr. 2012).   
 
Despite the odds, these two villages decided to take their case up to the federal 
government level. They selected three representatives to go to Addis Ababa to 
discuss their concerns with the responsible federal ministries. Although none of the 
concerned ministries wanted to talk to them, they finally managed to get access to 
the President of the country, Mr. Girma Wolde-Giorgis, whose position is more of a 
figurehead.5 In their meeting, they explained to the President the importance of the 
forest to their communities as a means of livelihood and cultural identity. Moreover, 
they also stressed the efforts they had already put into protecting this forest and their 
fear of the negative environmental consequences of clearing it (FGD – 9, 14 Apr. 
2012).  
 
Much to his credit, the President listened to their concerns and in his capacity he 
wrote a letter to the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), asking them to take 
urgent action regarding the concerns of these two villages (Appendix – 2). 
Accordingly, the EPA wrote an official letter dated 6 May 2010 to the MOARD, the 
                                                          
4
 This FGD is made up of the three representatives selected by the Gumare and Kabu villages to 
follow up the leasing out of their communual forest to foreign investor.  
5
 Ethiopia is a parliamentary system: the real political power lies with the Prime Minister. The 
President plays only ceremonial and formal roles. However, President Girma Wolde Giorgis is a 
renowned environmentalist. He is the founder and current Patron of the Environment and 
Development Society in Ethiopia.  
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Ministry responsible for large-scale land investments, requesting them to rethink this 
particular land lease agreement vis-à-vis its possible negative environmental impacts 
(Appendix – 2). In this letter, the EPA also suggested that the country might gain 
multiple and better benefits (socially, economically and environmentally) from this 
forest by applying to the UN-REDD (United Nations Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation of Forests) Programme than from the expected 
economic benefits from turning this forest into a tea plantation (Appendix – 2). The 
EPA copied this letter to the Gambella regional state council and the Godere woreda 
administration council.  
 
In an evasive response to this letter, the governor of Gambella regional state wrote 
an official letter dated 19 November 2010 to the Godere woreda explaining to them 
that the land lease had already been signed and that they should collect the payment 
of 334,332 ETB ($19,000) from Verdanta Harvest PLC and hand over the land to 
them as soon as possible (Appendix – 2). The letter stated that, upon receiving this 
money, the woreda government should send a copy of the receipt voucher both to 
the regional government and to the MOARD. Finally, the letter stressed that the 
woreda administration should assist and cooperate with the investor in all of his 
activities in the woreda (Appendix – 2).  
 
Similarly, in another evasive response to the letter from the EPA, on 25 November 
2010, the MOARD dispatched a team to Gumare village to investigate the 
complaints and hear directly from the villagers. When they reached the village, 
instead of meeting all the villagers, they only met villagers who were pre-selected by 
the Godere woreda administration (Appendix – 2). To make things worse, the official 
 4 
 
representatives of these two villages who went to Addis Ababa and talked to the 
president were not even invited to this meeting (Appendix – 2; FGD – 9, 14 Apr. 
2012). 
 
Nevertheless, the official representatives of these two villages did not stop their 
complaints against this land lease. On 9 December 2010, they wrote a letter to 
President Girma Wolde-Georgis updating him on how the MOARD, the regional 
government of Gambella and the Godere woreda administration were handling the 
matter by intimidating the villagers and going ahead with the project (Appendix – 2). 
The next day, President Girma Wolde-Giorgis wrote a direct letter to the MOARD 
literally telling them to suspend the project on environmental grounds, echoing the 
previous letter written by the EPA (Appendix – 2).  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MOARD) did not respond to this 
latest letter from the president. However, on 25 January 2011, the chairman of 
Gumare village council, one of those who went to Addis Ababa and who had been 
leading the resistance against this land lease agreement, received an official letter 
from the Godere woreda administrator stating that he is being removed from his 
position (Appendix – 2). His deputy, who actually led the meeting during the visit of 
the federal representatives (MOARD), was named as temporary chairman (Appendix 
– 2).  
 
I first heard about this story from my former colleague who works for an international 
NGO in the Gambella region. Then the story became public when some of the letters 
exchanged were leaked to the media and advocacy groups (Solidarity Movement for 
 5 
 
New Ethiopia, 2011). Because of its relevance to my research and due to the 
national and international attention it has attracted, I investigated the story further 
when I went to Ethiopia for my field research. I first met the project coordinator for 
the ‘Participatory Forest Protection scheme’, a project supported by an international 
NGO that works with the aforementioned villages. The project coordinator gave me a 
good background about the project and the awareness they have created among 
those communities. Then, later on, he arranged for me to talk to the three 
representatives of these two villages, who gave me a detailed account of the story 
and the overall picture of land investments in Godere woreda.  
 
This story is both normal and special. It is normal in the sense that I have heard eight 
similar stories in which village councils have launched a formal complaint against 
land lease deals to their immediate woreda authorities.6 However, none of the village 
councils dared to take their case to the higher government levels after they failed at 
the woreda level. Only two other villages (Pinykew and Ilea) went up to the regional 
state level (FGDs – 7 and 8, 09 and 10 Apr. 2012). Hence, Gumare and Kabu 
villages are very special cases in the sense that they took their cases up to federal 
government level.  
 
The reason I decided to start with this story is because it embodies the fundamental 
contradictions inherent in the current large-scale land deals in Ethiopia that I am 
trying to investigate in this research. In the story we see a clear conflict of interests 
between the communities of Gumare and Kabu villages on one hand, and different 
                                                          
6
 1. Illea kebele in Itang woreda; 2. Pinykew kebele in Gambella woreda; 3. Abol kebele in Gambella 
woreda; 4. Chibo kebele in Abobo woreda; 5. Thenyi kebele in Abobo woreda; 6. Perbongo-Oma 




levels of the government on the other. We also see a conflict between different 
ministries of the government such as between the EPA on one hand, and the 
MOARD on the other. Although not very visible in the letters, from my discussions 
with the three representatives of these two villages and the NGO officer, I also saw a 
latent conflict between the local Godere woreda administration and the Gambella 
regional state council on one hand, and the federal agency, i.e. the MOARD, on the 
other. Hence, the contemporary large-scale land investment in Ethiopia is not only 
an interesting research topic from an economic or food security perspective but also 
an interesting research topic from a political science or peace studies perspective.  
 
To begin with, from an historical point of view, land policy in Ethiopia in general has 
not been only an economic issue (Crummey, 2000). It has also been a contentious 
political issue around which the rural farmers, arguably the backbone of the 
Ethiopian economy, are mobilized either to support one regime or repel another 
(Dessalegn, 2008). Among the key factors that haemorrhaged the legitimacy of Haile 
Selassie’s regime, particularly among the rural farmers, and eventually precipitated 
his fall, was his land policy, which was characterized by drastic power imbalance 
between the landlords and the peasantry (Crewett et al., 2008).  
 
The military junta, hereafter referred to as the Derg, came to power in 1974 with the 
famous slogan – meret le arashu!, an Amharic translation for ‘land to the tiller!’, 
promising to free and empower the peasants (Cohen and Koehn, 1977). In 
accordance with the slogan of the revolution, the Derg declared all land to be 
“collective property of the Ethiopian people” without any compensation for previous 
holders (Proclamation No. 31/1975). The proclamation also nullified all the tenancy 
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relations that existed before and Peasant Associations (PA) were formed and 
empowered to redistribute rural land and adjudicate conflicts that might arise from 
the implementation of the overall land reform. According to Ottaway, “If one can 
judge the effect of a land reform after less than three years, then the Ethiopian land 
reform must be considered a success” (Ottaway, 1977, p.70).  
 
Although the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the 
current ruling party, radically changed the overall nature of the state – from military 
socialist to federal democratic (at least on a theoretical level) – the new constitution 
of 1994 entrenched Derg’s land policy of  ‘state ownership’, as echoed by Article 
40:3 that read:   
 
The right to ownership of rural land and urban land, as well as of all natural resources is 
exclusively vested in the state and the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property of the 
nations, nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia. 
 
In the early years of the EPRDF, the continuation of the Derg’s land policy of  ‘state 
ownership’ was a source of a heated debate between the government – upholding 
the state ownership policy on one hand – and the opposition – advocating for land 
privatization on the other (Dejene, 1999; Dessalegn, 1992 and 1994). However, 
since this debate was mainly taking place in Addis Ababa among the elites and more 
on a theoretical level, it failed to stimulate any considerable interest among the rural 
farmers, who actually felt comfortable with the continuation of the status quo of the 
Derg (Dessalegn, 2008). Since then, the debate about land tenure policy has been 




However, with the current rising global interest in farmland, and the Ethiopian 
government’s open door policy for those land investors, the debate about land tenure 
policy is back again on the Ethiopian political scene (Dessalegn, 2011). This time 
though, the debate is no longer flowing down only in one direction from the top 
political elites in Addis Ababa in an abstract form to ordinary Ethiopians as it used to 
be in the early 1990s. It is now also gushing upwards from rural farmers, who are 
struggling with practical questions of massive displacement from their lands and 
huge influx of large-scale farmers to their territories, taking over their farmlands, 
ancestral territories and natural resources, as we have seen in the previous story of 
Gumare and Kabu kebeles (Appendix – 1).  
 
As it stands now, Ethiopia is among the top African countries that have leased, and 
are still in the process of leasing out, large amounts of their arable lands to large-
scale investors (World Bank, 2011). According to the Oakland Institute (OI), by 
January 2011 Ethiopia had leased 3.6 million ha of land to 1,349 large-scale 
investors, both domestic and foreign (OI, 2011a, p.20). Likewise, in 2010 the 
Ethiopian government started a villagization programme aiming to relocate 1.5 
million households in lowland regions within three years (Davison, 2010a). In the first 
phase of the programme in the Gambella region, 26,000 households out of the 
planned 45,000 households have already been relocated within the region (Walta 
Information Centre (WIC), 2011b). Although the government claims that its 
villagization programme is not related to its large-scale land investment plans, the 
programme only targets regions that are at the same time also targeted for large-
scale land investment. In my fieldwork, I have also found out from local communities 
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I talked to that they see villagization programmes as an attempt by the government 
to free more land for large-scale investors (FGDs – 1 and 2, 30 and 31 Mar. 2012).   
 
At the moment, although a number of studies have been conducted on the global 
phenomenon of large-scale land acquisition (LSLA), most of them are narrowly 
focused on its economic, food security and environmental aspects (Aabo and Kring, 
2012; Cotula et al., 2009; Friends of the Earth (FoE), 2012). In the Ethiopian case, in 
spite of wide international media coverage, detailed case studies on the on-going 
large-scale land investments remain very limted (BBC News, 2012; Davison, 2010a; 
The Guardian, 2011).    
 
The purpose of this research is to draw attention to what I see as sidelined in the 
global discussion about land transfers; namely, the question of land rights of local 
communities, and particularly in the Ethiopian case to investigate the implications of 
those land transfers for the state-communities power relation. In Ethiopia, since as a 
matter of state policy those investments are directed to lowland regions that are 
predominantly occupied by historically marginalized indigenous communities, I will 
try to study this phenomenon from a minorities and indigenous peoples’ rights 
perspective using the Gambella region, one of the minority regions, as my case 
study. Likewise, in order to study the power dynamics between the Ethiopian state 
and the indigenous communities, this research gives due attention to the ethnic 
federal system in Ethiopia under which the state-communities power relations are 
defined. Stated concisely therefore, this research is about putting the rights of 
landholders – in this case minorities and indigenous communities – at the centre of 
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this debate, and locating the debate in its broader political context, which in the 
Ethiopian case is the ethnic federal arrangement that has been in place since 1994.   
 
 
1.2. Research Scope and Delimitation  
 
In the light of the preceding discussion, the main focus of this research is to explore 
how large-scale land acquisitions are redefining indigenous communities’ rights to 
land and the implications of this redefinition for the ethnic federal system under 
which those rights are articulated. Each of the intersections of these topics – i.e. 
LSLA, indigenous communities’ right to land and federalism – is complex enough to 
deserve independent research in its own right. Hence, researching their intersections 
makes it even more challenging unless the study is narrowed down and its scope is 
clearly delimited. The following figure shows the area of intersection with which this 

















As it is illustrated in this figure, LSLA in Ethiopia interacts with the state as shown in 
area 1, with communities in area 2, and with the state-communities relationship in 
area 3. So far, most of the global studies about LSLA are inclined towards either its 
relationship with the state in general (Area 1) in terms of macroeconomic growth or 
to the communities (Area 2) in terms of its direct impact on local food security and 
environment (Aabo and Kring, 2012; Cotula et al., 2009; FoE, 2012).   In Ethiopia 
and also globally less attention has been given to how LSLA is impacting the existing 
state-communities relationships (Area 3). The fundamental interest of this research 
lies in this under-researched area 3. Although other areas will be touched upon, the 
major objective of this research is to investigate the impacts of LSLA on state-
communities relationship – i.e. area 3. To this end, the research will attempt to 














1.3. Research Questions  
 
Throughout this thesis, the underlying key research question that guides the course 
of this study is:  
 Is the contemporary phenomenon of large-scale land acquisitions in Ethiopia 
redefining indigenous communities’ right to land and what are the implications 
of this redefinition for the ethnic federal system? 
 
Subsidiary questions that this research will try to answer in the course of answering 
the above-mentioned key research question include:  
 How is the right to self-determination implemented in the Gambella region? 
 What are the modalities of large-scale land acquisitions vis-à-vis the 
indigenous communities of Gambella? 
 What are the benefits of large-scale land acquisitions for the indigenous 
communities of Gambella? 
 What are the negative impacts of large-scale land acquisitions on the 
indigenous communities of Gambella? 
 
 
1.4. Hypothesis  
 
This thesis is of the hypothesis that LSLA is not politically neutral. In one way or 
another, it carries the potential to entrench or shift the political power in favour of one 
or the other group/class. Particularly in countries like Ethiopia where rural land has 
been historically used as a political tool to control the rural mass, LSLA can enhance 
the dominance of the ruling class at the expense of the already marginalized groups.  
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Hence, I hypothesize that LSLA is not only challenging the indigenous peoples’ right 
to land, territory and natural resources, but it is also threatening the post-1991 social 
contract (i.e. ethnic federalism) between the envisaged new Ethiopian state and its 




1.5. Research Structure  
 
This thesis is organized into eleven chapters. The introductory chapter attempts to 
clarify the research problem that is to be investigated and delimits the scope of the 
research. Against this background, the chapter then articulates the overarching 
research question and proposes a working hypothesis. The second chapter 
discusses the methodological issues involved in this thesis. The major part of the 
chapter thoroughly discusses the research methods that have been used to generate 
data for this research and the theories that have informed the selection of those 
methods.  
 
Chapters three and four locate the research into its theoretical and country context. 
In Chapter three, I have tried to review the literature and provide working definitions 
for the recurring key concepts such as ‘Large-Scale Land Acquisitions (LSLA)’, 
‘Indigenous Peoples’, and ‘Federalism’. In Chapter four, the history of land and 
politics in Ethiopia is discussed. For the sake of analysis, the discussions are 
organized under the ‘Imperial’, the ‘Derg’ and current ‘EPRDF’ regimes. Since this 
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thesis mainly focusses on the current regime, an extended discussion is provided 
under the EPRDF regime.  
 
Against this background, the next five chapters (five to nine) take the discussion to 
the specific case of the Gambella regional state. In Chapter five, as a way of 
introduction, the place of Gambella region in Ethiopia is discussed. This includes the 
background of the region, its peoples, incorporation into the Ethiopian empire at the 
beginning of the 20th century and recognition as an autonomous regional state in the 
post-1991 Ethiopia. Likewise, since this thesis focuses on natural resources, a brief 
background to resource-induced conflicts in the region is also provided in this 
chapter.  
 
Chapter six examines the implementation of the right to self-determination in the 
Gambella region. After thorough discussion of the socio-cultural, political and 
economic aspects of the right to self-determination, this chapter argues that the 
denial of economic self-determination seems to be more pronounced in the 
Gambella region and other minority regions. That is why this thesis focuses on one 
aspect of economic self-determination – i.e. the management of a group’s resources 
(in this case land) in the interests of the group.   
 
In Chapter seven, large-scale land acquisition in the Gambella region is discussed. 
The chapter discusses in detail the actual process of land acquisitions in the 
Gambella region; provides critical analysis of land lease agreements; and discusses 
the estimated actual land leased out to investors and the composition of investors in 




Chapter eight critically reviews the Ethiopian government’s repeatedly claimed and 
cited benefits of LSLAs such as ‘food security’, ‘employment opportunities’, 
‘technological transfer’, and ‘increase of tax revenues for local governments’. Then 
Chapter nine discusses negative impacts of LSLA on the indigenous communities 
such as the ‘villagization programme/forced relocation’, ‘environmental, social and 
cultural impacts’, ‘escalation of ethnic conflicts over diminishing land and water 
resources’ and ‘marginalization of rural women in access to land’.  
 
Finally, the last two chapters (ten and eleven) provide comprehensive answer to the 
overarching research question and conclude the thesis. In Chapter ten, I will provide 
an answer to the key research question namely: is the contemporary phenomenon of 
large-scale land acquisitions in Ethiopia redefining indigenous communities’ right to 
land and what are the implications of this redefinition for the ethnic federal system? 
After answering this key research question, in Chapter eleven, I will provide the 
general conclusion and suggest future research questions that I am not able to 











Given the interdisciplinary nature of this research and the dispersal of data across 
different sources, the best approach, in my view, that can generate inclusive data 
and ensure comprehensive analysis is to use multiple theories and data collection 
methods. Methodologically, this approach is known as ‘triangulation’ (Denzin, 1970; 
Kimchi, et al., 1991). In its original meaning, the triangulation metaphor used in 
social science research was derived from navigation and construction that use 
multiple reference points to locate an object’s exact position (Smith, 1975). 
According to the basic geometrical principle, multiple viewpoints provide greater 
accuracy (Denzin, 1970). Hence, the intention in using triangulation in social science 
research is to use two or more aspects of research to strengthen the design and 
increase the ability to interpret the findings (Campbell and Fiske, 1959; Polit and 
Hungler, 1995). Broadly speaking, therefore, in social science research, triangulation 
is defined as the combination of two or more theoretical perspectives, methodologies 
or data sources within the same study (Denzin, 1970; Kimchi, et al., 1991).  These 
combinations could result in theoretical triangulation, methodological triangulation or 
data triangulation. In cases when more than one type of triangulation is used, for 
instance two or more theories along with two or more methods, the resulting complex 
triangulation is referred to as multiple-triangulation (Denzin, 1970; Polit and 











this research could be referred to as multiple-triangulation, as shown in Figure 2,  
since more than two theories (theoretical triangulation), methods (methodological 
triangulation) and data sources (data triangulation) have been used to generate and 
analyse data for this research.  
 











2.2. Theoretical Triangulation 
 
As discussed earlier in the introduction chapter, this research looks at the 
intersection of three different themes that are mostly studied under different 
theories/disciplines. Hence, in order to comprehensively capture those themes, this 
study interrogates the overarching research question from three theoretical 
perspectives namely, (1) ‘critical agrarian political economy’, (2) ‘political ecology’ 




2.2.1. Critical Agrarian Political Economy  
 
According to Bernstein and Byres, ‘agrarian political economy’ in general 
investigates “the social relations and dynamics of production and reproduction, 
property and power in agrarian formations and their processes of change, both 
historical and contemporary” (Bernstein and Byres, 2001, p.1).  Historically, this 
theory has been applied to studying the interactions and impacts of the capitalist 
mode of production on small-scale farming. The underlying questions that agrarian 
political economists grapple with – as succinctly summarised by Bernstein – include, 
among others, “Who owns what? Who does what? Who gets what? What do they do 
with it?” (Bernstein, 1992, p.24). In addition to these fundamental questions, 
contemporary critical agrarian political economists include other dimensions that 
were relatively neglected in the classical agrarian political economy such as gender 
dynamics, ethnicity, livelihoods diversity, rural urban links and mobility issues (White 
and Dasgupta, 2010).  As such, this theoretical framework has been applied in this 
research to formulate questions pertinent to the influx of large-scale land investors to 
rural areas of Gambella and their interaction with small-scale indigenous farmers. 
The framework has also been useful in the analysis of the Ethiopian LSLAs’ legal 
and policy framework pertaining to how it accommodates or impedes the respective 
interests of investors and small-scale farmers.  
 
 
2.2.2. Political Ecology  
 
Political ecology as a research field studies the complex interaction between the 
environment, politics, economics, technology and social traditions (Bryant and 
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Bailey, 1997). As such, it also looks into diverse topics such as environmental 
conflicts, marginalization, environmental degradation and conservation, 
environmental identities and social movements (Robbins, 2004). Most important to 
this thesis, in its study of environmental issues and natural resources, ‘political 
ecology’ reiterates the importance of understanding the pre-existing economic and 
political power relationships among stakeholders (Raleigh, 2010). As such, it 
grounds the study of natural resources and environmental changes in their wider 
political and economic contexts (Turner, 2004).  
 
Despite the multiple definitions and understandings of political ecology, Bryant and 
Bailey (1997) have developed three fundamental assumptions that define its core 
principles. Firstly, political ecology argues that environmental changes do not affect 
society in a homogenous manner. In other words, the benefits and costs 
accompanying environmental changes are not distributed equally among society. 
Secondly, political ecology maintains that this unequal distribution of costs and 
benefits associated with environmental changes inevitably either reinforces or 
reduces the existing economic and social inequalities. In the words of Bryant and 
Bailey, “any change in environmental conditions must affect the political and 
economic status quo” (Bryant and Bailey, 1997, p.28).  Finally, political ecology 
concludes that these uneven distributions of benefits and costs and the reduction or 
reinforcement of pre-existing disparities carry political implications as a result of the 
new power relationships (Bryant and Bailey, 1997).  
 
Against these three fundamental assumptions, political ecology framework has 
provided a very useful insight into the understanding of the new power structures 
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and relationships brought about by LSLAs. These new power dynamics are analysed 
between various levels of government (federal, regional, zonal, woreda and kebele); 
different ethnic groups (indigenous vs. highlanders; indigenous vs. indigenous; one 
clan vs. another clan); indigenous communities and local authorities; local authorities 
and investors, etc. All in all, the political ecology framework has been mainly used in 
this research to collect and analyse data pertinent to environmental degradation, 
environmental conflicts, marginalization and indigenous communities’ right to land.   
 
 
2.2.3. Political Science  
 
Political science is a very broad discipline with multiple branches, which makes it 
difficult to define in one sentence. The American Political Science Association 
(APSA) defined political science as “the study of governments, public policies and 
political processes, systems, and political behaviour” (APSA, www.apsanet.org, 
2013). Depending on which sub-field one is interested in, political science raises 
fundamental questions with regard to political theories, political philosophy, political 
ideology, political economy, international relations, comparative politics and political 
systems (Heywood, 2007; Roskin et al., 2007). Since part of this research deals with 
the Ethiopian federal system vis-à-vis indigenous peoples’ rights, the political 
science framework has guided the formulation of research questions and analysis of 
data relating to the implementation of right to self-determination, power sharing and 




2.3. Methodological Triangulation  
 
Research designs that apply more than one method are sometimes called multi-
strategy designs, mixed methods, multi-methods, or methodological triangulation 
(Risjord et al., 2002; Robson, 2011). In this research, I have used multiple primary 
data collection methods such as interviews, focus groups discussions and 
observation. Likewise, I have also used multiple secondary data collection methods 
such as legal and policy documents, governmental and non-governmental reports 
and various print/digital media sources. Hence, since more than one data collection 
method has been used for this research, the research design could be referred to as 
‘methodological triangulation’. In the following sections, I will elaborate on how I have 





The interviews for this research involve 44 people from Addis Ababa, Gambella 
town, and four woredas in the Gambella region namely Abobo, Godere, Gog and 
Itang. This number does not include focus group discussions which will be discussed 
in the next section. The actual field research took place in Ethiopia, from 13 March 
2012 until 26 May 2012. After leaving Ethiopia, I continued interviews for more 
clarification mainly through telephone and Skype contacts I collected whilst there.   
 
Before I began my field research, I proposed three categories of people whom I 
should interview. These are government employees (both elected officials and civil 
servants), independents (NGOs workers, experts/academics, pensioners and others) 
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and business people (mainly large-scale farm managers and officials). In order to 
balance gender and ethnic compositions, I broke down these categories according to 
sex and ethnic backgrounds. However, at the end, most of my respondents turned 
out to be men for the practical reason that they happened to be the ones occupying 
most of the relevant positions for my research. The following table shows the 
distribution of my respondents across ethnic and professional categories. For the 
sake of simplicity I reframed the ethnic background into general categories of 
‘indigenous’, ‘highlanders’ and ‘foreigners’.7   
 
Table 1: Composition of interviewees 
Interview 
Categories 
Indigenous Highlanders Foreigners Total 
M F M F M F  
Government 
(GOV) 
11 2 4 - - - 17 
Independent 
(IND) 
11 4 3 - - - 18 
Business  
(BSS) 
2 - 6 - 1 - 9 
Total 24 6 13 - 1 - 44 
 
In this thesis, interviews are referenced according to the above-mentioned 
categories followed by the date in which that interview took place. For example 
(Interview-1GOV, 15 Mar. 2012) refers to the first government employee interviewed 
on 15 March 2012. The same procedure is applied to other categories. 
                                                          
7
 ‘Indigenous’ for the five ethnic groups of Gambella, ‘highlanders’ for all other Ethiopian ethnic groups 




Another issue related to the background of the interviewees is the medium of 
communication through which those interviews were conducted. Luckily enough, I 
did not use any translation in the above categories. For highlanders and indigenous 
Majang people I used Amharic; most of the Nuer indigenous ethnic group preferred 
English; and for the Anywa ethnic group I just used the Anywa language, which is my 
mother tongue. The following figure shows the usages of these three languages 
during my fieldwork.   
 
Figure 3: Language usages during fieldwork 
 
 
Most of the interviews for this research could be characterised as open-ended, 
where respondents were asked about their opinions on pre-determined themes. In 
certain cases, I prepared fixed sets of questions to get straightforward answers from 
the respondents. However, in most cases I used general interview guides (Appendix 
– 5). Any time before I go to interview somebody, I review and adapt my interview 
guide to match the expertise of my respondent. In some cases, I only made slight 




changes, especially when interviewing people from a similar professional category. 
As I gained more knowledge from those interviews, I also obtained new questions 
that I later on added to the interview guide for the next respondents. 
 
The interviews proved to be a crucial source of information in terms of examining the 
actual process of land investments and the challenges surrounding indigenous 
communities’ right to land. The interviews also served to investigate the 
implementation of some provisions in the land lease agreements and the claimed 
benefits and negative impacts of LSLAs. Concerning federalism, the interviews 
provided crucial information related to de facto functioning of ethnic federalism. 
Since people from different backgrounds and political orientations were interviewed 
for this research, there were conflicting opinions expressed on certain issues and 
events. Under those circumstances I had to look for independent sources in order to 
determine what might be closer to the reality. The interviews are used both directly 
as quotes and indirectly as references throughout this thesis, depending on their 
relevance to the topics being discussed under different sections.  
 
 
2.3.2. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
 
For this research I have conducted nine focus group discussions in nine villages 
across five woredas, namely Abobo, Gambella, Godere, Gog and Itang. These focus 
group discussions were planned for an average of three to four persons. In most 
cases I tried to have a combination of a village’s chairman, an elder and a village’s 
women representative. The following table shows the number and gender balance of 





Table 2: Focus Group Discussions (FGD) 
 Abobo  Gambella Godere Gog Itang Total 
Men  6 4 3 3 2 18 
Women 3 2 - 3 1 9 
Total 9 6 3 6 3 27 
 
Focus group discussions are referenced in this thesis in two ways. First, when 
referring to a general story or argument reflected by all members of a FGD, I simply 
refer to the number of that FGD and the date on which it was conducted (e.g. FGD – 
1, 30 Mar. 2012). Secondly, when quoting or referring to a statement made by a 
particular FGD participant, another number for the specific participant is added (e.g. 
FGD – 1 – P1, 30 Mar. 2012).  
 
Generally, the FGDs provided vital information in the areas of assessing the claimed 
benefits and negative impacts of LSLAs and local knowledge and traditions 
surrounding the environment. They also provided comprehensive and coherent 
information about the planning and implementation of the ‘villagization’ programme; 
local consultation; informal relations between large-scale investors and small-scale 





2.3.3. Observation  
 
It was not in my original research plan to use observation in my field research. 
However, unexpectedly, it became a useful source of information. The time I was in 
the Gambella region was the hottest season of the year with the temperature going 
up to 480C at mid-day. Normally, during this season, government workers – including 
NGOs’ staff – have a longer lunch break from 11am till 4pm. During these long lunch 
breaks people would be sitting under mango trees close to the Baro River talking 
about all manner of issues while cooling themselves. A few times I also went to 
these places during those hours of the day to get cool air without any intention of 
data collection for my research. However, it happened that most of the discussions 
taking place in those places were very relevant for my research. So I started taking 
notes without asking any questions. In a few cases I only asked for clarifications on 
certain issues. Hence, I took this as observation since I was only listening to informal 
discussions that were initiated and led by the discussants themselves.  
 
 
2.3.4. Legal and Policy Documents  
 
Despite being a poor and technologically underdeveloped country, most of Ethiopia’s 
legal and policy documents are available online.8 This made my work far easier and 
quick since I did not have to go to every ministry to collect those documents. It was 
only in the cases of land laws of regional states that I had to look for them at different 
locations.  
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Legal and policy documents have been extensively used in this thesis since they 
present and represent the official position of the government and, in fact, the overall 
organization of the state in the case of the federal constitution. As such, most of 
them have been used as a foundation to evaluate the implementation of ethnic 
federalism in general and minority/indigenous peoples’ rights to land in particular. 
This is also true of legal documents pertinent to land investment in Ethiopia, which 
have also been used as a basis to examine whether Ethiopia has developed a robust 
legal framework for land investments and what recognition it has accorded to 
indigenous peoples’ rights.  
 
 
2.3.5. Governmental and Non-governmental Documents  
 
Periodic reports and project proposals of various government departments, NGOs 
and UN agencies were also used as sources of information for this research. 
Especially in areas where facts and figures are needed, this research has directly 
quoted or made reference to such kinds of reports and documents. However, since 
in some cases there are considerable inconsistencies or even contradictions 
between different reports, caution had been taken in the ways in which those reports 
and proposals are quoted or used as references. In situations where there are 
considerable inconsistencies or contradictions between two reports (e.g. local 
government’s report and local NGO’s report), I have tried to cross-examine such 
information from independent sources like the UN agencies or other international 
NGOs. However, one of the problems in Ethiopia is that, while most of the UN 
agencies’ reports are based on local governments’ data, international NGOs’ reports 
are mainly based on data obtained from their local partner NGOs. Hence, a 
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difference between reports from a local government and a local NGO can also reflect 
itself in national reports of UN agencies and international NGOs.  
 
Something worth noting here is the enactment of the ‘Charities and Societies 
Proclamation 621/2009’, which severely restricted the activities of NGOs in the 
country. According to this proclamation, NGOs that receive more than 10% of their 
income from sources outside Ethiopia are automatically banned from doing any work 
in the areas of human and democratic rights, conflict resolution and reconciliation 
and other advocacy-related activities (FDRE-Charities and Societies Proclamation 
621/2009)9. Hence, as a consequence of this law, many NGOs that used to be active 
in these areas were closed by the government (Tiwana, 2008). As such, in this thesis 
when it comes to human rights and general advocacy issues I depended a lot on 
international human rights organizations since there are no local human rights 
organizations working in this area due to this latest law.  
 
 
2.3.6. Media Reports  
 
In Ethiopia media freedom is very much restricted. There is no independent radio 
station or television channel. All are controlled by the government. Although the 
government claims that there is press freedom in the country because of the 
                                                          
9 The Proclamation creates three categories of charities and societies. These are: (1) Ethiopian 
Charities or Societies (Article, 2:2); (2) Ethiopian Residents Charities or Societies (Article 2:3); and, 
(3) Foreign Charities or Societies (Article 2:4). Only Ethiopian Charities or Societies – i.e. those 
groups that receive less than 10% of their income from foreign sources – are allowed to work on: (a) 
advancement of human and democratic rights, (b) promotion of equality of nations, nationalities, 
peoples, gender and religion, (c) promotion of the rights of the disabled and children, (d) promotion of 
conflict resolution or reconciliation and, (e) promotion of the efficiency of justice and law enforcement 
services (Article 14:5). Other types of charities and societies are relegated to undertaking only service 
delivery activities (for more on this see, FDRE-Charities and Societies Proclamation 621/2009).  
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existence of independent newspapers, many argue that the recently enacted 
‘Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation 590/2008’ and 
‘Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 652/2009’ have made the situation worse for the limited 
number of independent newspapers in the country. At the time I was conducting this 
research, 18 prominent journalists, bloggers and opposition figures were imprisoned 
on charges of terrorism and high treason and by the time I was writing this chapter 
(July 2012) they were given sentences by the Federal High Court ranging from 18 
years to life imprisonment (WIC, 2012a).   
 
Against this context, it will not be surprising that most of my media sources are 
mainly Ethiopian government media sources and various international media outlets. 
The government-controlled media provided vital information with regard to the 
government’s position on issues I was researching. Especially with regard to LSLAs 
and ‘villagization programmes’, many high level officials had been interviewed and 
expressed the position of their government on these particular issues. Similarly, 
some of the CEOs of those large-scale commercial farms in the Gambella had also 
been interviewed in the local media and expressed their opinions on various critical 
issues to this research. Globally, there have been lots of discussions on LSLAs in 
various international media outlets.  
 
Therefore, media reports helped me to access a wide range of information in a short 
period of time and also gave me access to high-level government officials, investors 
and international experts on LSLAs. Similarly, I have also used some media reports 
about similar events in other countries to compare and contrast the Ethiopian 
experience with that of other countries.  
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2.4. Data Triangulation  
 
 
Over the last decade, the responsibility of LSLA has been shifting not only from one 
level of the government to another but also from one department of the government 
to other departments, agencies or ministries. In the Gambella region, for example, 
LSLA used to be processed at the woreda council level then it was moved to the 
regional investment agency and it is currently the responsibility of the federal Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development. As such, data pertinent to LSLA is dispersed 
among different levels of government and departments. Moreover, since at the 
moment the responsibility of LSLA is divided between the regional and federal 
governments10, data about LSLA too is split between these two government levels. 
As such, when it comes to figures about the number of large-scale land investors, 
amount of land leased out, land contractual agreements and related information, I 
had to consult different data sources/databases. In some cases, I tried to cross-
check different government departments’ records with those of investors themselves. 
For example, I prepared some questionnaires to find out and cross-check the 
number of investors in five woredas (Abobo, Gambella, Gog, Godere and Itang) in 
the Gambella region, the size of land they have acquired, the lease period, the type 
of crop they plan to grow and the amount of land rental fees per hectare per year 
they are charged (Appendix – 3). 
 
Similarly, in order to find out the number of job opportunities created by large-scale 
land investors and the beneficiaries of those job opportunities, I used different data 
sources such as the investors themselves, farm employees and woreda 
                                                          
10
 According to the current LSLA policy, any land lease beyond 5,000 hectares is processed at the 
federal government level while anything below that threshold is left to the regional government.  
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governments’ tax income records. For instance, I designed a questionnaire on the 
number of job opportunities these investments have created, proportion of 
‘highlanders’ and ‘indigenous’ employees, the nature of jobs created (permanent or 
contract), average salary for different levels of jobs, what portion of their land leases 
they have operationalized and how much they were able to produce during the last 
harvest season (Appendix – 4). The same questionnaires were also presented to 
some farm employees to confirm the validity/accuracy of the responses obtained 
from investors.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned questionnaires, I also designed very specific 
questionnaires on certain topics such as the prices and sources of food commodities 
in the Gambella region in order to see the impact of LSLA on the regional food 
market. Likewise, I also prepared a questionnaire on the contribution of LSLA to 
respective woreda governments’ tax income.  
 
In short, although the use of quantitative methods remained very limited in my 
research, the cross-checking of the responses from different data sources provided 
essential information that either complemented my qualitative findings or raised 
further questions that merited further investigation.  
 
 
2.5. Fieldwork Constraints and Mitigating factors  
 
The security situation was the major constraint for me during my fieldwork. Although 
Gambella had enjoyed relative stability since 2007, by the time I was conducting my 
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field research, the security situation had deteriorated dramatically as a consequence 
of back and forth attacks between different bandits/rebel groups and the army.  
 
To demonstrate the deterioration of the security situation: in January 2012, the 
military shot dead two daily labourers from the indigenous Anywa community who 
were working on one large-scale farm close to Ilea village. These two young men 
were arguing with their supervisor over payment. When the supervisor called the 
military to take them away, they refused to leave, demanding payment of their 
wages. Then the military shot them both dead (FGD – 8 – P3, 10 Apr. 2012). On 16 
February 2012, unknown gunmen killed two policemen between Gambella town and 
Abobo woreda. In retaliation the military forces killed two indigenous Anywa people 
in Okuna village and arrested others whom they said were relatives of the suspects 
(FGD – 1, 30 Mar. 2012). So the tensions were already high before I went to Ethiopia 
for my field research. The day I arrived in Addis Ababa (12 March 2012) unknown 
gunmen attacked a public bus travelling from Godere to Gambella and killed 19 
passengers – all of them highlanders (WIC, 2012b). This incident escalated the 
tensions between the indigenous Anywa ethnic group and the highlanders in 
Gambella to a different level.  
 
Despite the deteriorating security situation, my local knowledge and contacts helped 
me to conduct my research without much interference. Although I had to change 
some villages that I originally planned to visit, because of my good knowledge of the 
area I was able to adjust my research plan as quickly as possible according to the 
changing circumstances. Luckily, by the time I was conducting my fieldwork, the 
mobile telephone network had already been expanded to all woredas in the 
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Gambella region, including to most of the villages that were in my research target. 
This made my work a lot easier and faster, especially in terms of security, as I was 
able to get security updates before travelling to my research sites and on my way 
back to Gambella town. Similarly, the fact that almost all officials from the regional to 
woreda government levels have mobile telephones made my work a lot faster than I 
originally anticipated.  
 
Most importantly, the fact that I had arranged my own means of transportation made 
my fieldwork much easier and faster. In Addis Ababa I had rented a vehicle for the 
whole period of my stay there and used it to see different ministries, individuals and 
research institutes. This saved me lots of time since I did not have to wait for public 
transport, and gave me lots of flexibility to meet my respondents wherever was 
convenient for them at any time.  
 
In the Gambella region, I also rented a four-wheel drive car for the whole period of 
my stay in the region. The benefit of having my own means of transportation within 
the region proved essential particularly under the above-mentioned security 
conditions. This again gave me flexibility to visit villages I needed for my research at 
any time and to adjust to the security conditions as quickly as possible. In terms of 
accessibility, since the time I was conducting my research was dry season, all 
villages were accessible by car. Furthermore, having my own means of 
transportation also helped me to feel secure since I knew that I could leave the 




Therefore, despite the security challenges, my local knowledge and networks in the 
region, the expanding mobile telephone network and having my own means of 
transportation both in Addis Ababa and in the Gambella region mitigated those risks 




Chapter Three: Conceptualizing Large-Scale Land 
Acquisition, Indigenous Peoples and Federalism in 
the Global Context  
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter attempts to conceptualize the three keywords that this research is 
interrogating by reviewing the existing literature, revisiting the basic debates and 
providing working definitions for them as they are applied in this thesis. These 
keywords are ‘Large-Scale Land Aquisition’, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ and ‘Federalism’. 
They are chosen since they constitute the major building blocks of the research 
question identified earlier in Chapter one. Each of them is discussed in turn in the 
subsequent sections.  
 
 
3.2. Large-Scale Land Acquisition (LSLA)  
 
The emerging trend of long-term land deals in Africa and other developing countries 
has recently drawn much attention from both practitioners and scholars of diverse 
disciplines. By the actors and proponents, the trend is called a ‘development 
opportunity’ (e.g. Collier, 2008; MOARD, 2009b). However, the critics refer to it as 
‘land grabbing’ (GRAIN, 2008; OI, 2011a). Due to the fact that the major land 
grabbers are foreign companies aiming at securing the food and fuel needs of their 
own countries, this has also led some to label this trend as ‘neo-colonialism’ (Hall, 
2011a; On the Commons, 2011). Others use a more cautious, neutral term: ‘large-
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scale land acquisition’ (Imeru, 2010; Mathieu, 2009; World Bank, 2011). Whatever 
the prevailing terminology used, there is at the moment ample evidence that vast 
swathes of Africa’s farmland are being sold or leased to large-scale investors, with 
more land waiting in national land banks for investors (ILC, 2012; Pears, 2012).  
 
Historically speaking, farmland acquisitions by transnational corporations are not a 
completely new development. Throughout the 20th century, as agricultural production 
became increasingly industrialized, small farmers were either driven out of their 
farms or forced into corporate farming where they become a class of workers within 
plantations (Stone, 2001). However, several factors distinguish the current 
phenomenon from the previous farmland acquisitions that have taken place 
elsewhere around the world. 
 
In the first place, while this practice had largely been confined within the private 
sector domain in the past (i.e., private investor buying land from private owner), the 
majority of the new land deals are government to government/government-affiliated 
bodies. Most of the major buyers or leaseholders are foreign governments’ affiliated 
enterprises and the sellers are host governments dispensing land they ostensibly 
own (GRAIN, 2008). Secondly, unlike the former large-scale farmland transactions, 
which were centred around cash crops production (e.g. tea, sugar, coffee, bananas, 
etc.), the current phenomenon mostly focuses on the production of staple food and 
biofuel crops such as, maize, rice, wheat, etc. (Ghosh, Interview with NewsClick, 13 
Sept. 2011). Finally, another noticeable difference is the enormous size of the land 





These major differences are reflections of the new drivers of the contemporary 
LSLA. Hence, for a better understanding of the current LSLA, it is essential to briefly 
discuss the major drivers behind them.   
 
 
3.2.1. Drivers of the Contemporary LSLA  
 
According to GRAIN’s (2008) report11, which for the first time brought attention to the 
mounting global trend of ‘land-grabbing’, two big global crises triggered this new 
phenomenon. The first one is the 2007/2008 international food crisis and the second 
one is the global financial meltdown that surged around the same time. 
 
As well as exacerbating the vulnerability of poor countries, the 2007/2008 food crisis 
also raised the spectre of food insecurity among those that hitherto had relied on and 
felt secure with the global food market (Bending and Wilson, 2012). In response to 
the food price hikes of 2007/2008, some of the major food exporting countries 
withheld their exports. This in turn set off the alarm for food-import-dependent 
countries regarding their vulnerability and the unreliability of the global food market. 
Thus, the issue of food security became a top policy agenda not only for the poor 
countries but also for the capital rich countries that have limited agricultural potential 
(Fisher and Mahendra, 2011). As a long-term food security policy strategy, those 
capital rich countries decided to outsource their domestic food production through 
acquisition of farmland overseas. They saw this as an innovative and reliable long-
                                                          
11
 GRAIN is an international non-profit organization that works to support small farmers and social 




term food security strategy that could feed their people at a good price and with far 
greater security than before (Cotula et al., 2009). Some of these countries include 
China, India, Japan, Malaysia and South Korea in Asia; Egypt and Libya in Africa; 
and Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in 
the Middle East (GRAIN, 2008). 
 
While food security has emerged as one of the key drivers of the contemporary 
farmland acquisitions, expectation of high financial return from agricultural 
investment has also been playing a prominent role (Gelder and Spaargaren, 2011). 
Taking into account the rising agricultural commodity prices, acquisition of farmlands 
either for food or biofuel production appears to be an increasingly lucrative 
investment option. As a consequence of the current financial crisis, all kinds of 
players in the finance industry – private equity funds, investment houses that 
manage workers’ pensions, hedge funds – have turned to land as a new source of 
profit (Weingärtner, 2010). In the past, direct agricultural production or owning land 
as such has not been an ideal investment area for a lot of these financial firms 
because of a variety of economic and political constraints attached to land (Cotula et 
al., 2009). However, the combined effect of both the food and financial crises 
occurring at around the same time has transformed agricultural land into a new 
global strategic asset. While food prices around the world have been rising 
tremendously, land prices in developing countries are being made available very 
cheaply – if not for free – to attract investors (Daniel and Mittal, 2010). Therefore, in 
addition to food security concerns, the contemporary large-scale land acquisitions 





Indeed, the above factors alone cannot fully explain the current LSLAs without 
factoring in the cooperation of the host countries. In developing countries, particularly 
in Africa, there is a renewed interest in agriculture as a source of growth, 
employment, and poverty reduction (World Economic Forum, 2012). As such, foreign 
investment is believed to break the overall vicious cycle of poverty that exists in 
these countries, by introducing new technology, infrastructure development, 
employment opportunities, and food to local markets (Congressi and Kennedy, 2009; 
World Bank, 2011). In oil-producing countries like Sudan and Angola, governments 
are explicitly promoting diversification of their oil-dependent economy to other 
sectors such as agriculture (Cotula et al., 2009). Therefore, many developing 
countries have been going through policy reforms to improve conditions for foreign 
investors by simplifying or eliminating restrictions on foreigners’ acquisition of land 
and easing the administrative processes involved (World Bank, 2009). Hence, the 
contemporary LSLAs are not only driven by the rich countries’ food security and 
financial return needs, but there is also a perceived reciprocal gain from the host 
nations’ perspective in terms of both food security and economic growth.  
 
This being said, there are no comprehensive evidence-based studies yet to either 
support or dispel this win-win argument. The available literature on the contemporary 
LSLAs continues to be characterised by extreme polarisation. The following section 
looks at these competing claims about LSLAs and pinpoints where this thesis aims 




3.2.2. Competing Claims about LSLA  
 
Despite the wide recognition that something distinctive is going on at the moment, 
i.e. global rush for farmland deals, there is no consensus yet on its impacts and 
implications for the stakeholders involved. Different groups view this phenomenon 
differently, from absolute opposition to eager embrace, with some grey positions in 
between (GRAIN, 2008; MOARD, 2009b; World Bank, 2011).  
 
So far, the debate has been largely dominated by human rights and environmental 
activist organizations who have stressed the exploitative nature of those land deals 
and their negative impacts on local/indigenous communities. The earliest reports 
about a significant rise in transnational commercial land deals emerged from 
organizations such as the Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN) and 
GRAIN (2008), which both identify themselves as advocacy organizations on behalf 
of small-scale farmers in developing countries. Other NGOs followed in their wake, 
including well-known international media outlets, which also offered additional critical 
accounts of this phenomenon (BBC News, 2009; Blas, 2008; Cotula et al., 2008). 
Regardless of some differences in those initial reports, they more or less all 
conveyed a similar message: that “If left unchecked, this global land grab could spell 
the end of small-scale farming, and rural livelihoods, in numerous places around the 
world” (GRAIN, 2008, p.1).  
 
After those initial reports, some reconciliatory reports emerged from global research 
institutes and concerned international organizations. In May 2009, the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), a Washington D.C.-based research institute, 
issued a statement claiming that, since 2006, 15-20 million ha of farmland in 
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developing countries had been sold or leased to foreign entities (Braun and 
Meinzen-Dick, 2009). This was followed by another report, from the International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), a London based research 
organization, which claimed that about 2.4 million ha of land had already been 
leased or sold to foreign investors by African governments (Cotula, et al., 2009). 
Despite their concerns regarding the speed of those deals and the limited 
institutional capacity of the host countries, those reports recognize potential 
opportunities in those LSLAs that could benefit the host countries and their 
populations.  
 
Along the same line of argument, the World Bank (2009) and the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2009) have published reports and 
statements arguing that, with a responsible participatory decision-making process, 
the risks and costs assumed to be inherent in LSLAs could be reduced and therefore 
lead to win-win agricultural investments for both the investors and the host countries.  
 
Apart from the question of whether or not those land investments will benefit the host 
communities, Borras and Franco have diverted the debate to what they see as the 
“broader view of the politics of global land grab” (Borras and Franco, 2010, p.1). The 
impact of the contemporary land grabbing, they argue, is to bring about radical 
transformations in land property relations favouring the (re)concentration of power 
and wealth in the hands of the dominant classes, especially corporate entities, 
capitalists, state bureaucrats, landed groups and village chiefs (Borras and Franco, 
2010). Following the same line of thought, Hall (2011b) argues that the most likely 
scenario of the current LSLAs is towards what she calls the ‘South Africanization’ of 
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agrarian structures where large estates exist side by side with a host of 
impoverished small farms that are struggling to survive in their shadow (Dessalegn, 
2011).    
 
All in all, the existing literature on LSLA – except for the works of the likes of Borras, 
Franco and Hall – seems to be, to a larger extent, economic centric. Questions about 
land rights and political implications of LSLA for local communities seem to be 
overlooked to a greater extent. The line of inquiry pursued in this thesis is to take 
back the debate about LSLA from economic and environmental implications to the 
basic question about the land rights of the indigenous communities inhabiting those 
lands and the implications of this trend towards state-communities power relations.  
 
 
3.3. Indigenous Peoples  
 
3.3.1. Who are Indigenous Peoples?  
 
Under international law, one of the problematic questions concerning indigenous 
peoples is ‘who are they?’  Although several proposals for defining indigenous 
peoples have been put forward by various legal experts, there is not yet a universally 
accepted legal definition. Nonetheless, the definition proposed by Martínez-Cobo – 
the UN special rapporteur for the study of discrimination against indigenous peoples 
– is usually accepted as authoritative and is being widely used by many legal experts 




Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity 
with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider 
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or 
parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to 
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic 
identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own 
cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems (Martinez-Cobo, 1983, p.8). 
 
This definition stresses the fact that indigenous communities consider themselves to 
be distinct ‘people’ from the rest of the societies with whom they share their present 
territorial states. Although they historically own those territories, indigenous peoples 
are now in non-dominant positions in those states. The definition also emphasizes 
that indigenous peoples are determined to transmit their ancestral territories, ethnic 
identity and pre-colonial social institutions to their future generations. Hence, 
according to Gilbert (2006), indigenous peoples are those who used to inhabit, 
continue to inhabit, and wish to keep their strong attachment to, a defined territory.  
 
This territorial attachment is one of the crucial elements of the ‘indigenousness’ of 
any group and it is a key issue of concern in the protection of indigenous peoples 
under international law (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rrights 
(OHCHR), 2000). For instance, the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Convention 169 accentuates that indigenous peoples are ‘indigenous’: 
 
On account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a 
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or 
the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, 
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions (ILO, 1980, 




This element of ‘territorial attachment that predates colonialism’ makes the concept 
of ‘indigenous peoples’ problematic in the context of present-day Africa. Some even 
go further to argue that the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ is not applicable in Africa 
since there are no politically dominant colonial setters on the continent (Ndahinda, 
2012). Here I argue that this is a big misconception about indigenous peoples. This 
misconception arises from a narrow interpretation of the concept of indigenous 
peoples. Whenever people speak about indigenous peoples, the first example that 
would come to mind is either the ‘indigenous peoples of North America’ or the 
‘Australian Aboriginal peoples’, both of whom are now turned into tiny minorities on 
their territories by European settlers. Hence, in situations where there are no 
overseas colonizers, the concept of indigenous peoples seems to make less sense 
(Miller, et al., 2012). That is how some come to the above conclusion that the 
concept of indigenous peoples is not applicable in the African states (Ndahinda, 
2012).    
 
Indeed, in the African context, there is no one group that can claim ‘indigenousness’ 
to the African continent. Leave alone the continental level, even at the regional or 
state level it is difficult if not impossible to find a single group that could claim the 
status of ‘indigenous people’ to one African country. After all, African peoples’ history 
is characterized by massive migrations that make it difficult to determine which group 
might be descendants of the first inhabitants (Reid, 2009). That is why the ‘African 
Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous Populations’ disregarded the question 
of aboriginality or ‘first comer’ as a criterion by which to identify indigenous peoples 
in Africa (African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) and 




This being said, it is indisputable that different African ethnic groups have inhabited 
certain territories for centuries and at the moment are recognized by their states as 
the indigenous communities to those territories (Pyhälä, 2012). The Maasai and 
Turkana in Kenya, the Batwa in Burundi, the Fulani in Burkina Faso, the Baka in 
Cameroon, and many others could be mentioned who are recognized as indigenous 
peoples to certain territories of those states (ACHPR and IWGIA, 2006).  
 
In the Ethiopian case, although it is proud of being the only African country that has 
not been colonized, the contemporary Ethiopia was only born in the last quarter of 
the 19th century through brutal subjugation and colonization of the western, southern 
and eastern peoples by the northern Abyssinian kingdom, as we shall see in the next 
chapter (Merara, 2003). Hence, it is unquestionable today that Ethiopia belongs to 
various indigenous communities who occupied their present territorial regions long 
before the Abyssinian conquest or the involuntary integration into the contemporary 
Ethiopia (Asafa, 1993).    
 
Most importantly, however, the question of the ‘first comer’ is not the only criterion by 
which to identify indigenous people, according to the ‘Working Group on Indigenous 
Peoples in Africa’ (ACHPR and IWGIA, 2006). This Working Group, rather than 
putting forward a one-size-fits-all style definition for indigenous peoples, outlined key 
characteristics that could help identify indigenous peoples in Africa:  
  
The overall characteristics of groups identifying themselves as indigenous peoples are that 
their cultures and ways of life differ considerably from the dominant society, and that their 
cultures are under threat, in some cases to the point of extinction. A key characteristic for 
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most of them is that the survival of their particular way of life depends on access and rights to 
their traditional lands and the natural resources thereon. They suffer from discrimination as 
they are regarded as less developed and less advanced than other more dominant sectors of 
society. They often live in inaccessible regions, often geographically isolated, and suffer from 
various forms of marginalization, both politically and socially. They are subjected to 
domination and exploitation within national political and economic structures that are 
commonly designed to reflect the interests and activities of the national majority. This 
discrimination, domination and marginalization violates their human rights as 
peoples/communities, threatens the continuation of their cultures and ways of life and 
prevents them from being able to genuinely participate in decisions regarding their own future 
and forms of development (ACHPR and IWGIA, 2006, p.10). 
 
These key characteristics are adopted as the working conceptual framework for 
indigenous peoples in this thesis since they precisely capture the kinds of indigenous 
peoples that this research is about. In this thesis, ‘indigenous peoples’ and 
‘indigenous communities’ are used interchangeably. Another term that is sometimes 
used interchangeably with ‘indigenous people’ is ‘minorities’. While most of the 
indigenous peoples are also minorities within their own states, not all minorities are 
indigenous peoples. This distinction is further discussed in the following section.  
 
 
3.3.2. Indigenous Peoples as Distinguished from Minorities  
 
Some argue that, instead of an indigenous peoples’ rights framework, a minorities’ 
rights framework would be more relevant and effective in claiming special protection 
for marginalized ethnic groups in Africa (Kane, 2008; Ndahinda, 2012). So why did I 
frame this thesis in light of the indigenous peoples’ rights framework instead of 




In the first place, there is no clear-cut line between indigenous peoples and 
minorities. Groups that identify themselves as indigenous peoples are most often 
also numerically a minority in their states, and minority groups also sometimes 
invoke the indigenous peoples’ human rights framework to defend their own rights 
(Pyhälä, 2012). However, the nature and kinds of rights attributed to indigenous 
peoples and minorities under international law differs in some significant areas and 
this has its own major implication.  
 
One of the basic differences between the nature of minority rights and indigenous 
peoples’ rights regimes is that, whereas the former is formulated as individual rights, 
the latter is formulated as collective rights. This is already noticeable from the titles of 
the two declarations – i.e. the UN ‘Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (UNDM) and the UN 
‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (UNDRIP). In the case of the 
UNDM, the use of the phrase ‘Rights of Persons belonging to…’ indicates that the 
declaration is designed to protect individual members of those minorities in question. 
Whereas, in the case of the UNDRIP, it explicitly uses the term ‘People’, a term that 
has a collective meaning under international law (Anaya, 1996; Thornberry, 2002).  
 
When we look at the specific rights enumerated under these declarations, we could 
also observe the differences between minority rights and indigenous peoples’ rights. 
Some of the specific key rights of minorities under the UNDM Article 2 include the 
right to enjoy their own culture, to use their own language, to practice their own 
religion, to establish their own associations, to participate in national affairs, etc. 
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These rights could be exercised by members of minorities in question individually as 
well as collectively with other members of their group. The point here is not to protect 
and preserve the group as such but to protect the individuals belonging to these 
groups (Thornberry, 2002).  
 
Indigenous peoples also have these rights under the UNDRIP. However, some of the 
crucial rights of the indigenous peoples that distinguish them from minorities are 
formulated in the language of group rights. For instance, indigenous peoples’ rights 
to land, territory and natural resources are collective rights that are given to a group 
and can only be enjoyed by a group not by an individual member of a group (Anaya, 
1996; Thornberry, 2002). Most importantly, while the “Indigenous peoples have the 
right to self-determination [a collective right]” (UNDRIP Article 3), UNDM contains no 
such rights.  
 
Therefore, even though overlaps are unavoidable between indigenous peoples and 
minorities, since the question of land, territory and natural resources is central to this 
thesis and to the kinds of groups that this thesis is about, the indigenous peoples’ 
human rights framework is preferred in this thesis over that of minorities. However, 
‘minority’ is also used in this thesis when generally referring to minority ethnic groups 
in Ethiopia and also when referring to any of the four peripheral regions, i.e. Afar, 





3.3.3. Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Land, Territories and Natural 
Resources  
 
The right to lands, territories and natural resources is one of the central rights for 
indigenous peoples. The UNDRIP refers to the term ‘land’ 21 times. This is because, 
according to Barume (2010), the question of lands, territories and natural resources 
is so inextricably intertwined with the indigenous peoples’ capability to survive as 
people and to exercise other fundamental group rights. This is repeatedly reflected in 
the UNDRIP (2007, p.10):   
 
Article 25  
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual 
relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, 
waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future 
generations in this regard. 
 
Article 26  
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have 
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories 
and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional 
occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. 
Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land 
tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
In this regard, recognition and protection of indigenous peoples’ rights to land is not 
only a question of access to their livelihood but also a question of group survival. 
Indigenous communities argue that, without this protection of their ancestral lands, it 
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is difficult to maintain the collective identity of an indigenous group (ILO and ACHPR, 
2009). For instance, according to one UN report by Chavez, Chairperson-Rapporteur 
of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations: 
 
In their interventions on the provisions of the declaration concerning lands, territories and 
natural resources, all indigenous representatives emphasized the critical importance of their 
relationship with their lands, territories and resources for their survival, their spiritual, economic, 
social and cultural well-being, and the effective exercise of indigenous self-determination 
(Chavez, 2002, p.8).  
 
Likewise, Anaya (1996) argues that the right of indigenous peoples to use their land 
also includes their ability to access the resources that sustain life as well as to the 
geographical space necessary for the cultural expression and social reproduction of 
the group. Building on this line of argument, McNeil (2000) argues that the question 
of land for indigenous peoples is not a mere private property right, but a communal 
right that includes the recognition of the community leadership and legal system and 
therefore is more in the nature of title to territory than title to the land as such.  
 
On the question of natural resources, the UNDRIP requires states to make sure that 
indigenous peoples maintain their right of access to vital natural resources such as 
water, plants and forests on their traditional lands (UNDRIP, Article 25). Access to 
these resources determines whether indigenous peoples’ rights to livelihood and 
food are upheld (Knuth, 2009).  
 
According to Perera (2009), associated with the right of access to natural resources 
is also the right to a healthy environment. Since indigenous peoples’ lives are closely 
linked with their environment, if the environment is not safe and conducive, then they 
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cannot afford to continue living on their lands or they will be exposed to various 
environmental problems (Perera, 2009). The UNDRIP in its Article 29:1 explicitly 
provides for the rights of indigenous peoples to conserve and protect their 
environment:  
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection of the environment and 
the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources. States should establish and 
implement assistance programs for indigenous peoples for such conservation and protection, 
without discrimination. 
 
Therefore, indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories and natural resources carry 
far-reaching implications since access to these resources also implies access to 
food, health and a decent natural environment that allows for human development 
(Knuth, 2009). As such, for the indigenous peoples to effectively enjoy those rights, 
they might need to be granted political autonomy, which in some countries is 
ensured through a federal form of government. The following section discusses in 





3.4.1. Evolution of Federalism  
 
To begin with the etymology of the concept, the term ‘federal’ is derived from the 
Latin word foedus, which, like the Hebrew term brit, means covenant (Elazar, 1991). 
In its original form, the federal idea was Theo-political, characterizing the partnership 
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between God and man as one in which both were bonded by a covenant to mutually 
rule over earth (Elazar, 1980).  
 
The ancient Israelites transformed this theological concept of a covenant between 
God and man into an explicitly political practice to preserve their national unity by 
linking their twelve tribes under confederal political covenants (see the books of 
Exodus, Deuteronomy, Judges and Joshua in the Old Testament of the Bible). 
Although the Bible discusses the ancient Israelites’ political system more in religious 
rather than political terms, it does lay foundations for the federal idea in its 
transformation of covenant from its original meaning as the relationship between 
God and man into an established political pact among partners. As Elazar argued, 
“the Israelites example represented federalism in its most complete form: a people 
founded by covenant and a polity organized on federal principles” (Elazar, 1987, 
p.120).   
 
Another historical forerunner of the federal idea was the federal-style confederations 
that were formed by Greek cities as means for promoting intercity harmony and 
cooperation, primarily for defensive purposes. However, despite mentioning some 
specific leagues like the Achean and Aetolian leagues, the Greek writers left no 
theoretical discussions of the league as a political system (Friedrich, 1968). 
 
With the birth of the Swiss and subsequently the Dutch confederations, a full-bodied 
concept of the federal idea emerged.  In 1291 three independent states signed an 
alliance to create what is known today as Switzerland (Iff and Töpperwien 2008). 
These states signed the founding treaty, mainly for the purposes of defence against 
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outside enemies and of arbitration in the case of disputes among them. The 
confederation evolved slowly, new states were admitted and included with new 
treaties so that over time a complex treaty system developed, loosely uniting the 
states (Linder, 1994).  
 
It was not until the development of the modern nation-state concept had come into 
being that the concept of federalism begun to theoretically take root. Modern 
federalism evolved as an alternative and or counteractive to the classic nation-state 
model that prevailed over Europe from the 16th century. The modern nation-state 
model was invented based on the notion of a single entity commanding universal 
loyalty on the part of all subjects or citizens and possessing full authority or 
sovereignty within its territorial limits (Bartelson, 1995; Hinsley, 1986; Jackson, 
2007). At the core of the classic modern nation-state, was the principle that a state’s 
sovereignty was indivisible, and indeed, for the state to properly exercise this 
sovereignty, the sovereignty had to be concentrated in a single centre (Franklin, 
1992; Jackson, 2007). This concept of state sovereignty was developed by a 
Frenchman, Jean Bodin (1530-1596); hence it is not surprising that France was the 
first of the modern nation states (Franklin, 1992). In stark contrast to Bodin, 
Johannes Althusius (1562-1638), a man considered as the ‘father of modern 
federalism’, invented the concept of dispersed sovereignty among different territorial 
and corporate centres within a state to preserve traditional liberties and prevent 
absolutism. Althusius presented a comprehensive model of this polity in his Politica 
Methodice Digesta (1603 and 1614) and tried to implement that model as syndic of 




The emergence of contemporary federalism in the theoretical framework as we know 
it today, however, is greatly attributed to the birth of American federalism. The 
founders of American federalism, although they shared and borrowed many 
concepts from their predecessors, went further both theoretically and practically to 
establish a federal framework that still today is referred to as the archetype of 
contemporary federalism (Lacroix, 2011). In addition to the federal principles of 
dispersed sovereignty, freedom and autonomy for federal sub-units, the founders of 
American federalism introduced a stronger separate federal government with a 
presidential executive, two houses – of which one represents the nation and the 
other the states, a judicial guardian of the federal constitution, and a broad 
guarantee of civil rights and liberties for the citizens (Sutton, 2002). American 
federalism was built on the notion that, in a federal system of government, citizens 
belong both to their own states and to the nation; that these two levels of the 
government should be clearly distinguished and effectively provided with their own 
executive, legislative and judiciary; and that in the establishment and operation of the 
federal government the member states as states must play a distinctive role (Riker, 
1987). These principles of American federalism later on become the bedrock 
principles upon which contemporary federalism was founded, as we can see from 
the discussion in the following section.  
 
 
3.4.2. Defining Federalism  
 
Different scholars have greatly enriched the knowledge of what it means for a state 




Federation [is] to be most significantly distinguished from other forms of sovereign state by 
the fact that its structure is grounded in the representation of regional governments within the 
national or central legislature on an entrenched basis (King cited in Burgess and Gagnon, 
1993, p.94). 
 
For King, representation of regional units at central government level is the key 
distinguishing characteristic of federalism. He continued that, “the chief 
distinguishing feature of a federation is the territorial grouping of its citizens, and the 
means by which these groups are represented” (King cited in Burgess and Gagnon, 
1993, p.95). Therefore, despite the fact that King has drawn upon other 
characteristics of federalism, ‘representation’ for him remains the heart of what 
makes a nation to be categorized as a federation. However, according to Elazar:  
 
Federal polities are characteristically noncentralized; that is, the powers of government within 
them are diffused among many centres, whose existence and authority are guaranteed by the 
general constitution, rather than being concentrated in a single centre (Elazar, 1987, p.34). 
 
As far as Elazar (1987) is concerned, the division of power among different levels of 
government makes the true genius of federalism. His emphasis on ‘power sharing’ 
as a prime yardstick  for measuring federations is evident in his frequent reference to 
the term ‘power sharing’, his illustrations, and the flow of his general arguments 
pertinent to federal systems. For example, he opposes the notion of a ‘capital city’ in 
federal states, because for him, a ‘capital city’ represents a single centre of power 
which contradicts his fundamental feature of a federation – i.e. the diffusion of power 
among many centres. Hence, for Elazar, Bern should not be called the capital city of 




Burgess and Gagnon (1993) on their part have underlined another facet of 
federalism; that is, the need to protect minorities’ interests and respect diversities. 
They are not alone in stressing this particular feature of federalism. Duchacek 
argues that:  
 
A federal constitution may therefore be seen as a political compact that explicitly admits of the 
existence of conflicting interests among the component territorial communities and commits 
them all to seek accommodation without outvoting the minority and without the use of force 
(Duchacek, 1970, p.192). 
 
Similarly, Kymlicka (2001) through his discussion about the experience of 
Francophone Quebec province in Canada argues that:  
 
Under the federal division of powers in Canada, the province of Quebec (which is 80 per cent 
francophone) has extensive jurisdiction over issues that are crucial to the survival of the 
francophone society, including control over education, language, culture, as well as significant 
input in to immigration policy. The other nine provinces also have these powers, but the major 
impetus behind the existing division of powers, and indeed behind the entire federal system, 
is the need to accommodate the Quebecois (Kymlicka, 2001, pp.95-96).  
 
Another important characteristic of federalism accentuated by Hicks and King is 
constitutionalism and democracy. Hicks argued that, “The objective of federation is a 
form of government for the people by the people; that is to say it is inherently 
democratic” (Hicks, 1978, p.4). Along the same line of argument, King (1982) 
concluded that only those governments that practice democracy, and are thereby 
subordinated to the rule of law, are judged as federations.  
 
All the above definitions tell us one thing:  federalism is not a unitary concept with a 
single central characteristic. It is an embodiment of several equally important 
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principles. As such, taking one of the above definitions as a working definition for 
federalism cannot really capture the whole genus. Therefore, based on the above 
discussion, instead of one working definition, I will elaborate on some of the core 
principles of federalism which I will use as frames of reference throughout the thesis.  
 
 
A. Constitutional Division of Powers  
 
The division of powers among constituent units of a federation is one of the most 
notable features of federalism. As defined by Kymlicka: 
 
Federalism refers to a political system which includes a constitutionally entrenched division of 
powers between a central government and two or more subunits (provinces, states, cantons), 
defined on a territorial basis, such that each level of government has sovereign authority over 
certain issues (Kymlicka, 2001, p.94).  
 
Even though divisions of powers also exist under non-federal political arrangements, 
what distinguishes the two systems is that – under federal arrangements neither the 
federal nor the sub-units are subordinate to the other. This means that the two levels 
of government have sovereign powers directly derived from the constitution rather 
than from another level of government. In federalism, each level of government is 
empowered to deal directly with its citizens in the exercise of its executive, legislative 
and taxing powers, and each is directly elected by its citizens (Watts, 2008). 
However, the ways in which powers are constitutionally shared and the areas of 
jurisdiction assigned to each level of government could vary among different federal 




Generally speaking, in most federal states while foreign affairs, national security and 
monetary union are assigned to the jurisdiction of the federal government, local 
economic development issues and social affairs such as health services, education 
and social welfare including local government are usually assigned to the regional 
governments (Watts, 1996). Likewise, the concept of power sharing in federal states 
goes hand in hand with the distribution of wealth and income. As Iff and Töpperwien 
(2008) have argued, in genuine federal states, not only are legislative, judiciary and 
executive powers shared but also mechanisms for sharing wealth and income are 
constitutionally entrenched.  
 
 
B. Representation of Federal Sub-units at the Centre 
 
Burgess and Gagnon (1993) have warned that federations cannot be established 
through coercion and force from above or sustained by the threat of military power. 
In federal systems, the government has to be legitimate both from citizens as 
individuals and from the federal sub-units as collectives. As Dosenrode argued:   
 
In all genuine federations the federal level gets its legitimacy from the people in one or the 
other way: the president may be directly elected as in the US, or the members of the first 
house are directly elected as in Austria, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and the US. Thus the 
people participate in the governing of the federation both at member state level and at the 
federal level (Dosenrode, 2007, p.23). 
 
In federal systems the federal/central government obtains its legitimacy through the 
representation of the federal sub-units at the centre/federal level. King stated that, 
 
A federation may be viewed as a sovereign state marked by the fact (a) that its representation 
is preponderantly territorial; (b) that this territorial representation is characteristically secured 
on at least two sub-national levels (which I shall refer to as ‘local’ and ‘regional’ government); 
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(c) that the regional units are incorporated electorally, perhaps otherwise, into the decision 
procedure of the national centre; and (d) that the incorporation of the regions into the decision 
procedure of the centre can only be altered by extraordinary constitutional measures, not for 
example by resort to a simple majority vote of the national legislature, or by autonomous 
decision of the national executive (King, 1982, p.143). 
 
According to this argument, representation of territorially-based regional units at 
central government level on an entrenched constitutional basis is an essential 
feature of federalism. Representation in federal systems is normally ensured through 
two chambers (bicameral system). The first or lower chamber by and large 
represents the interests of a country as a whole and it serves as the power base for 
the federal government (Watts, 1996). The members of the first chamber are 
normally elected by popular vote in the federal constituent units based on population 
size, as in Germany, Switzerland, the United States, Austria and Belgium (Aalen, 
2002).  The second or upper chamber, on the other hand, represents the interests of 
the constituent units of the federation as collectives. Different federations have 
different ways of appointing members of the second chamber. They could be directly 
elected by the people, as in the United States; elected by the regional state 
legislatures, as in Switzerland; or they could be delegates from the state executives, 
as in Germany (Sharman, 1987). In most federations, second chambers play the role 
of checking the power of the federal government by its constituent units and ensure 
that all policies/legal actions of the federal government take into account the 
interests of minority regions as they do for the majority (more populous) regions 




C. Protection of Minorities 
 
The relationship between federalism and minorities is as old as the federal idea 
itself. As already discussed, the concept of federalism (dispersed sovereignty among 
many centres within a single state) was originally invented by Johannes Althusius – 
intellectual father of federalism – as a moral shield for his minority Calvinist city of 
Emden against the then dominant Catholic emperor and the Lutheran provincial lord 
(Carney, 1965).  According to Hueglin (1999), for Althusius, the power of the 
government must be limited. The state and all human social institutions are gifts of 
God and owe accountability to God for their actions; hence, the state cannot ever 
claim ultimate sovereignty. In other words, for Althusius, if ever the state 
transgresses its divinely ordained authority, it becomes illegitimate. In contrast, a 
legitimate state is that which undertakes all actions of its administration according to 
law (Hueglin, 1999). Therefore, when a state ceases to direct its power towards the 
common good and attempts to release itself from the power and jurisdiction of God, 
it forfeits its authority to rule. Althusius developed this theory to justify minorities’ 
resistance against majorities’ tyranny. Following Althusius’s theory of dispersed 
sovereignty, the French Huguenots (French Calvinists) justified their resistance 
against unitary France based on the argument that people who live in a distinct 
community or territory have a God-granted right to resist rulers without rightful claim 
(Ephrem, 2010).  
 
Likewise, on the relationship between federalism and minorities, Gagnon has argued 




The political uses of federalism have been particularly notable with respect to the protection of 
minorities. For most ethnic groups and territorially structured communities, federalism has the 
advantage of being a provider of accommodation with the potential to respond adequately to 
problems occurring in multicultural and multilingual settings (Gagnon, 1993, p.21). 
 
Kymlicka (1995, 1996, and 2001) on his part has extensively discussed some 
practical aspects of the relationship between federalism and protection of minorities. 
In the first place, he argues, under federal systems where minorities are territorially 
concentrated in one or more geographical region, the boundaries of the federal sub-
units can be drawn in order for minorities to become a majority in one or more of the 
federal sub-units. Under this arrangement, federalism can provide extensive self-
government rights for a minority by constitutionally guaranteeing its ability to make 
decisions in certain policy areas without being outvoted by the larger society 
(Kymlicka, 2001). Secondly, he continues, most often regional autonomy alone may 
not be enough to protect minorities’ interests if they are not effectively represented at 
central government level. Hence, under federal systems, minorities can be given 
special representation rights (e.g. quota system or veto power) at a central 
government level so that their interests are taken into account in the central decision-
making process. Above all, Kymlicka (1995) argues, with the exception of a few 
federal states, many federations around the world today embraced federalism in the 
first place to accommodate and protect national minorities and/or regional diversities.      
 
 
D. Constitutionalism and Democracy   
 
As discussed above, constitutional division of powers, representation of regional 
governments at federal level and protection of minorities on an entrenched 
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constitutional basis constitute some of the essential characteristics of federalism. 
Hence, Elazar (1987) argued that, for a state to be classified as a federation, it must 
have in the first place a written constitution that outlines, among other things, the 
division of powers, procedures of representation and mode of minorities’ protection.  
 
The concept of constitutionalism, however, goes beyond the mere ratification of a set 
of rules and procedures (Belz, 1998). It includes the idea of limited government and 
the supremacy of law. In other words, constitutionalism is the idea that government 
should be limited in its powers and that its authority depends on its observation of 
these limitations (Allen and Thomson, 2005). In this regard, Watts argues that: 
 
Recognition of the supremacy of the constitution over all orders of government and a political 
culture emphasizing the fundamental importance of respect for constitutionality are therefore 
prerequisites for the effective operation of a federation (Watts, 2008, p.157).  
 
Building on this line of thought, Forsyth (2010) argues that, if the culture of 
constitutionalism is lacking in a federation, then it would likely deteriorate into a 
situation in which one or other level of government subordinates the other, thereby 
undermining other basic features of federalism. 
 
Another important tenet for realization of genuine federalism, according to Burgess 
and Gagnon (2010), is democracy. They have argued that, in the contemporary 
world, democracy is recognized as a necessary element of good governance and 
decisions that are made in accordance with established democratic procedures are 
regarded as legitimate. Hence, they concluded that federalism and democracy 
reinforce each other; one cannot be complete without the other; most notably 
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federalism cannot be fully realized without democracy. Federalism only becomes 
meaningful in polities whose processes of government reflect the federal principles. 
In other words, a polity may have in place federal structures, and it may enshrine 
federal principles in its constitution, but there may still be no federalism in operation 
(Burgess and Gagnon, 2010).  
 
Drawing upon the Russian example, Ross and Campbell (2010) argued that, 
although Russia has adopted all the key structural trappings of federalism and the 
constitution does indeed enshrine many of the key federal principles, in practice 
neither the federal authorities nor the federal subjects have fully lived up to these 
federal principles. Hence, they concluded that, in the absence of democratic political 
culture, Russia can only be considered as a federation without federalism. Ross 
(2002) has also cited other federal countries that have turned into dictatorships due 
to lack of democracy, such as former Yugoslavia, Pakistan and Mexico.  
 
For King (1982), federalism and democracy are only two sides of the same coin and 
for true federalism to function relations between the centre and regions must be 
grounded in constitutional law and democratic representation. To emphasize this 
positive relationship between federalism and democracy, Elazar has also argued 
that:  
 
By distributing power, federalism curbs arbitrary rule, both at the centre and locally. It 
decentralizes responsibility while providing a mechanism to restrain potential local conflicts 
and abuses. It provides a school of democracy, and it quite literally brings government closer 




Therefore, in a nutshell, in this thesis federalism is conceptualized as a system of 
government where state sovereignty is constitutionally shared between the centre 
and the federal sub-units; regional interests are represented at the central 
government level; minority rights are entrenched in the constitution; and supremacy 
of the law and democratic principles are observed.  
 
 
3.5. Conclusion  
This chapter has tried to revisit and provide working definitions for the three 
keywords (i.e. LSLA, indigenous peoples and federalism) of this thesis. Although 
these three keywords seem to be independent in their own rights, from the above 
discussion it becomes apparent that they also share a common denominator. This 
common denominator is the place of honour accorded to land under all the three 
keywords. In the first case of LSLAs, land – in the form of agricultural land – is 
explicitly situated at the centre of the debate about the contemporary LSLA. In the 
second case of indigenous peoples, attachment to land is the sine qua none of their 
identity as people.  Finally, federalism as a political system requires an identifiable 
land – in the form of geographical area or territory - on which regional sovereignty or 
autonomy could be exercised. Therefore, despite the apparent independence of 
these three keywords, the question of land, whether in the form of agricultural land or 
territory, cuts across these three themes.  As such, land as a cross-cutting theme 
deserves special attention in this thesis. Therefore, the following chapter looks at the 




Chapter Four: The History of Land and Politics in 
Ethiopia   
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
  
Following the placing of land as a cross-cutting feature for the three keywords 
discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter puts the spotlight on its significance 
both as a productive economic resource and political instrument under the 
successive regimes of Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a country that relies heavily on 
agriculture, mainly in the form of small-scale cultivators, who account for 85% of the 
Ethiopian population (CSA, 2007). In Ethiopia, the agricultural sector accounts for 
85% of employment, 60% of exports and 41% of the GDP (CIA World Factbook, 
2012). Hence, this makes the question of who controls the land an important 
question both in economic and political terms. Moreover, the fact that poverty, 
famine and hunger have been some of the defining features of Ethiopian history 
makes the question of control over land again a very important question. Therefore, 
this chapter discusses the nexus between land and politics under three regimes 
namely, the Imperial, the Derg and current EPRDF. In order to contextualize the 
discussions, brief introduction as to how those regimes evolved and consolidated 




4.2. The Imperial Regime (1855-1974)  
 
The origin of the contemporary Ethiopia as an organized and independent polity 
dates back to the first century A.D., with the first kingdom in the Abyssinian 
highlands located at Axum in what today straddles northern Ethiopia and southern 
Eritrea (Marcus, 2002). In the mid-fourth century the Axumite king Ezana adopted 
Christianity, which became one of the most important elements that shaped the 
subsequent Ethiopian political history (Endale, 2012). However, the rise of Islam in 
the Arabian Peninsula in the 7th century crippled the Axumites and isolated them 
culturally and commercially from the rest of the Christian world, particularly the 
Byzantine Empire. This economic isolation of the Axum Empire led to its southward 




4.2.1. Evolution and Consolidation of the Ethiopian state  
 
The evolution of the contemporary Ethiopian state is a source of profound, even 
bitter, contention among politicians and historians (Asafa, 1998; Solomon, 1993; 
Zewde, 1975). At one extreme, pan-Ethiopian nationalists argue that the 
contemporary Ethiopia is a 3,000-years-old ancient state created through gradual 
incorporation and voluntary assimilation of other ethnic groups into the northern 
Amhara/Tigray core cultures (Solomon, 1993; Zewde, 1975). According to this 
perspective, as well represented by Solomon (1993), the historical ruling class in 
Ethiopia cannot be identified with a particular ethnic group. They were multi-ethnic 
groups whose only common denominators were that they were Amharic speakers, 
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Orthodox Christians, and claim lineage to the Solomonic dynasty12. Hence, 
according to pan-Ethiopian nationalists, Ethiopia is the melting pot par excellence. In 
other words, it is a nation-state (Solomon, 1993; Zewde, 1975).   
 
At the other extreme, ethno-nationalist groups, such as the Ogaden National 
Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), claim that 
contemporary Ethiopia is a colonial state created through conquest and colonization 
(Asafa, 1998, 2005; Mohamed, 2007). According to this perspective, Abyssinia – the 
historic core of Ethiopian polity – colonized over half of the current Ethiopian 
territories and peoples to form a colonial empire-state in the last quarter of the 19th 
century. Ethiopia, from the ethno-nationalist vantage point, is a colonial empire that 
needs to undergo decolonization where ‘ethno-national’ colonies become 
independent states. Thus, the image portrayed by this perspective is one of Ethiopia 
as a colonial-state (Asafa, 1998, 2005; Mohamed, 2007).  
 
Straddling the two extreme viewpoints is one that makes a distinction between the 
ancient Abyssinian state of two or three millennia and the modern state of Ethiopia 
emerging in the second half of the 19th century (Markakis, 2003). According to this 
perspective, the creation of the contemporary Ethiopia is associated with Emperor 
Tewodros II (1855-1868) who ended the instability and rivalry of the Zemene 
Mesafint or ‘Era of the Princes’13 (Marsden, 2007). However, as Emperor Tewodros 
II became more authoritarian in his leadership, he lost the support of the regional 
                                                          
12
 Solomonic Dynasty or the House of Solomon was the former imperial house of Ethiopia. Its 
members claim descent from King Solomon of Israel and the Queen of Sheba. The tradition asserts 
that the biblical Queen Sheba who visited Solomon in Jerusalem gave birth to Menelik I who became 
the first Solomonic Emperor of Ethiopia around 950 BC (Bahru, 1991).     
13
Zemene Mesafint or ‘era of the princes’ (1769-1855) was a period in Ethiopian history known for 
violent struggles among princes mainly from Gojam, Tigray and Wollo regions who were fighting for 
the control of Gondar, the imperial centre (Bahru, 1991).  
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kings, which subsequently contributed to the collapse of his rule. In the fight for 
successor among the regional kings, Emperor Yohannes IV (1872-1889), the 
regional King of Tigray, won the race and became the first Tigrayan Emperor to take 
the throne from the Amhara (Pankhurst, 2001). Unlike Tewdoros II, who chose the 
path of confrontation with regional powers, Yohannes IV devolved power to 
monarchs who recognized him as ‘king of kings’.  After the death of Yohannes IV in 
1889, Menelik II (1889-1913), an Amhara, managed to reclaim the throne from the 
Tigrayan line of successors.  
 
Emperor Menelik II, known as the modernizer, pursued a policy of expansion (Parker 
and Abraham, 1995). He expanded his rule from the central highland regions to the 
south and east of the country and consolidated the borders of the contemporary 
Ethiopian state. He defeated powerful traditional kingdoms including some who had 
not previously been under the rule of Abyssinia such as the Wolaita in the south, the 
Oromos, the Sidama, the Kafa and others (Bahru, 1991). These peoples were 
defeated and forced into submission to the Abyssinian state, a conquest similar to 
that of the European colonization elsewhere in Africa (Asafa, 1998). Toward the end 
of the 19th century, following the battle of Adwa in 1896, Ethiopia was recognized as 
a sovereign state by the major European powers and the contemporary Ethiopian 
state came into being (Bahru, 1991). 
 
After a series of events, Ras Tafari Mekonnen was crowned emperor and given the 
regnal name ‘Haile Sellassie’ meaning ‘Power of Trinity’ in 1930. His full title in office 
was ‘His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, 
King of Kings of Ethiopia, Elect of God’ (Parker, 1995). Haile Sellassie centralized 
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the state and expanded Ethiopia's civil society. He fostered unity through the 
mobilization of a national army, a modern infrastructure and communications, and a 
pan-Ethiopian economy (Spencer, 2006). The Emperor was also instrumental in 
garnering foreign aid while he was in exile in Britain during the Italian invasion in the 
1930s. Ethiopia's determination not to be colonized, coupled with the pressures of 
World War II Allied Powers on Italy, forced Italy out of Ethiopia once more (Spencer, 
2006). Haile Sellassie then returned to Ethiopia in 1941 from exile and continued his 
reign. However, he soon faced external challenges over Eritrea and the Ogaden,14 
and later on internal challenges from his own military, university students and the 
urban working class, which eventually brought his reign to an end (Markakis, 1974).  
 
 
4.2.2. Land and Politics under the Imperial Regime  
 
It needs to be noted that Menelik’s II expansion campaign to the southern parts of 
the contemporary Ethiopia took place around the same time of the European 
scramble for Africa. In one of his letters to the European colonial powers sent in 
1891, Menelik II stated that, “If powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa 
between them, I do not intend to be an indifferent spectator” (cited in Markakis, 1974, 
p.24). As such, Menelik’s II expansion motives and subsequent treatment of the 
newly conquered territories and their subjects was not that different from what the 
other European colonizers were doing elsewhere in Africa (Hussein, 2004). Firstly, 
among other desires, Menelik II wanted to expand his territories and consolidate his 
powers in the newly acquired territories. Secondly, Menelik’s II expansion was also 
                                                          
14
 The Eritrean Liberation Front and the Ogaden Liberation Front were established in the early years 




driven by economic interests of securing the flow of resources such as ivory, gold, 
agricultural products and even slaves (Markakis, 1974). These economic interests 
had both domestic and international significance for Menelik II in terms of 
maintaining his empire and linking Ethiopia to the global economy (Clapham, 2002). 
Hence, it is against this general political economy of the southward expansion of the 
imperial Ethiopia that land policies in particular need to be revisited.  
 
Land policies under the imperial Ethiopia had never been uniform throughout the 
country. While the imperial Ethiopia maintained the local land tenure systems among 
the northern ethnic groups of Amhara and Tigray, it introduced a new range of tenure 
systems in the conquered territories in the south (Cohen and Weintraub, 1975). In 
the northern part of the country, a customary land holding system known as the rist 
in Amharic or risti in Tigrigna was preserved and respected by the involved imperial 
officials and local political institutions (Bezuwork, 1992). Under the rist system, 
peasants had the right to use, rent and inherit the land from their family members. 
People who obtained their land through rist (which literally means inheritance), either 
from a family member or from the village, were allowed to maintain indefinite use 
rights over their possession (Markakis, 1974). However, since land is taken as a 
communal property, individuals had no right to sell the land (Hoben, 1973). The 
major significance of the rist system was the tenure security it provided to the 
peasants since it gave them almost an absolute or unchallenged control over their 
landholdings vis-à-vis the state. As Hussein has argued, “As far as political 
authorities, including the Emperor, or landlord interventions were concerned, there 
was no tenure insecurity or fear of being evicted from the rist land” (Hussein, 2004, 
p.3). Although there had been the practice of periodic land redistribution in the north, 
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some argue that this was not an externally or politically imposed practice; rather it 
was done locally by the concerned communities to provide for their young generation 
of peasants (Cohen and Weintraub, 1975; Weissledre, 1965). Therefore, in addition 
to the tenure security it provided, the concept of rist or being a ristegna (a person 
with hereditary land rights) also meant political and social benefits of freedom, pride 
and belongingness to a society (Hoben, 1973).  
 
This was in stark contrast to the new range of tenure systems that the imperial 
regime had introduced in the conquered southern and western parts of the country. 
Here, the imperial regime divided the rural land into three categories of ‘private land’, 
‘state land’ and ‘church land’ (Cohen and Weintraub, 1975). The regime expropriated 
lands from the local people and then categorized them under the above-mentioned 
titles. They employed different means of expropriating lands from the southern and 
western peasants. Firstly, lands were taken by sheer force from the southern and 
western rural farmers as a consequence of the northern conquest of those territories 
(Bahru, 1991). Those lands were then transformed into the private property of the 
respective northern military officials or reserved as state land to be distributed to the 
loyalists. Secondly, lands were also expropriated from individuals and communities 
who failed to pay taxes to the emperor (Markakis, 1974). These lands were then 
permanently transferred either to the state or to the Church (Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church). Thirdly, the imperial regime confiscated what it called the ‘unused’ or 
‘excess’ lands in the southern and western parts of the country although these lands 




These expropriation strategies resulted not only in exploitative economic relations 
between the southern/western peasants and northern landlords, but also in absolute 
political subordination of the southerners to the imperial representatives and northern 
landlords. Consequently, as well documented by many researchers, a majority of the 
peasants in the south and west were transformed into tenants (locally known as 
Chisegna) of the predominantly northern landlords (Clapham, 1988; Cohen and 
Weintraub, 1975; Pausewang, 1983; Weissleder, 1965). During that time, it was 
estimated that the number of tenant rural farmers was as high as 39% in Sidamo and 
75% in Illubabor (Cohen and Weintraub, 1975). In the extreme cases, as 
demonstrated by the experience of the Nekemte province (western Ethiopia), it was 
estimated that over 80% of the rural farmers were reduced to the status of tenants 
working for the northern landlords and government officials (Clapham, 1988).  
Hence, those southern and western tenants had to live and work under uncertain 
conditions and excessive dependence on the predominantly northern landlords and 
imperial representatives.  
 
Another impact of the new land titles introduced in the south by the imperial regime 
was the emergence of the sharecropping system. This is a system of agriculture in 
which a landowner allows a tenant to use the land in return for a share of the crop 
produced on the land (Cohen, 1974). Since this was an unregulated practice, 
southern and western tenants were left to the mercy of their northern landlords who 
were reported to sometimes take as much as 3/4 of the land products from their 
tenants (Dawit, 1989). Moreover, studies have shown that landlords in the south and 
west were commonly forcing their tenants to render other labour services without 
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compensation. Failure to give free labour service to the landlord would result in 
eviction of the tenants (Bezuwork, 1992; Dawit, 1989; Shiferaw, 1995).   
 
The introduction of mechanized farming in the 1960s created another big problem for 
landless tenants in the southern and western parts of the country (Cohen and 
Weintraub, 1975). Hoping for a better land return, the landlords rented their lands to 
mechanized farmers, or those who had the capacity switched to mechanized 
farming, to increase their production and get better benefits. As a consequence, the 
landlords evicted the tenants from their lands, creating a mass of landless farmers in 
the southern and western parts of the country (Dawit, 1989; Shiferaw, 1995). 
Clapham (1988) found that, as a result of mechanized farming in the southern 
provinces such as Arsi, Bale and southern Shewa, a portion of the poor peasants 
were either turned into part of the agricultural workforce or were displaced from their 
villages to go to the urban centres in search of jobs or migrated into ‘marginal’ areas 
to seek plots of land to cultivate.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned economic impacts on the southern and western 
Ethiopians, the tenure systems imposed by the imperial Ethiopian regime also 
relegated the southerners and westerners to an inferior political and social class. As 
such, the imperial land policies in the south and west produced a “political and social 
structure that had created an enormous inequality in wealth and power along class 
and ethnic lines” (Alemneh, 1987, p.32). Although the Haile Selassie regime 
attempted several land reforms, none materialized as they were either watered down 
by the parliament, which was made up of the landlords themselves, never 
promulgated or not communicated to the people affected.  According to Brietzke, 
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“Haile Selassie was not committed to land reform: he could have promulgated 
reforming laws as Decrees under Article 92 of the revised constitution of the 1955, 
rather than waiting for parliament to proclaim them” (Brietzke, 1976, p.645).15 
 
In conclusion, it could be stated that the imperial land policy in the southern and 
western parts of the country greatly alienated the majority of farmers and created 
second-class citizens of tenants without proper rights vis-à-vis the predominantly 
northern landlords and government officials. In addition to economic exploitation, 
land was also used as a political means through which the landlords and state 
officials ensured the loyalty of their subjects and punished the disloyal. As such, 
these policies created great dissatisfaction in the rural areas towards the state and 
contributed on the one hand – to the discourse that precipitated the fall of Haile 
Selassie in particular and end of monarchy in general, – and on the other – to the 
rise of the Derg regime, which will be discussed as follows.   
 
 
4.3. The Derg Regime (1974-1991) 
 
The rise of the Derg to power marked a radical change in Ethiopian history as the 
monarchy was abolished and replaced by a Leninist political system. The 
subsequent sweeping reforms – particularly the famous 1975 land reform – 
fundamentally transformed not only the agricultural production systems but also the 
organization of the rural political structures and power relations between different 
                                                          
15
 “The emperor Haile Sellassie himself and his family, together with barons and lords in both houses 
of parliament were owners of the vast tracts of land, and any change in land reform would mean 
harming their interests” (Daniel, 2012, p. 4).    
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rural stakeholders. Nevertheless, despite these sweeping changes, the nature of the 
state-communities relations or some elements of it seems to have persisted 
throughout the new regime. The aim of this section is to discuss those 
transformations and continuities, particularly in relation to the nexus between land 
politics under the Derg. In order to contextualize it, the first section discusses the 
events that brought the Derg to power and how they eventually shaped the 
consequent reforms. Then the relationship between land and politics under the Derg 
regime will be discussed in the second section.     
 
 
4.3.1. The Derg: Evolution and Consolidation of Power 
 
Several events contributed to the downfall of the imperial regime and its replacement 
by the Derg in 1974. As Clapham argued:  
 
Far from constituting a coup d'état in the normal sense of the word, they [events that brought 
down Haile Sellassie] consisted in a series of mutinies, strikes and demonstrations through 
which all of the elements in the potential urban opposition to the regime were progressively 
mobilized, and in a series of desperate countermeasures through which the imperial 
government unsuccessfully sought to stave off impending collapse (Clapham, 1988, p.38).  
 
Although earlier demonstrations by the university students and demands for political 
and economic reforms from the urban elites marked the first overt discontent towards 
the imperial regime, the immediate event that triggered the 1974 revolution was to a 
great extent attributed to the mutiny of the Territorial Army’s Fourth Brigade at 
Negele in the southern province of Sidamo on 12 January 1974 (Lefort, 1983).  The 
mutiny per se was described as a simple dissent over poor food and water 
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conditions. However, when senior officials went to investigate the problem, the 
mutineers arrested them, giving the simple dissent some political overtones 
(Clapham, 1988).  Soon, the simple mutiny in the deep south spread to other military 
units, with a second one breaking out in the far north region of Eritrea.  The Second 
Division at Asmera, capital of Eritrea, imprisoned its commanders and announced its 
support for the Negele mutiny. The Signal Corps, in sympathy with the uprising, 
broadcasted information about events to the rest of the military (Ofcansky and Berry, 
1991). As a consequence, further and much more dangerous mutinies broke out in 
the Fourth Division headquartered in Addis Ababa, and the air force base near Addis 
Ababa (Clapham, 1988).  
 
To make things worse for the imperial regime, a series of demonstrations and strikes 
from different sections of the civilian populations in Addis Ababa also broke out 
around the same time. Students protested against a proposed new education 
policy,16 teachers were demanding better pay and taxi drivers went on strike over 
increased fuel prices (Ofcansky and Berry, 1991). As the time went on, other issues 
were added to the demands, including issues about land reform and the famine in 
Wollo that was estimated to have left hundreds of thousands dead (Ofcansky and 
Berry, 1991). Eventually, the different discontented urban groups called for a new 
political system, which led to the resignation of the Prime Minister, Aklilu Habte-
Wold, and his replacement by another aristocrat, Endalkachew Mekonen, on 
February 28, 1974 (Lefort, 1983).   
 
                                                          
16
 The new education policy proposed an “expansion of basic education in the countryside, and 
relative restriction of secondary and university education in the towns causing uprising among the 
urban students in particular and dwellers in general” (Clapham, 1988, p.38).  
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The reforms introduced by Endalkatchew were either perceived as window dressing 
or too late to contain the mounting urban discontent and the mutinying military units. 
In fact, the military, realizing that it was getting the upper hand in the unrest, even 
became more determined to exploit the opportunity to its own advantage. In order to 
ensure cohesion within the army and effectively coordinate the revolution, a common 
front was formed called the ‘Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, 
and Territorial Army’. In Amharic it was called the Derg meaning ‘committee’ or 
‘council’ (Ofcansky and Berry, 1991). Its membership was drawn from each of the 
main units of the army, air force, navy and police. Different sources have given 
different figures about the actual number of Derg members. For instance, Clapham 
(1988, p.40) stated that they were 108, while Aregawi (2009, p.127) said they were 
109 and others such as Ofcansky and Berry (1991, p.28) and Pankhurst (2001, 
p.269) put the number at 120. The Derg soon began arresting leading figures of the 
government thereby forcing Prime Minister Endalkachew, who felt powerless to 
prevent the arrest of his own members, to resign on 22 July 1974 (Clapham, 1988). 
Thereafter, the Derg went after the emperor himself, abolishing his governing 
council, arresting the commander of the Imperial Bodyguard and nationalizing his 
assets. By late August, the Derg accused the emperor of covering up the Wello and 
Tigray famine of the early 1970s.17 In order to intensify urban opposition to the 
emperor, the Derg showed a “television film which contrasted the starvation of the 
peasants with the luxury in which the emperor lived” (Clapham, 1988, p.40). As a 
result, street demonstrations took place urging the emperor’s arrest, and then the 
Derg formally deposed Haile Selassie on 12 September 1974 and imprisoned him. 
Three days later, the Derg transformed itself into the Provisional Military 
                                                          
17
 The famine in Wollo and Tigray is estimated to have killed 100,000 – 200,000 between 1972 and 
1974 (Ofcansky and Berry, 1991).  
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Administrative Council (PMAC) and proclaimed itself as the nation's ruling body 
(Clapham, 1988; Lefort, 1983; Ofcansky and Berry, 1991; Pankhurst, 2001).    
 
This marked the beginning of the end for the rise of the military dictatorship that 
would define and dominate the Ethiopian political scene for the next seventeen 
years. After three years of bloody internal conflicts within the Derg that left its first 
and second chairmen executed, Menguistu Haile Mariam emerged as the 
indomitable leader of the Derg on 3 February 1977, assuming at latter stages the 
position of the Secretary General of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) and 
President of the Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE), while remaining 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Clapham, 1988).   
 
 
4.3.2. Land and Politics under the Derg  
 
One of the famous slogans during demonstrations against the imperial regime was 
‘Meret le Arashu!’ an Amharic translation for ‘land to the tiller’, a catch phrase in the 
1970s among the land reformists (Ellis, 1992). As such, it was already predictable 
that land reform would be one of the priorities of any new regime succeeding Haile 
Selassie. That was what the Derg did. In its first ten-point policy directions issued on 
20 December 1974, numbers four and seven state that “Every regional 
administration and every village shall manage its own resources and be self-
sufficient…The right to own land shall be restricted to those who work on the land” 
(Lefort, 1983, p.84). In 1975 the Derg enacted a law known as the ‘Proclamation to 
Provide for the Public Ownership of Rural Lands’ – hereafter referred to as the 
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‘Proclamation 31/1975’. This proclamation became the legal basis upon which the 
Derg redistributed the rural land to the farmers who had been working on it under 
exploitative tenancy agreements with their landlords.  
 
The most significant provisions of this proclamation were that, in the first place, it 
declared all rural lands to be the property of the state without any compensation to 
previous right holders (Proclamation 31/1975, Article 3). The proclamation 
eradicated the private land ownership systems that had existed in the southern and 
western parts of the country and placed those lands under community ownership 
(Article 3:1, 2). In order to administer and facilitate rural land redistribution, Peasant 
Associations (PAs) were formed in almost every village. The PAs were given power 
to redistribute rural land to local farmers and adjudicate rural land-related disputes. 
Under this proclamation, only individuals who directly worked on the land were 
entitled to land and hiring labour was generally banned (Article 4:5). Since land was 
placed under community ownership through the PAs, any transfer of land through 
whatever means like sale, lease or mortgage was prohibited (Article 5). Farmers 
were only given use rights and not private ownership rights. Moreover, as a direct 
response to the imperial land policies, tenancy and landlordism in general were 
abolished (Article 6:3).     
 
The 1975 land reform was therefore a radical departure from the imperial land 
policies and related historically entrenched practices. The reform fundamentally 
shifted not only the rural land ownership from the landlords to the tenants but also 
the rural political power from the absentee landlords to the local PAs (Ottaway and 
Ottaway, 1978). In a dramatic power shift, the former losers under the imperial 
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regime – i.e. the peasants – became the new winners, and the old winners – i.e. the 
landlords – became the new losers as land was confiscated from them without any 
compensation. In the early years of the land reform, the peasants enjoyed the 
freedom of consuming all the fruits of their labour and also felt tenure security as 
they were given indefinite land use rights (Pausewang, 1990). Taking all this into 
account, it was not surprising therefore that the reform measures were warmly 
welcomed by the majority, particularly in the southern and western parts of the 
country.  
 
Nevertheless, despite its early achievements and popularity among the rural 
communities, the Derg’s popularity waned rapidly as a consequence of its pre-
occupation with political control of all aspects of society’s life (Hussein, 2004). The 
politicization of the PAs is an excellent illustration in this regard, as the Derg 
gradually subjected the PAs to political control (Hussein, 2004). Hence, “what was 
established in order to promote local democracy, justice, and peasants’ rights, has in 
practice turned into a control for administrative efficiency and against popular 
participation” (Pausewang, 1988, p.264). Or, in other words, for the most part, the 
PAs were converted into “extensions of state power, rather than agencies of self-
administration” (Clapham, 1988, p.161). As a consequence, PAs lost their legitimacy 
and moral authority among the rural populations – the very populations they were 
created to represent and serve.  
 
Similarly, the establishment of ‘Agricultural Producer’s Co-operatives (APC)’ and an 
‘Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC)’ produced adverse effects on the gains of 
the land reform itself. These practices re-introduced similar problems of tenure 
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insecurity and landlordism among the ordinary peasants under different names 
(Alemneh, 1987). The government-backed APCs became the new sources of tenure 
insecurity among ordinary peasants who were not included in those cooperatives 
since in most cases “the best land available was allotted to them [APC], evicting 
ordinary peasants, who might then be given greater inferior land in exchange” 
(Clapham, 1988, p.172). This was in stark contrast to the spirit of the land reform, 
whose one aim was to ensure tenure security for ordinary peasants.   
 
Likewise, the Derg established the ‘Agricultural Marketing Corporation’ (AMC), in 
1976 to set prices, buy grains from rural areas and supply agricultural input to the 
farmers (Alemneh, 1987; Clapham, 1988). The AMC was also charged with the 
responsibility of assigning quotas as to how much grain each village should sell to 
their nearby cooperative. As such, ordinary peasants were obligated to sell a certain 
portion of their production to their surrounding cooperative, as per the quota imposed 
on them, at fixed lower prices determined by the AMC (Cohen and Isakson 1987; 
Eshetu, 1990). Hence, the AMC quota system became another indirect way of over-
taxation of the small-scale farmer. This is substantiated by Clapham who argued 
that, “The compulsory purchase of crops at substantially less than open market 
prices is another major form of surplus expropriation” (Clapham, 1988, p.161). This 
again was in sharp contrast to the objectives of the land reform about empowering 
peasants to freely enjoy the fruits of their labour.    
 
In conclusion, despite the radical changes and early success that the Derg brought 
in rural areas, the pre-occupation of the regime with political control, the politicization 
of rural institutions such as the PAs, the APC and AMC greatly undermined those 
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early achievements of the great land reform. Instead of freeing the peasant to make 
independent and free choices about their lands and productions, the Derg simply 
shifted the gears of peasant domination from landlords to the new socialist state 
structures and institutions.   
 
 
4.4. The EPRDF (1991-present)  
 
After taking over power in 1991, the EPRDF introduced reforms in the political 
structure of Ethiopia that have been called both pioneering and radical (Turton, 
2006). It has been called pioneering, “because Ethiopia has gone further than any 
other African state, and further than ‘almost any state worldwide’ (Clapham, 2002: 
27) in using ethnicity as its fundamental organizing principle” (Turton, 2006, p.1). 
Likewise, it has also been called radical, “because it has introduced the principle of 
self-determination [including secession] for federated regional units in a formerly 
highly centralized and unitary state” (Turton, 2006, p.1). Although the EPRDF 
continued the Derg’s land policy of ‘state ownership’, it constitutionally devolved ‘land 
administration’ to the newly ethnically delineated regional states, linking control over 
land to ethnic self-determination. The aim of this section is to provide an extended 
analysis of the current political order since the question of control over land is now 
constitutionally embedded in the overall political structure. As such, the first section 
introduces how the EPRDF came to power, which is followed by an analysis of the 
main features of ethnic federalism vis-à-vis the federal principles identified in 
Chapter three. In the third section, ethnic self-determination – a foundation for the 
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current political order – is discussed and in the final section land policy under this 
regime in general is analysed.   
 
 
4.4.1. The EPRDF: Evolution and Consolidation of Power   
 
The birth of the EPRDF is intimately linked with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF). The TPLF was officially established in 1975 with objective of liberating 
Tigray from an Amhara-dominated Ethiopia and create an independent republic of 
Tigray (Aregawi, 2009). However, soon after launching its armed struggle, the TPLF 
modified its initial objective to cultural and political autonomy for the Tigray region 
within a united democratic Ethiopia (Young, 1997). By 1989, the TPLF had already 
assumed total control over the Tigray region (Young, 1997). However, in order to go 
ahead with their objective of toppling the Derg and creating a democratic Ethiopia 
with a legitimate government, the TPLF had to secure military and political allies from 
other regions and ethnic groups of Ethiopia. Thus, in 1987, a broader-based 
movement, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was 
created composed of the TPLF and the Amhara National Democratic Movement 
(ANDM). In pursuit of widening the coalition against the Derg, the Oromo People’s 
Democratic Organization (OPDO) was established by the TPLF in 1990 after 
negotiations with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) failed to include the latter in the 
coalition (Leencho, 1999). In addition to being the creator of the new front, the TPLF 




When the EPRDF entered Addis Ababa on 28 May 1991 it met no resistance. The 
Derg regime had already lost crucial external support when the Soviet Union was 
dissolved, and Mengistu Haile Mariam had already fled to Zimbabwe. Talks under 
the auspices of the United States and the United Kingdom had taken place earlier in 
London in which they endorsed a new Ethiopian government led by the 
TPLF/EPRDF and an independent Eritrea led by the Eritrean People’s Liberation 
Front (EPLF) (Aalen, 2002).  
 
After securing recognition from the world’s superpower, the main challenge for the 
TPLF/EPRDF was how to reform the state in order to establish political legitimacy 
among the wide range of Ethiopian peoples. Given the quest for self-government 
among many Ethiopian ethnic groups, addressing the issue of ethnicity in 
governance became an inevitable reality for the TPLF/EPRDF elite (Andreas, 2003; 
Tronvoll, 2000). This was grounded in two major factors: first of all, the main 
opposition movements that together under the umbrella of EPRDF overthrew the 
Derg were all organized along ethnic lines. The other main reason was the Ethiopian 
history itself. As described earlier, Ethiopian political history has been characterized 
by severe domination of other ethnic groups by a strong northern Amharized state 
(Andreas, 2003; Tronvoll, 2000). In that regard, the TPLF, in order to disconnect 
itself from the historical northern domination, advocated for giving every ethnic group 
in Ethiopia the right to autonomy including secession if so wanted (Tronvoll, 2000). 
Therefore, the introduction of ethnic federalism was a collective result of different 
factors converging together, some rooted in the Ethiopian political history itself 




4.4.2. Ethnic Federalism and its Federal Features   
 
The new constitution of 1994 unequivocally declared Ethiopia to be a federal state 
(Article 1) and recognized nine territorial entities constructed mainly along ethnic 
lines as the new federal sub-units or regional states (Article 47), as shown in the 
following figure.  
 










Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia (2013)   
 
In accordance with the federal principle of dispersed sovereignty and division of 
powers between the centre and its sub-units, the constitution empowered regional 
states to form their own state governments (legislative, judiciary, and executive 
branches), promulgate their own constitutions and establish their own state 
administrations based on their respective regional states’ constitutions. Articles 51 
and 52 of the constitution list the powers and functions allocated to the federal 
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government and to the regional states respectively. Among others, the regional 
states are empowered to administer land and other natural resources (Article 52:2d). 
Concerning tax collection and revenues, both the federal and regional governments 
share the right to levy taxes and collect duties on revenue sources (Articles 96, 97).  
 
With regard to representation of regional states at the federal level, the Ethiopian 
federal system ensures this through two chambers known as the House of the 
Peoples’ Representatives (HPR) and the House of the Federation (HOF). In the 
Ethiopian federal system, the highest authority in the federal state is the HPR (Article 
55). It is equivalent to the lower house in parliamentarian systems, usually serving 
the interests of the people as a whole. The members of the HPR are elected by a 
majority vote cast in general elections every five years. Twenty seats out of the 
maximum 550 seats of the HPR are reserved for minority groups (Article 54). 
However, elections to these minority seats or decisions on who constitute a minority 
are not specified in the constitution. As elaborated in Article 55, the most important 
functions of the HPR are to enact laws on matters allocated to the federal level and 
ratify national policy standards. Moreover, when it comes to forming a government, a 
political party or a coalition of political parties that has the greatest number of seats 
in the HPR shall form the government and elect the Prime Minister (Article 56).  
 
The Ethiopian upper house – i.e. the HOF – is organized and given a different 
function from the conventional functions of upper houses or second chambers in 
many federal systems. As discussed earlier in Chapter three, in classical federal 
systems like Switzerland and the United States, the second chamber serves as the 
representative institution of the federal sub-units (Aalen, 2002). In other words, 
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members of this house are direct representatives of their respective regions. 
However, in the Ethiopian case, members of the HOF are not representatives of the 
above-mentioned nine federal sub-units but are representatives of the ‘Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia’ (Article 61:1). Likewise, while in other federal 
systems regional states are equally represented in the second chamber regardless 
of their population size; in the Ethiopian case representation in the HOF is 
proportional to the population size of each ethnic group (Article 61:2).  
 
When it comes to the functions of the second chambers, in the United States federal 
model, for instance, the second chamber of the legislature plays the important role of 
checking the power of the other federal institutions (Aalen, 2002). In parliamentary 
systems like those of Canada or Australia, the second chamber has the power to 
ensure the participation of regional states in the decision-making or legal actions of 
the national government (Sharman, 1987). The Ethiopian HOF plays neither of these 
roles. Instead, it is given a legal role of investigating constitutional disputes and 
interpretation of the constitution, which is mainly done by supreme courts or 
specialized constitutional courts in other federal systems (Assefa, 2006). This implies 
that the federal sub-units in Ethiopia do not have any role in policy making or 
debating laws at the federal level, which starkly contradicts the practice of other 
federal bicameral parliamentarian systems. Hence, it can be argued that the 
Ethiopian legislature is in fact a unicameral rather than bicameral since the second 
chamber by law does not play any policy or law-making role.  
 
In the executive branch, the Ethiopian federal state is headed by a constitutional 
President and the federal government by an executive Prime Minister. In the 
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Ethiopian system, the president has no real power but, like other constitutional 
monarchs and presidents, should formally sign all new laws coming from the HPR 
(Article 71). The Prime Minister has quite extensive powers akin to those of 
presidents in presidential systems. He is the Chief Executive, the Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers and the Commander-in-chief of the national armed forces 
(Article 74:1).  
 
This being said, in addition to the above-mentioned major federal organs, the other 
federal features of the Ethiopian ethnic federalism model are also to be found in the 
principles and legal framework it has adopted. One of its salient principles is the right 
to self-determination it has accorded to ‘Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of 
Ethiopia’. Given the importance of this principle for understanding the new political 
order in Ethiopia under which land policies in particular and LSLA in general are 
embedded, I provide an extended discussion on it as follows.   
 
 
4.4.3. Self-determination under Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism  
 
The notion of self-determination that has dominated the post-1991 Ethiopian political 
landscape did not emerge as a surprise in the 1994 constitution. In their struggle 
against the military regime, the then strongest rebel groups, the TPLF and EPLF, 
were both organized on the basis of ethnic/regional identity and mobilized their 
constituencies on the card of right to self-determination including secession (Young, 
1997). By the time the military regime was ousted, all the major political movements 
(TPLF, EPLF, OLF) that had contributed to the defeat of the Derg regime were 
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ethnic-based political organizations, each claiming to have fought for the right to self-
determination of their constituent ethnic group. As Andreas stated: 
 
During the Peace and Democracy Conference held at Addis Ababa in July 1991, the vast 
majority of participants were nationalist organizations, with political programmes upholding 
the right to self-determination (Andreas, 2003, p.16).  
 
As a result, the National Charter and the transitional constitution produced by the 
conference uphold the principle of self-determination and secession as 
indispensable entitlements for the ‘Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ of Ethiopia. 
Hence, when the 1991 Peace and Democracy Conference established and 
mandated a constitutional commission, it was already predictable that the principle of 
right to self-determination would seize a central position within the new political 
landscape in Ethiopia.  
 
Accordingly, the principle of right to self-determination including secession became 
one of the pillars of the new constitution that was ratified by the constituent assembly 
on 8 December 1994 and entered into force on 21 August 1995. In order to 
understand the extent to which the 1994 Ethiopian constitution upholds the principle 
of right to self-determination, it is important to look not only at the constitutional 
provisions that explicitly talk about self-determination, but also at provisions that are 
implicitly directed towards enjoyment of the right to self-determination. For the 
purpose of this thesis, I discuss those constitutional provisions under political self-




A. Political Self-Determination 
 
One way in which peoples’ right to political self-determination is observed in 
multinational states is through dispersion of a state sovereignty among different 
centres so that each level of government exercises sovereignty over certain policy 
areas (Kymlicka, 2001). From its start, the Ethiopian constitution unequivocally 
states that Ethiopia is an aggregate state of ‘Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’. 
Unlike the constitutions of unitary states or even of some federal states in which the 
state’s sovereignty is vested in the people as a whole or in the constituent units, the 
Ethiopian sovereignty is vested in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia. 
Article 8 states that:  
 
1. All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia  
2. This constitution is an expression of their sovereignty 
3. Their sovereignty shall be expressed through their representatives elected in accordance 
with this constitution and through direct democratic participation (FDRE-Constitution, 
1995, Article 8:1, 2 and 3).  
 
This article confirms the constitutional commitment to the ultimate sovereignty of the 
‘Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia’. It portrays the new Ethiopian state 
as a union formed through the free consent of the ‘Nation, Nationalities and Peoples 
of Ethiopia’. Thus, if any level of the government ceases to serve their interests or 
abuses their rights, the ‘Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ are entitled to reassert 





This leads us towards what the constitution has explicitly declared as the right to 
self-determination, including secession.  Under the Ethiopian constitution Article 
39:1, “Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopian has an unconditional right to 
self-determination, including the right to secession.” In principle, the constitutional 
procedures for the exercise of this right are not complicated. First, the demand for 
secession has to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the legislative council of the 
‘Nation, Nationality or People’ concerned (Article 39:4a); Second, the federal 
government is then obliged to hold a referendum in that region within three years 
(Article 39:4b). If the ‘Yes’ vote receives a simple majority in the referendum, then 
the ethnic group in question could secede from the federation following the transfer 
of powers and division of assets between the federal government and the concerned 
ethnic group (Article 39:4c,d and e). Therefore, it would not be an overstatement to 
say that, under the 1994 Ethiopian constitution, all Ethiopian ethnic groups are 
entitled to a unilateral right to secession. As such, in theory, as Andreas argues, 
“The foundation of the Ethiopian state as well as its continuance now requires the 
consent of each Ethiopian Nation, Nationality and People” (Andreas, 2003, p.17). 
 
 
B. Economic Self-Determination  
 
Economic self-determination is defined here as “the ability of the peoples to take 
control over their mineral resources and use those resources for their own ends” 
(Farmer, 2005, p.419). The question of control over natural resources and related 
wealth lurks behind most of the struggles or demands for political self-determination. 
In fact, management and distribution of natural wealth is one of the major causes of 
violent conflicts around the world (Bannon and Collier, 2003; Alao, 2007). Particularly 
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for indigenous peoples, as discussed in the previous chapter, the question of control 
over the natural resources on their traditional territories is inextricably intertwined 
with their demands for political self-determination (Stavenhagen, 2005). Hence, 
economic self-determination goes hand-in-hand with political self-determination.  
 
Under the federal power-sharing arrangement enshrined in the Ethiopian 
constitution, both the federal and state governments “shall jointly levy and collect 
taxes on incomes derived from large-scale mining and all petroleum and gas 
operations, and royalties on such operations” (Article, 98:3). This means that the 
control over natural resources in Ethiopia falls under what is known under federal 
constitutions as the ‘concurrent powers’ – i.e. powers shared by the federal and state 
governments. In case of emergence of other revenue sources that are not mentioned 
in the constitution (undesignated powers of taxation), it is stated that, “The House of 
Federation and the House of Peoples’ Representatives shall, in a joint session, 
determine by a two-thirds majority vote on the exercise of powers of taxation which 
have not been specifically provided for in the constitution” (Article 99). This article 
could contradict the provision in Article 51:2, according to which “All powers not 
given expressly to the Federal Government alone or concurrently to the Federal and 
the states are reserved to the states.”  
 
All in all, despite the limitations and ambiguities inherent in the constitution and 
related legislations, it could be argued that, in general, the Ethiopian ethnic 
federalism legal framework to a certain extent recognizes economic self-




C. Socio-cultural Self-Determination   
 
Socio-cultural self-determination is defined here as, among other meanings, the 
ability of a people to preserve its way of life, ensure the continuation of its language 
and freely participate in cultural life with others (Fribourg Declaration, 2007). It is 
argued that, in many cases, minorities and indigenous peoples demand political self-
determination in order to enjoy their socio-cultural rights. Particularly in multination 
states where majorities do not only control the politics and the economy but also 
tend to impose their culture over the rest, demands for political and economic self-
determinations by minorities also go hand-in-hand with demands for socio-cultural 
self-determination (Thornberry, 2002).  
 
One of the major components of socio-cultural self-determination is the right to use 
and maintain one’s own language. In fact, language is perhaps the most distinctive 
feature along which groups justify their suitability to be categorized as ‘people’ or a 
distinct ‘nation’ that is entitled to the right to self-determination. As Hannum argued:  
 
Self-determination, as the concept developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in 
Europe, was based primarily on linguistic groups, rather than on religion, politics, or 
economics (Hannum, 1990, p.458).  
 
Language, in addition to its function as the glue that holds and sustains a community 
together, also plays a symbolic role as an identity marker vis-à-vis other communities 
or the state at large. Recognition of a language as official or in other form ultimately 
means recognition of those who speak that language. Denial of this status, on the 




In stark contrast to its predecessors, the 1994 Ethiopian constitution adopted the 
principle of linguistic pluralism. In general terms, the constitution states, “All 
Ethiopian languages shall enjoy equal state recognition” (Article 5:1). Similarly, 
Article 39:2 reads, “Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to 
speak, to write and to develop its own language; to express, to develop and to 
promote its culture; and to preserve its history.” These provisions alone would not 
have been a significant departure from the 1987 Constitution under the Derg regime, 
which also granted all Ethiopian languages equal state recognition (Assefa, 2006). 
However, the current federal constitution went beyond mere recognition of all 
Ethiopian languages to authorizing members of the federation (regional states) to 
determine by law their respective official languages. Accordingly, while Amharic is 
retained as the working language of the federal government (Article 5:2), regional 
states are entitled to determine their respective working languages by their own laws 
(Article 5:3). As a result, six out of the nine regional states in Ethiopia today use their 
regional languages as official languages within the jurisdiction of their regional 
states.18 It can therefore be argued here again that the Ethiopian federal legal 
framework recognizes socio-cultural rights of the ‘Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
of Ethiopia’.    
 
 
4.4.4. Land Policy under the EPRDF  
 
Land policy under the current system is not that different from that of its predecessor. 
Upon assuming full control of the country in May 1991, the EPRDF announced the 
                                                          
18
 These six regional states are the Afar Regional State, Amhara Regional State, Harari Regional 
State, Oromia Regional State, Somali Regional State and Tigray Regional State.  
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continuation of the land policy of the Derg (EPRDF, 1991). Although it radically 
changed the overall state structure – from military socialist to federal democratic (at 
least in theory) – in November 1991 and later on in the new constitution of 1994, the 
EPRDF entrenched the state ownership of land in Ethiopia. Article 40:3 states: 
 
The right to ownership of rural land and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is 
exclusively vested in the state and the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property of the 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other 
means of exchange. 
 
This article further specifies the right for Ethiopian peasants and pastoralists to be 
protected against eviction from their lands and the right to obtain land for grazing and 
cultivation without payment (Article 40:4, 5).  
 
Since Article 52:2d of the constitution empowers regional states to administer land 
and other natural resources, some regional states have promulgated their regional 
land laws under the general framework of ‘state land ownership’ outlined in the 
federal constitution and Federal Rural Land Proclamation No. 89/1997.19 As such, all 
regional land laws validate state land ownership and give farmers only usufruct rights 
to plots of land without transfer rights such as sale or mortgage. Regional states’ 
land laws only differ on what portion of land farmers are allowed to lease out, the 
lease period and questions about land redistribution.  
 
This policy of ‘state land ownership’ has been and continues to be a source of 
intense debate among policy makers, practitioners and scholars from diverse 
                                                          
19
 The regions that had their own regional land laws by the time I was conducting this research are: 
the Amhara Regional State, the Oromia Regional State, the SNNPRS and the Tigray Regional State.  
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disciplines (Dessalegn, 1994; Dessalegn and Taye, 2006; Ethiopian Economic 
Association (EEA), 2002). The debate can be summarized mainly around the 
question of whether state land ownership guarantees tenure security for the 
peasants and better land productivity or whether the policy creates uncertainty 
among the land users and therefore less land investment and productivity (Hussein, 
2001).    
 
 
A. The Government Position: State Ownership 
 
The government argues that its general principle of ‘state land ownership’ is meant 
to protect the rural peasantry from the adverse effects of market forces and to 
ensure access to land for all the rural communities. Land privatization, according to 
this perspective, would result in the concentration and accumulation of arable land in 
the hands of a small number of landowners (Hussein, 2001; Yigremew, 2001). This 
could then lead to massive immigration of the landless peasantry to urban areas, 
creation of exploitative tenancy structures, and increases of rural poverty and food 
insecurity (Hussein, 2001; Yigremew, 2001). Given the historical experience of 
landlordism under the imperial regime where rural land was concentrated in the 
hands of a few absentee landlords, Mersha (1998) argued that privatization – would 
bring back that kind of system under a different name:   
 
The proposed agenda of privatization of land will indeed open the floodgate for a massive 
eviction of peasants and the displacement of pastoralists…. Moreover, the pre-reform period 
land lords, who battened on the meager ‘surplus’ produced by the peasants, mostly tenants, 
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will now be replaced by ‘capitalist’ farmers who will alienate small peasants from their land 
(Mersha, 1998 cited in Hussein, 2001, p.49). 
 
Hence, the government maintains that, by keeping the land under the ownership of 
the state, the state could serve as the protector of the rural peasants from market 
forces and deter rural landlessness and absolute poverty (Hussein, 2001; Yigremew, 
2001).   
 
 
B. The Critics’ Position: Privatization 
 
The critics of ‘state land ownership policy’ argue that the government’s claim of 
protecting rural peasants from market forces and keeping in check a worst-case 
scenario of massive rural landlessness are both built on a false hypothesis (EEA, 
2002). This hypothesis assumes that once the land is privatized then the rural 
farmers would automatically sell off their farms to wealthy private investors, thereby 
resulting in the accumulation of land in the hands of a few and the dispossession of 
the rural masses. According to the critics, so far the empirical evidence does not 
support this hypothesis that the majority of rural farmers would sell off their farms if 
they have the opportunity to do so (Berhanu, 2004; Deiniger et al., 2003; Samuel, 
2006). Experience from land renting has shown that, despite its legalization, so far 
only very few rural farmers have rented out their lands except under special 
circumstances such as loss of oxen or labour (Dessalegn and Taye, 2006). Hence, 
according to the critics, protection of rural farmers from market forces and prevention 
of massive rural landlessness are both inaccurate assumptions built on an 




On the contrary, the critics argue that ‘state land ownership policy’ has created 
tenure insecurity and discouraged landholders from making long-term investment in 
the land. They maintain that the state land ownership policy has limited the 
opportunities for a dynamic rural land market that would have allowed entrepreneurs 
to access land and use it efficiently (EEA, 2002). According to Crewett and Korf, 
state land ownership:    
 
1. Prevents the emergence of a dynamic rural land market that allows entrepreneurial 
agents to access credit and land,  
2. It discourages farmers on marginal land to out-migrate and ties the farmer to inefficient 
uses of his land, which subsequently leads to fragmentation of plot size, overpopulation in 
the rural areas and resource degradation and,  
3. It perpetuates the legacies of the derg regime’s redistribution programmes that are 
creating tenure insecurity and discouraging landowners from investing in sustainable 
resource use (Crewett and Korf, 2008, p.206).   
 
These arguments are underpinned by neo-classical economic theories of property 
rights which suggest that land privatization increases the incentives for long-term 
investments in the land, increases land productivity and encourages access to land 
for commercial farmers. Consequently, this would allow out-migration of labour – i.e. 
ineffective small-scale farmers – to other economic sectors in urban centres 





C. Third Option: Community Ownership 
 
Dessaleng (1994) on his part takes the argument beyond the simple ‘state 
ownership’ vs. ‘privatization’ dichotomy, which he thinks are both unhelpful in the 
Ethiopian context where the concept of ‘Community’ is more important than both the 
bigger state and the smaller individual. Hence, he proposed what he called 
‘community’ or ‘associative’ land ownership that places land matters in the hands of 
the concerned community (Dessalegn, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2011). ‘State ownership’, 
according to him, creates insecurity among landholders and dependency on the 
state, which in turn disempowers both the individual and the communities. He argues 
that state ownership also enhances the hegemonic authority of the state over the 
communities. Land privatization, on the other hand, Dessalegn (1994) argues, is an 
alien concept since in Ethiopia we cannot separate individual holders from their 
communities. The farmland each person holds belongs to the larger community in 
which he/she resides and the individual plot alone would not be sufficient without 
shared community resources such as the water resources, pasture and grassland, 
woodland or forestland, and others (Dessalegn, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2011). Except for 
like-minded academics who are pushing this argument forward and some NGOs who 
are supporting related projects, the concept has not yet been seriously considered 
by policy makers. However, this argument resonates well with the traditional land 





4.4.5. Land Registration and Certification Programme  
   
Despite the differences on which land policy provides tenure security to land users, 
there is a consensus that the current tenure insecurity is made worse by the absence 
of any official document that recognizes land use rights for rural farmers. In order to 
fill this gap, the government has started an initiative to register and provide 
certificates for rural land users. Hence, since 2003, four regional states, namely the 
Amhara, Oromia, SNNPRS and Tigray, launched a large-scale land registration and 
certification programme modelled on the experience of the Tigray region, which 
started a similar programme early in 1998 through its own efforts (Solomon, 2006).  
 
This programme has been hailed by the World Bank and other donor agencies as 
one of the most successful and cost efficient land registration programmes in Africa 
(Deiniger et al., 2007). Within a span of only two to three years, the programme 
registered about 20 million plots under the names of about 5.5 million households in 
a cost effective manner (Deiniger et al., 2007). 
 
The success and cost efficiency of this programme could be attributed to the highly 
decentralized manner in which it was executed. The major work of the programme 
was mainly carried out by a locally elected body for this purpose, known as the ‘Land 
use and Administration Committee’ (LAC). The LAC is elected through a popular 
vote for a limited term of two to three years, depending on each regional state. To 
ensure women’s participation, it is made mandatory that at least one woman be 




In order to increase transparency and the legitimacy of the process, the registration 
of each plot requires the presence of the plot holder and his/her neighbours on the 
field. Hence, the programme, rather than being the work of only the LAC, actively 
involves the concerned public in general and the plot holders in particular. In some 
regions, the local governments have organized trained support teams to provide 
advice for the LAC. In Amhara region for example, there was a survey team at 
woreda government level made up of students trained in the relevant procedures to 
supervise the overall process and provide technical expertise for the LAC (Sida-
Amhara Rural Development Programme, 2010). In the SNNPRS, the supervision is 
much less intense, only carried out by the ‘development agent’ in each kebele 
(Wondwosen and Ayana, 2006). The Oromia region experience, however, provides 
full independence to the LAC to carry out their responsibility and only call upon the 
woreda office for advice when deemed necessary (Senbeta and Merga, 2006).  
 
Upon the completion of the registration process and public approval of the overall 
process and results, households receive preliminary registration certificates 
identifying their plot. Then, after all the information for the whole kebele is entered 
into the land registry book, households will receive a final land certificate with their 
photographs and map of their landholdings attached. In Tigray region, certificates 
are issued only in the name of the head of the household (the man), which raises 
concerns about the women’s rights. But in all other regions certificates are issued in 
the name of the head and spouse and space is provided on the land certificate to 




Coming back to the principal question of tenure security, there is no definitive answer 
as to whether the land registration and certification programme has erased land 
tenure insecurity among the beneficiaries (rural farmers). According to Daniel (2011), 
while land registration and certification has, to a certain extent at least, assured the 
peasants of compensation in the event of losing their land for public projects, it has 
not completely erased the fear of losing land per se. There is still widespread fear 
among the rural peasants that the government could give away their land to large-
scale investors anytime or that they will lose a portion of their land through the 
periodic land redistribution practice that is enshrined in the land laws of some 
regional states (Daniel, 2011).20 
 
 
4.5. Conclusion  
 
As I have tried to show in this chapter, control over rural land has been one of the 
defining features for the state-communities relationship under successive regimes in 
Ethiopia. During the imperial regime, rural land was used not only as a productive 
economic resource to maintain the empire but also a political tool through which the 
landlords and state officials maintained the loyalty of peasants who constitute over 
85% of the population. As such, the imperial land policy was characterized by 
extreme inequality between the tenants (southern and western farmers) and northern 
landlords.  
 
                                                          
20
 The regional states that have enshrined land redistribution in their regional land laws are the 
Amhara Regional State, SNNPRS and Tigray Regional State.  
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The Derg regime came to power with a promise to avert this historical injustice 
against the peasant, and accordingly introduced radical land reforms in 1975 that 
abolished landlordism and gave the land to the tiller (or in Amhric, ‘Meret le Arashu’). 
Nonetheless, despite removing some of the forces of domination over the peasants, 
the Derg land policies enhanced the power of the state over the peasant by 
politicising rural institutions and using them as means for controlling the peasants. 
As such, the Derg only transferred peasant domination from landlords to the state.  
 
Although the EPRDF more or less continued with the main principles of the Derg’s 
land policies, it finally wedded control over land to the question of ethnic self-
determination. As such, land administration was constitutionally given to ethnically 
delineated regional states. The question is, does this represent a departure from the 
historical trend of state hegemony and peasant subordination or is it a continuation 
of a similar trend in a different form? By drawing upon the contemporary trend of 
LSLA in Gambella regional state, the following chapters will attempt to provide (both 
















Chapter Five: Gambella Regional State in Ethiopia: 
Territory, Peoples and Identity Politics   
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the Gambella region and provide a 
context for a better understanding of the subsequent chapters about the 
implementation of right to self-determination and the contemporary phenomenon of 
LSLA in the region. As such, the first section introduces the region and its peoples, 
followed by a historical account of how the Gambella region was incorporated into 
imperial Ethiopia. The historical account of how Gambella became part of Ethiopia is 
included here because it can help to explain some of the contemporary impediments 
between the Gambella region and the Ethiopian state. In the third section, I will 
discuss the circumstances that led to the recognition of the former Gambella 
province as one of the nine regional states in the post-1991 Ethiopia. Finally, since 
the Gambella region has been known for its conflicts, I will discuss the major 
conflicts in the region. In spite of the region being referred to by the central 
government as an “empty region with abundant unutilized lands” (Shiferaw, 2011, 
p.100), this last section demonstrates that, on the contrary, resource-induced 
conflicts have been one of the defining characteristics between the two major 
indigenous ethnic groups of Gambella – namely the Anywa and the Nuer – for the 




5.2. The Region and its Peoples  
 
The Gambella regional state is one of the nine member states of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). It is located in the south-western Ethiopian 
lowlands bordering the Oromia regional state from the north and east, SNNPRS from 
the south-east and the Republic of South Sudan from the west (Figure 5). 
Administratively the region is divided into three zones along the three major ethnic 
groups, (1) Anywa zone, (2) Nuer zone, and (3) Majang zone. These three zones are 
further divided into 12 woredas; five under Anywa zone, two under Majang zone, four 
under Nuer zone and one special woreda that is directly accountable to the regional 
state council. According to the latest census, the Gambella region has a population 
of 306,916 people, which makes it the smallest region after Harar in terms of 
population size (CSA, 2007). 
 
Figure 5: Map of the Gambella Region 
Source: UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2013) 
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The region is home to five indigenous ethnic groups, namely the Anywa, the Nuer, 
the Majang, the Opo, and the Kumo. Each ethnic group will be discussed in detail 
below. Even though these groups are all of Nilo-Saharan linguistic origin, they do not 
form a homogenous ethnic identity. Ethnic boundaries among these groups are 
mainly constructed along linguistic lines, distinct cultural and political traditions, and 
different subsistence economic systems. For instance, while the Anywa are 
predominantly cultivators, the Nuers are pastoralists and the Majang typically 
combine shifting cultivation with hunting (Evans-Pritchard, 1940 a and b; Stauder, 
1971). 
 
In addition to the indigenous groups, since the 1980s Gambella has also witnessed a 
huge influx of diverse ethnic groups from the central/highland parts of the country. 
This wave of migration has introduced a new category of people in Gambella known 
as ‘highlanders’. The category ‘highlanders’ is generally used to collectively refer to 
other Ethiopians in the region who do not belong to the five indigenous groups of the 
region. The identity boundary between the five ‘indigenous ethnic groups’ versus the 
‘highlanders’ is constructed along: linguistic origins, the highlanders being mainly 
from ‘Semitic and Cushitic’ linguistic origin while the indigenous groups are from the 
‘Nilo-Saharan’ linguistic origin; racially, the ‘brown’ highlanders being contrasted with 
the ‘black’ indigenous peoples and; culturally, highlanders share a common 
traditional dish known as injera,21 while the indigenous peoples of Gambella mainly 
eat kwon/kwan22 as their traditional dish. Most significantly, since the incorporation of 
the Gambella region into the contemporary Ethiopian state at the beginning of the 
                                                          
21
 Injera: It is a yeast-risen flatbread made from teff cereal, soft, spongy texture, with tiny holes and 
slightly sour taste.  
22
 Kwon/Kwan: Is an Anywa and Nuer words respectively for a dish made out of maize and sorghum flour cooked 




20th century, the imperial Ethiopian state had been introduced through, identified with 
and represented by, the ‘brown skin highlanders’ in the region. Therefore, from the 
locals’ vantage point, the ‘brown highlanders’ and the central Ethiopian state are only 
two sides of the same coin (Dereje, 2011). 
 
Socio-economically, until recently the Gambella region and its peoples have been 
among the most marginalized communities in Ethiopia in terms of government 
services. Despite some progress being made, particularly in the area of social 
services and basic development infrastructures, the socio-economic gap between 
the local communities and the highlanders remains staggering. The business sector 
and, in fact, the general economy of the region is totally controlled by the 
highlanders, leaving the indigenous populations heavily dependent on a diminishing 
number of government jobs. This marginalization has its roots in the integration of 
the region into the Ethiopian state, which will be discussed in detail below, after 





Anywa is spelled in different ways in the literature, sometimes as Anuak, Anyuak, or 
Agnwak (Evans-Pritchard, 1940b; Perner, 1994). The people call themselves 
‘Anywa’ and their language ‘dha-Anywa’ meaning Anywa-language. As part of the 
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cultural revival under ethnic federalism23, Anywa was reinforced as the official name 
of the people. Hence, throughout this thesis Anywa is used.  
 
The settlement pattern of the Anywa people is mainly concentrated along the main 
four rivers in the Gambella region, namely the Baro, Alwero, Gilo, and Akobo. On the 
Sudanese side, the Anywa are also settled along the Oboth River (Kurimoto, 1992). 
The Anywa share boundaries with all the indigenous ethnic groups of Gambella, 
including the highlanders. The mountains to the east and north of the Gambella 
region have been recognized as boundary markers between the Anywa and highland 
Ethiopia in general and the Oromo people in particular (Kurimoto, 1992). To the 
western side of the Gambella region, the Anywa share a boundary with the Nuer 
ethnic group. However, to the southern part of the region, the Anywa-land extends to 
South Sudan where South Sudanese Anywas share boundary with the Murle ethnic 
group. Between the Anywa-land and highland Ethiopia there are smaller ethnic 
groups such as the Opo and Kumo in the northwest and northeast and the Majang in 
eastern parts (Kurimoto, 1992).   
 
Under the current administrative structure of the Gambella regional state, the Anywa 
zone comprises five woredas, namely Abobo, Dimma, Gambella, Gog, and Jor. Itang 
woreda and Gambella municipality, which used to be part of the Anywa zone were 
made multi-ethnic entities after 2003 as a consequence of large influxes of other 
ethnic groups (highlanders and Nuer) to these areas (Interview – 16GOV, 12 Apr. 
2012).24 Despite accounting for only 21% of the population of the region, the Anywa 
                                                          
23
 In the early years of the EPRDF (1991-1996), the dominant political party in Gambella, the 
Gambella Peoples Liberation Movement, took different measures to reinstate Anywa culture and 
traditions including Anywa literature.  
24
 This interviewee is an elected woreda official interviewed in Itang town.  
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zone is by far the largest zone, comprising about 70% of the total land area of the 
Gambella region (Dereje, 2006).  
 
Although the Anywa subsistence economy largely depends on agriculture, the 
practices differ considerably according to the ecological variations of different Anywa 
settlements. As is thoroughly discussed by Kurimoto (1996), the Anywa classify their 
ecological zones into three main categories. These are, according to Kurimoto 
(1996), what they call ‘Bap’ (grassland that is flooded every rainy season); ‘Wok’ 
(woodland); and ‘Lul’ (forest). Those who live in ‘Bap’ areas tend to practise 
pastoralism and fishing in addition to cultivation. Since most of the land is flooded 
during rainy seasons, Bap is not a very convenient place for cultivation. Cultivation is 
only practised in the slightly elevated hinterland where villages are also constructed. 
The subsistence economy of those Anywa people who live in Bap areas is similar to 
that of the Nuer, with whom they share boundaries and similar ecological conditions. 
The Anywa of ‘Wok’ (woodland) mainly practise shifting cultivation. During the dry 
season, cultivation is carried out on the riverbanks and in rainy seasons when 
riverbanks are flooded the people shift to the hinterland. Although fishing and 
pastoralism are also practised, agriculture remains the most important means of 
subsistence in those areas. The biggest Anywa population lives in woodland areas. 
In the third category of Lul (forest), the practices of fishing and raising domestic 
animals are virtually non-existent. Due to the fertility of the soil and the lack of 
weeds, enough food can be produced for the whole year in one cultivation. In 
addition to cultivation, beekeeping and hunting are very common practices among 
the Anywa of ‘Lul’.  It is argued that the south-eastern Anywa adopted the forest 
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livelihood style from their neighbours, the Majang people, who are forest people 
(Kurimoto, 1996).  
 
Politically, the Anywa traditional political system is a centralized system consisting of 
village states headed by either a Nyeya (king) or Kwaaro (headman). The king or 
headman takes care of all the affairs of village life through different structures from 
food production to conflict resolution and ensures security for villagers either through 
peaceful relations or wars with neighbouring villages and ethnic groups (Evans-
Pritchard, 1940b). Some of these institutions, particularly in villages close to 
Gambella regional capital, were dismantled during the Derg regime and most of 
them could not be revived after the fall of the Derg. However, traditional leaders still 
play a large role in rural areas in terms of cultural and social issues. In fact, although 
the traditional political system has evolved over the years, the traditional kings and 
chiefs remain the legitimate leaders among the Anywa of South Sudan (Gurton 
Trust, www.gurtong.net, 2013).   
 
 
5.2.2. Nuer  
 
The Nuer is the second largest ethnic group in the Republic of South Sudan after the 
Dinka. The historical settlement of the Nuer in the Gambella region is a contested 
issue. Many anthropologists and historians believe the contemporary Nuer areas 
both in eastern South Sudan and in Ethiopia used to be Anywa territories (Bahru, 
1976; Collins, 1971; Kurimoto, 1992). In fact, Nuer eastward expansion – from 
Sudan to the current Gambella region of Ethiopia – is a well-researched topic 
 111 
 
(Dereje and Hoehne, 2010). According to Kelly (1985), by the end of the 19th 
century, the Nuer had already expanded their territory fourfold. Hence, the 20th 
century began by major Nuer encroachment into the Anywa land. This encroachment 
had taken place both peacefully in some places – through exchange of cattle with 
Anywa chiefs – and violently in other places – through wars and uprooting of some 
Anywa villages (Dereje, 2003).  
 
At the moment, according to the latest national census results, the Nuer is the 
largest ethnic group in the Gambella region consisting of 46% of the total population 
of the region (CSA, 2007). Geographically, the Nuer zone is located in the western 
part of the Gambella, sharing a boundary with the Republic of South Sudan on the 
northern, western and southern side and Anywa zone on the eastern side. The 
majority of the Ethiopian Nuers are from the Gajaak clan, which is divided into other 
five sub-clans known as: the Thiang, the Cieng Cany, the Cieng Wau, Cieng Nyajani, 
and the Cieng Reng (Dereje, 2005). 
 
The Nuer economy largely relies on cattle. Traditionally, cattle have been of the 
highest economic, religious and symbolic value among the Nuer ethnic group. 
Although limited agriculture, fishing and collection of wild foods are practised by the 
Nuer, cattle remain the most cherished possession as an essential source of food as 
well as a key social asset. The Nuer culture, traditional institutions, social behaviour 
and customs are intimately linked with cattle. Particularly in marriage, cattle play an 
important role as bride wealth given by the parents of the husband to the parents of 
the wife. It is because of this exchange of cattle that the children automatically 
became part of the husband’s family and his line of ancestry (Evans-Pritchard and 
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James, 1990). In religious rituals cattle also play an important role as a sacrifice to 
God. In the Nuer religion, a cow should not be slaughtered for any other purposes 
except as a sacrifice to God. When there are important guests or a marriage 
ceremony, an ox can be slaughtered to feed the guests (Evans-Pritchard, 1956).     
 
Over the last five decades because of recurring famines, displacement and most 
notably the Sudanese civil war, most Nuer have been forced to diversify their 
livelihood by mixing cattle herding with stable farming and fishing in permanent 
villages on the Ethiopia side. As such, permanent access to and control over vital 
natural resources such as land and water has gained more significance among them 
(Dereje, 2005). For the Nuer, land is communally owned. Individuals can have 
limited lands for farming that they can exchange for cattle if they move to a different 
location, but in most cases this exchange takes place only within the same clan. The 
grazing land in most cases is communally used not just by one clan but by different 
clans. This is one of the sources of clan conflicts among the Nuer people. The 
elevated lands where villages are constructed are assigned to specific clans and 
considered as property of that particular clan (Evans-Pritchard, 1940a). 
 
The Nuer political organization and structure could be categorised as a 
confederation of independent and autonomous sections and clans. Each clan has its 
own elected leader. Below the clan structure, the sub-clans also have chiefs and 
sub-chiefs elected on various justifications. In some instances, spiritual leaders play 
leadership roles in Nuer society. They are believed to foresee events and to have 
power over individuals’ and the community’s fate either for good or bad. Spiritual 
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leaders might also be consulted at times of inter-clan or inter-ethnic wars (Evans-
Pritchard, 1940a; Sommer, 2005). 
 
 
5.2.3. Majang   
 
The Majang people are the third largest indigenous ethnic group in the Gambella 
region. Their language is classified under the Nilo-Saharan Surmic African language 
cluster. As such, it differs considerably from either the Anywa or the Nuer languages 
(Stauder, 1971). According to the latest census results, the total Majang population 
is estimated at 15,341 (CSA, 2007). They live in scattered settlements in the hills 
and forests between the lowland Gambella region and highland Ethiopia. According 
to the administrative structure of the Gambella region, the Majang zone comprises 
two woredas, namely the Godere and Mengeshi.  
 
The Majang economy heavily relies on hunting and gathering forest products. 
Although farming has recently also been an important source of livelihood for some 
Majang, still for most agriculture plays only a supplementary role in their livelihoods 
(Kurimoto, 1996). According to my interview with one Majang intellectual (Interview – 
18IND, 15 Aprl. 2012),25 in typical Majang settlements, from January to April, they 
would be out in the forests collecting honey from hives consisting of hollowed logs 
placed in trees. During the rainy season, which lasts from around May to August, the 
Majang would be practising agriculture, and from October to December they mainly 
rely on collecting wild roots and fruits and sometimes eat them together with farm 
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 This interviewee has an MSc in Agriculture and works as a researcher for the Gambella Agricultural 
Research Institute with special focus on the Majang peoples’ agriculture and livelihoods.  
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products (Interview – 18IND, 15 Apr. 2012). Hence, generally speaking, in the 
majority of Majang settlements, agriculture seems to cover only 1/3 of their annual 
livelihood needs; the rest being covered by the forest in particular and their natural 
environment in general.   
 
This being said, due to external pressures and encroachment of other communities 
into traditional Majang areas, some changes have been rapidly taking place in the 
Majang livelihood system. Although formerly they used to avoid these pressures by 
moving deep into the forests when encroached on by other communities, due to a 
lack of more space to move into, they have started to adapt to these new pressures 
by changing their livelihoods. For instance, some Majang have started to settle 
permanently in villages as settled farmers as opposed to their traditional shifting 
cultivation style. As a result, they have adopted planting trees that take several years 
to produce fruits/crops, such as coffee trees, mangos, and avocado. More strikingly, 
herding of domestic animals had been non-existent among the Majang communities 
but, since recently, some Majangs have started to adapt it from highlanders who are 
encroaching onto their settlements (Interview – 18IND, 15 Apr. 2012).   
 
The traditional Majang political system is described as egalitarian in nature with no 
authoritative political positions or leaders (Stauder, 1972). The only people who 
seem to exercise some sort of authority are the spiritual leaders, who perform rituals, 
explain mysteries and foretell events. As such, individuals and communities consult 
spiritual leaders about their fate and they are feared because they are believed to 
trigger some calamities or cause deaths or sicknesses to individuals (FGD – 9, 14 
Apr. 2012). Since traditional Majang villages consist of a very limited number of 
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households (around three to five households, mainly family members), there is no 
standard conflict resolution mechanism. When there is a conflict between these 
family members, either one party to the conflict would simply move away or all would 
desert their settlement and move to different locations (FGD – 9, 14 Apr. 2012).  
 
 
5.2.4. Opo and Kumo  
 
The Opo and Kumo indigenous ethnic groups are numerically and politically less 
significant in the Gambella region. According to the latest national census results, 
the total population of the Opo and Kumo ethnic groups in the Gambella region are 
990 and 224 respectively (CSA, 2007). As such, these ethnic groups do not have 
their own zones or woreda. Their kebeles are divided between woredas under the 
Anywa and Nuer zones.  
 
The livelihood of these ethnic groups depends on agriculture. Due to their numerical 
minority status, these communities have sought security through assimilation into 
one of their neighbouring majority ethnic groups such as the Nuer, Anywa or the 
Oromos (Kurimoto, 1992). At the moment, while most Kumos are intermixed with 
Anywa and Oromo ethnic groups, most Opos are intermixed with their neighbouring 
Nuer clans. That explains why, in the organization of political parties in Gambella, 
the Opo are grouped under the Nuer political party and the Kumo are grouped under 
the Anywa political party. Although the indigenous ethnic groups of the Gambella 
regional state are marginalized in general, the Opo and the Kumo face double 
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5.3. Incorporation of Gambella into the Ethiopian Empire  
 
The contemporary Gambella regional state and its peoples became part of the then 
Ethiopian empire only in the beginning of the 20th century. According to the 1902 
boundary agreement between the British and imperial Ethiopia, Emperor Menelik II 
of Ethiopia leased a piece of territory in the Gambella town around the Baro River to 
the British to serve as a national port for Ethio-Sudanese trade (Bahru, 1987). At the 
time of this agreement, the indigenous Anywa ethnic group had already occupied 
and established permanent village states around the Gambella region. However, 
despite their ownership of the territories around the Baro River, the Anywa were not 
aware of this agreement between Emperor Menelik II and the British (Collins, 1971).   
 
According to Bahru (1987), the 1902 boundary agreement and the establishment of 
the Gambella port were mainly pre-emptive efforts from the British side to discourage 
the increasing French commercial and political influence in Ethiopia as result of the 
establishment of the Ethio-Djibouti railway – Djibouti being a French colony. From 
the Ethiopian empire’s perspective, this was another success for Menelik II, known 
as the expansionist, to expand his territories far to the west and also to extract 
resources from the resource-rich lowland regions. According to Bahru (1987), the 
establishment of the Gambella port proved to be an important success for both the 
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 This interviewee is an elected official who had worked as Development Agent (DA) among the 
Kumo and Opo people.  
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British and the Ethiopian empire. At the peak of its commercial accomplishment, 
from 1920s to1930s, the Gambella port accounted for 70% of the Ethiopian 
international trade through Sudan, with coffee being the main export from Ethiopia 
and cloth and salt the main import from the British colonial Sudan (Bahru, 1987).   
 
Despite the success of the Gambella port, the local populations occupying the trade 
route were conspicuously absent from this lucrative international trade (Dereje, 
2006). The main beneficiaries of the Gambella commercial enclave were the 
Ethiopian imperial representatives stationed in Gambella and the neighbouring 
highlands; the British colonial agents in Sudan and in Gambella; and the expatriate 
traders, mainly of Italian and Greek origins (Bahru, 1987; Kurimoto, 1992). In spite of 
their strategic location along this international trade route, neither the Nuer clan 
elders on the Sudanese side nor the Anywa village chiefs on the Ethiopian side were 
integrated into the political economy of the Baro River trade route (Dereje, 2006). As 
a consequence of their exclusion from this trade and what they saw as a foreign 
intrusion into their territories, the Anywa village chiefs along the Baro River 
organized isolated and small-scale resistances towards both the British colonial 
officials and the Ethiopian imperial establishment in Gambella (Bahru, 1987). 
However, those small-scale resistances turned out to be counterproductive as 
imperial Ethiopia and the British colonial officials responded with disproportionate 
military force in what became known as the ‘pacification campaigns’ (Bahru, 1987). 
As a matter of fact, Kurimoto argued, the reaction of the indigenous communities to 
their exclusion from the international trade and the intrusion of foreigners into their 
territories resulted in a further marginalization and loss of political autonomy 




In addition to their expressed motive of securing a trade route and punishing the 
disloyal chiefs, the so-called ‘pacification campaigns’ also served as a means 
through which to raid slaves from the indigenous communities (Dereje, 2006). Those 
who were captured by imperial Ethiopia’s forces were sold as slaves in the highland 
parts of the country. According to Birhanu (1973), around the same period of those 
‘pacification campaigns’, the Gambella region became one of the major providers of 
slaves in south-western Ethiopia, like other adjacent border regions such as the 
Benishangual-Gumuz region. Birhanu, writing about the slave trade in western and 
south-western regions of Ethiopia, provided the following oral account.  
 
After their capture slaves were beaten and roped together, and gags put in their mouths to 
prevent them from making a loud noise. Their legs were also tied to stones…their faces were 
painted with butter and a type of grass called soso was put around their necks…to make them 
look healthy. If their skins were not dark they were warmed beside a fire for a long time to 
change the pigment of their skins before taking them to the market (Birhanu, 1973, p.14).  
 
Therefore, for the indigenous communities of the Gambella regional state, the arrival 
of the imperial Ethiopian state meant not only economic and political marginalization, 
but also the inhuman experience of slavery. It was this experience of slavery that 
contributed to the stigmatization of the ‘black’ lowland peoples vis-à-vis the ‘brown’ 
highland mainstream Ethiopian societies. For instance, it is still a very common 
practice today to refer to the peoples of Gambella as baria (Amharic word for slave) 
on the streets of Addis Ababa, or demean them as Lemma – the name of the last 




Although on 27 August 1942 Haile Selassie abolished the legal basis of slavery 
throughout the empire and imposed severe penalties including death for slave 
trading (Peter, et al., 2007), he put very little effort into integrating the peoples of the 
periphery into the mainstream Ethiopian polity. In a symbolic gesture, a few Anywa 
chiefs and Nuer clan elders were given imperial titles, something that was too little 
compared to the strategic co-option of local elites that took place in other parts of the 
country (Dereje, 2006).  
 
From an economic perspective, as the British colonial officials left the Gambella 
region after the independence of Sudan, other traders of foreign origin also left the 
region (Collins, 1983). The few Ethiopian highland traders replaced the foreign 
traders in what became the beginning of the end for the indigenous communities’ 
marginalization in the regional economy. In terms of development, the Haile Selassie 
regime also made no effort to reach the peripheral regions with development 
infrastructures such as schools and health services (Kurimoto, 1992).  
 
In the Gambella region from the 1950s missionaries from the Presbyterian Church of 
America (PCUSA) played a de facto role as organs of the state by being the only 
providers of education and health services to the region’s indigenous communities 
(Partee, 2000). Therefore, by the time the imperial regime was ousted in 1974, the 
Gambella region and its peoples were weakly incorporated into the Ethiopian state 
and treated as secondary citizens (Dereje, 2006).  
 
The Derg took some measures towards meaningful integration of the peripheral 
peoples into the mainstream Ethiopian polity. In the first place, ethnic inequality or 
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northern supremacy was condemned. Despite their limitations, social services were 
expanded to lowland regions and education, in particular, was promoted through 
literacy campaigns even in areas where there were no formal schools (Interview – 
2IND, 22 Mar. 2012).27 In an attempt to encourage the national sense of belonging 
among the indigenous communities, in 1978 in the then Gambella district two local 
people were appointed as vice-administrators of the district. In 1987 when the Derg 
introduced a limited form of decentralization, the participation of the indigenous 
peoples in the district’s politics became even more pronounced as the Derg 
gracefully appointed locals to the top two key political posts, namely the ‘district 
administrator’ and ‘party secretary’. In fact, not only were Gambellians appointed in 
various political positions in the then Gambella district, but some were also 
appointed as district administrators or party secretaries in other districts of highland 
Ethiopia (Interview – 2IND, 22 Mar. 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, the Derg’s efforts at the local empowerment and integration of the 
peripheries into mainstream Ethiopian politics were heavily overshadowed by its 
absolute control over all aspects of life and unpopular socialist projects/agenda 
(Donham, 2002). For instance, in its efforts to monopolize all means of control and 
authority, the Derg delegitimized traditional chieftaincies and all other influential 
traditional institutions that were perceived as competing with or barriers to the 
modern/progressive socialist agenda. In the Gambella regional state, much in line 
with other lowland border regions where traditional institutions were maintained, the 
so-called ‘cultural-revolution’ of the Derg ferociously demolished the local culture, 
characterising it as a backward foe of the socialist revolution. The Anywa village 
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 This interviewee, an Anywa from Gambella, used to work as district administrator in various parts of 
Ethiopia during the Derg regime.    
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chiefs, for instance, were deposed; their cultural bride-wealth beads, locally known 
as Dimuy, were thrown into the river; and bride-wealth in general was forcibly 
monetized (Interview – 2IND, 22 Mar. 2012). Hence, for the indigenous peoples, the 
loss of political autonomy and the economic marginalization experienced during the 
imperial regime was simply made worse by the Derg’s ‘cultural revolution’ campaign 
(Dereje, 2006).  
 
Similarly, to the dismay of the indigenous communities, the forced resettlement 
programme of the 1980s, in which over 60,000 farmers from the northern and 
southern regions were brought to the Gambella region without proper consultation 
with or consent of the host, had the effect of further alienating the indigenous 
communities (Kurimoto, 1993). Particularly among the Anywa people on whose 
territories the resettlement villages were established, this provoked a widespread 
anxiety and become one of the sources of the Anywa discourse of a systematic 
ethnic cleansing by the central Ethiopian government (Kurimoto, 1993).  
 
The outbreak of full-scale civil war in Sudan around the same period (1983) 
compounded the demographic anxiety among the Anywa people. According to 
Kurimoto (1993), by the mid-1980s, the number of refugees in the Gambella regional 
state had reached 300,000, outnumbering the local Anywa population by more than 
two times. For the Anywa people, it was the Derg that brought both the highlanders 
and the Sudanese refugees to their territories. Apart from the obvious ecological 
costs of such massive population movement, the huge refugee camps greatly 
damaged the local economy as the imported UNHCR’s grains banished the local 
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products from the market and, in fact, discouraged local agriculture in general 
(Kurimoto, 1993).  
  
Nevertheless, refugees and the UNCHR were not the worst that the Sudanese civil 
war brought to Gambella. With the outbreak of the civil war in Sudan, Gambella was 
transformed into a strategic location for interstate proxy wars between Ethiopia and 
Sudan. While the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), supported by the Derg, 
launched its military operations against Khartoum’s government from its bases in the 
Gambella region, the Sudan government also actively supported various liberation 
movements against the Addis Ababa government (Johnson, 2003). These wars, and 
particularly the Derg allowing the SPLA to establish its military bases in the 
Gambella region, caused tremendous political, economic and social tragedies to the 
indigenous Anywa communities (Kurimoto, 1993). The presence of armed groups in 
the region encouraged the proliferation of small arms and militarization of society. 
This in turn transformed the previous small-scale skirmishes between indigenous 
groups into deadly inter-ethnic conflicts (Dereje, 2003). Moreover, the SPLA was 
devoid of any kind of military ethics or discipline. As such, its members 
unrestrainedly committed atrocities against the local population with absolute 
impunity due to their strong support from Addis Ababa (Kurimoto, 1993). As such, 
most of the indigenous communities either sought security in the refugee camps by 
pretending to be Sudanese refugees (mainly the Nuer) or took up arms to take their 
security into their own hands and resist the mounting political and social problems 




Nothing illustrates the failure of the Derg’s attempt at national integration in the region more 
than the irony that, by the mid-1980s, it was more rewarding and safer to be a Southern 
Sudanese refugee than an Ethiopian citizen in the Gambella region (Dereje, 2006, p. 213).  
 
It was this local dissatisfaction that finally gave birth to the Gambella Peoples’ 
Liberation Movement (GPLM), which later allied itself to other liberation movements 
fighting for the overthrow of the Derg’s regime. Fortunately, in 1991 the Derg was 
overthrown and Gambella became one of the nine regional states of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE).  
 
 
5.4. Gambella Regional State under the FDRE: 
Opportunities and Challenges  
 
Given the historical marginalization of the peripheral regions during the imperial 
period and largely failed integration efforts by the Derg, the introduction of ethnic 
federalism created a new political space and institutional design to encourage local 
empowerment. Regardless of whatever criteria were used to delineate regional 
states under the new federal system, the promotion of the previous Gambella district 
to an autonomous regional state became one of the most prominent political steps 
ever taken by successive Ethiopian regimes to empower peripheral regions and 
integrate minorities into the mainstream Ethiopian polity (Young, 1999).   
 
There are different oral accounts as to the grounds on which Gambella was 
recognized as one of the regional states by the new federal elites. According to one 
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GPLM veteran I interviewed (Interview – 15GOV, 04 Apr. 2012),28 Gambella was 
recognized as a regional state because of their contribution to the armed struggle 
that finally toppled the Derg. Two factors that support this claim are the fact that the 
GPLM was recognized as the representative party of the Gambella peoples during 
the transitional period and also that the movement’s chairman became the first 
regional president of the newly created Gambella regional state. This was the same 
in other regions in which previous ethnic-based liberation movements were 
automatically recognized as representative parties of their constituencies and their 
leaders assumed the newly created political positions for their respective ethnic 
groups or regions. All in all, according to this account, the contemporary Gambella 
regional state is an outcome of the struggle and ultimate sacrifices paid by the 
indigenous communities of the Gambella region (Interview – 15GOV, 04 Apr. 2012).  
 
However, according to the central elites, as well reflected in articles by Andreas 
(2003) and Young (1999), the promotion of the previous peripheral provinces into 
autonomous regional states is a true reflection of the new democratic dispensation 
under ethnic federalism. In other words, it is right to self-determination in practice. 
According to this account, regional statehood for peripheral regions reflects the 
central elites’ commitment to the empowerment and integration of historically 
marginalized minorities (Andreas, 2003; Kinfe, 2001; Young, 1999).  
 
Another explanation for the promotion of the former Gambella district to an 
autonomous regional state status is the power struggle between the three major 
ethnic groups, namely the Oromo, the Amhara and the Tigreans. The Oromo are by 
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 In additional to being a GPLM veteran, this interviewee was also one among the first regional 
executives of the newly established Gambella Regional State in 1991.   
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far the majority ethnic group in Ethiopia, accounting for 35% of the total Ethiopian 
population, followed by the Amhara who form 27% of the Ethiopian population. The 
Tigreans could be categorized as a numerical minority, accounting only for 6% of the 
total Ethiopian population. However, the Tigreans were the most organized and 
strongest rebel movement in the fight against the Derg so they became the dominant 
party in the coalition that toppled the Derg (Young, 1997). Hence, being aware of 
their numerical inferiority, the Tigreans were not in favour of annexing peripheral 
regions to the already big ethnic groups such as the Oromo or the Amhara (Young, 
1999).  
 
Since none of the above accounts actually contradict each other, they might have all 
contributed to the promotion of the peripheral regions, particularly the Gambella and 
Benishangual-Gumuz, to the status of autonomous regional states.   
 
The transformation of Gambella into a regional state brought many visible changes 
both in terms of political representation and social development. In stark contrast to 
the imperial and Derg periods, under the ethnic federal system, regional 
administration was virtually handed over to the local people. In the area of social 
development, education showed tremendous improvement in terms of facilities and 
student enrolment. In the first ten years of ethnic federalism, the number of 
elementary schools and student populations in the Gambella region had increased 
by 80% and 75% respectively. The number of secondary schools in the region rose 
from one to six. In order to provide teachers for the new junior secondary schools, 
the capacity of the then Teachers Training Institute (TTI) was upgraded to college 
level, offering diploma programmes in education and health. The health programme 
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was started to meet the demands in the new clinics and health centres being 
constructed in rural areas (G.P.N.R.S. Education Bureau, 2002).    
 
As part of local empowerment, especially in the regional job market, affirmative 
actions were introduced to increase the number of indigenous peoples in public 
sector jobs. These included the preferential treatment of the indigenous peoples vis-
à-vis highlanders. In order to qualify as an indigenous person, one had to have at 
least one parent from one of the five indigenous ethnic groups; be married to one of 
these five ethnic groups; have a brother or sister from one of these ethnic groups, 
either through the father or mother; or speak one of the languages of the indigenous 
communities. Some of those affirmative actions included the obligation for the 
regional government to employ any high-school graduate or above from the 
indigenous peoples and free two-year work experience to give indigenous peoples a 
competitive edge over highlanders (GPNRS-Civil Service Bureau, 1998).29 Although 
highlanders remained numerically dominant in public sector jobs, those affirmative 
actions resulted in the employment of many indigenous peoples as civil servants 
within different regional government ministries.  
 
At the national level, the federal government established the Ethiopian Civil Service 
College (ECSC) in 1995 in order to provide a workforce for the newly created 
regional states. According to the ECSC, it was established:  
 
To meet the urgent manpower needs of the regional governments in the context of 
decentralization given the right of nations and nationalities to determine their own affairs and 
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 GPNRS: stands for Gambella Peoples National Regional State.  
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to obtain the administrative capacity necessary to do this (ECSC, www.ecsc.edu.et, 10 Feb. 
2012).   
 
In its mission, the ECSC gives special emphasis to the admission of less advantaged 
groups such as women and students from less developed regions. At the moment, 
most of the civil servants and political leaders in the Gambella region – including the 
regional president – are all graduates from the ECSC. Hence, despite its 
characterisation by its critics (Alemayehu, 2010) as the training place for the cadres 
of the ruling party, this college had created unprecedented new career opportunities 
for minorities (ECSC, www.ecsc.edu.et, 2012).  
 
Despite those early achievements, ethnic federalism also brought its own 
challenges. The former conflicts between indigenous ethnic groups over water and 
land resources were politicised and transformed into violent conflicts over regional 
political power; the affirmative measures for public sector jobs were perceived by the 
highlanders as discriminatory practices and infringement of their citizenship rights; 
and the appointment of federal advisors to the regional government of Gambella was 
challenged by the regional officials as a denial of their constitutional right to self-
determination. All these challenges directly and indirectly transformed Gambella into 
one of the most conflict-ridden regions in Ethiopia. Therefore, for the sake of 
contextualizing some of the current conflicts related to LSLA which will be discussed 
later in thesis, it is important at this point to provide an overview of the conflicts 





5.5. Conflicts in the Gambella region 
 
Since 1991, Gambella has witnessed different kinds of conflicts among different 
groups over different causes. The prominent conflicts are the Anywa versus Nuer, 
indigenous versus highlanders, Anywa versus Majang, and Nuer versus Nuer 
conflicts. However, for the sake of this study, this section discusses only the Anywa-
Nuer and Indigenous-Highlanders conflicts, which are the most persistent and 
protracted conflicts in the region.  
 
 
5.5.1. Anywa versus Nuer Conflict  
 
The Anywa-Nuer conflict is one of the most prominent and protracted of all conflicts 
in the region. Its historical roots can be traced back to the eastward migration of the 
Jikany-Nuer group in the second half of the 19th century. This eastward migration of 
the Nuer from Sudan to Ethiopia, in search for access to and control over vital 
natural resources such as pasture land and water, was accomplished at the expense 
of the Dinka and the Anywa territories (Kelly, 1985). As described by an Anywa 
elder, initially the Nuer settlers would ask the permission of an Anywa chief to give 
them land for a short period of time (Interview – 3IND, 23 Mar. 2012).30 When they 
were given it, then they would invite relatives and politely request their Anywa friends 
again to allow the newcomers to stay for some time. The newcomers also invite 
relatives and it goes on and on (Interview – 3IND, 23 Mar. 2012). Gradually, this 
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 This elder is a son of an Anywa Chief of on one of the villages under Itang woreda. His home 
village is one of the villages that is now completely inhabited by the Nuer as a consequence of Nuer 
expansion, and that is why he moved to Gambella town.  
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movement of the Nuer resulted not only in their territorial expansion but also in their 
demographic significance. 
 
Traditionally, a major trigger of the Anywa-Nuer conflict is Nuer cattle trespassing 
into Anywa farmland where both groups live in neighbouring villages. When they 
were small in number, the Nuer could control their cattle and in such incidents they 
would opt for peaceful means of resolving the matter through an Anywa chief or 
compensate the Anywa farmer whose farm had been destroyed. However, when 
they grew in number, the Nuer gained confidence and began to allow their cattle to 
graze on the Anywa farmlands and were ready to fight when asked why they were 
not looking after their cattle. Moreover, the Nuer changed their peaceful strategy of 
acquiring land from the Anywa by becoming more aggressive and violent in their 
search for more lands (Interview – 3IND, 23 Mar. 2012). In the first three decades of 
the 20th century, thanks to their earlier acquisition of firearms from their imperial 
Ethiopian allies, the Anywa managed not only to contain Nuer territorial expansion 
but also launched a counter-offensive against the Nuer to recover lost territories 
(Dereje, 2003). Meanwhile, around the mid-20th century, the Nuer began to be 
involved in the ivory-for-firearms trade and in due course they reached a military 
balance with the Anywa. This in turn led to the stabilisation of relations and inter-
ethnic exchanges. Thus, according to Medhane (2006), confrontation based on a 
balance of power gradually gave way to socio-economic cooperation between the 
Nuer and the Anywa. Since then, the Anywa and Nuer had lived in relative harmony 
based on cooperation, albeit interspersed with small-scale skirmishes and 




Nevertheless, the escalation of the Sudanese civil war in the 1980s, the influx of 
hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees into the Gambella region in the same 
year, and the political ramifications in Ethiopia in the next decade turned the mode of 
relation between the Anywa and the Nuer from cooperation to competition and to 
violent conflicts (Kurimoto, 1993). These new developments brought with them new 
actors and structures of conflict, which drastically changed the intensity and nature of 
conflict among the Gambella communities. Hence, since 1991, although with some 
interruptions, the Anywa and the Nuer have been caught in violent conflicts (Dereje, 
2003).  
 
The first bloody conflict occurred from 1991 to 1992, right after the fall of the Derg 
regime. During the Derg’s time, many Nuers settled in traditional Anywa territories 
and the Derg appointed Nuers to both of the senior political positions mentioned 
earlier. This was presumably to discourage and punish the Anywa, who by that time 
had formed a liberation movement (GPLM) and were engaged in confronting the 
Derg with other ethnic-based liberation movements across the country. The 
appointed Nuer officials allegedly made use of this opportunity to advance not only 
their quest for more Anywa land but also political domination over the region 
(Interview – 2IND, 22 Mar. 2012). From my discussions with Anywa people, many of 
them believe the Derg-Nuer officials in Gambella apparently formed an informal 
alliance with the SPLA against the Anywa farmers and residents. As a result, in the 
second half of the 1980s, the SPLA carried out a number of massacres and the 
destruction of Anywa villages like Pinyudo and Itang, after which both the Nuer-
controlled local government and the central government of Menguistu Haile Mariam 
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took no action to prevent the massacres or to bring the perpetrators to justice 
(Kurimoto, 1993).  
 
With the 1991 regime change, the power balance shifted to the Anywa as the GPLM 
took control of the Gambella. For fear of retaliation, the Derg-Nuer officials trekked to 
Sudan with SPLA forces and Nuer refugees in Gambella refugee camps. From their 
base in Sudan, a group of armed Nuer together with the SPLA mounted a counter-
offensive, which resulted in the destruction of many Anywa villages along the border 
(Dereje, 2005). Thus, the first 12 months of the new regime was characterized by 
bloody conflicts between the armed Anywa forces in Ethiopia and armed Nuer forces 
from Sudan. Towards the end of 1992 a settlement was reached and many Nuer 
officials returned to Gambella and were incorporated again into the new regional 
government of Gambella with an Anywa as president, a Nuer vice president and a 
Majang secretary of the regional state.  
 
Another large-scale conflict between the Anywa and the Nuer took place from 1998 
to 2002. In this case, according to my analysis, many causes could be identified as 
related to the new system of ethnic federalism, including the question of language 
policy, which language should be taught in which school, which woreda belongs to 
who, what entitlement was to be used for representation in the regional government 
and others. According to the new system, representation in the regional government 
was based on number of woredas. This favoured the Anywa who by the time owned 
six out of the nine woredas in the region. In addition, the Anywa legitimated their 
dominant political status on the basis of settlement history (true indigenous people of 
Gambella) and contribution to the regime change. In order to widen their participation 
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in the new political process, the Nuer established a political party called the GPDUP 
(Gambella Peoples’ Democratic Unity Party). The first counter strategy of the Nuer 
was to deconstruct the Anywa claim of indigeneity by invoking a longer historical 
scope of reference, their shared Nilotic origin and that both of them had migrated 
from South Sudan no matter who came first (Dereje, 2003).  
 
In 1994, the first national census produced a new political instrument for the Nuer as 
they appeared to be numerically superior 40% to the Anywa 27% (CSA, 1994). 
Overnight, the Nuer political elite switched their approach to democracy-cum-
majority rule (Dereje, 2006). In 1995, their argument was supported by the federal 
government and they were given more seats in the regional government (Interview – 
15GOV, 04 Apr. 2012).31 This eroded the Anywa-dominated GPLM’s trust in their ally 
the EPRDF. In parallel, the Anywa political elites were becoming more disenchanted 
with the federal government and the way the new ethnic federalism was being 
implemented (Interview – 15GOV, 04 Apr. 2012). On their part, the Nuer political 
elites saw this deterioration of the relationship between the former allies (GPLM and 
EPRDF) as a window of opportunity that they had to exploit (Choul, 2006).  
 
By avoiding direct confrontation with the federal advisors in the region and building 
alliance with highlanders, the Nuer political elites won the mercy of the federal 
government over the Anywa political elites who were seen by the federal government 
                                                          
31
 According to this interviewee, in the summer of 1995, the federal government organized a seminar 
for Gambella regional state leaders in Addis Ababa to discuss the root causes of conflicts in the 
region. In the seminar, the federal government representatives said that the root cause of the conflicts 
in the Gambella region was because Nuers are the numerical majority in the region and yet they are 
less represented. So the number of Nuer representatives was increased by reducing the number of 
Anywa representatives.  
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as rebellious (Interview – 8GOV, 23 Mar. 2012).32 Again the power shifted to the 
Nuer as the federal government turned against the Anywa leaders, dissolved the 
GPLM and imprisoned many Anywa community elders on the ground of being 
‘narrow-nationalists’ (Interview – 15GOV, 04 Apr. 2012). This time the Nuer also 
launched another attack on Anywa villages in 1998 and took over 12 villages in Itang 
woreda (FGD – 8, 10 Apr. 2012). In 2000, they managed to take over the capital of 
Itang woreda after intense fighting that left over 100 people dead from both sides, 
including a number of policemen (Interview – 16GOV, 12 Apr. 2012). Unlike the past 
where conflict over land was mainly about grazing and water, this time, for the Nuer, 
taking more Anywa land also meant more power and representation at the regional 
government level (Medhane, 2006). The federal government intervened by 
imprisoning the Itang woreda officials and the surviving policemen, most of whom 
were from the Anywa ethnic group. This infuriated the Anywa elites who saw 
themselves as victims of Nuer aggression. Hence, the Anywa directed their 
exasperation at the federal government and their perceived agents in the region (i.e., 
the highlanders), shifting the old conflict to indigenous vs. highlanders/central 
government conflict (Chuol, 2006).  
 
 
5.5.2. Indigenous versus Highlanders/Central Government Conflict 
 
Another level of conflict in the Gambella regional state is between the indigenous 
peoples and the highlanders. One of the major resentments and causes of conflicts 
between them is the highlanders’ monopoly of the regional economy. Because of 
                                                          
32
 This interviewee is at the moment a civil servant at the Ministry of Education and had been one of 
the regional executives for six years.  
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their better social network with the central government and long experience in 
business, the highlanders are more successful and thriving in the business sector in 
the region (Dereje, 2011). But, according to some indigenous people, this is not the 
only reason for the highlanders’ dominance in business. They argue that both the 
government and its military forces have played a large role in protecting the interests 
of the highlanders while suppressing the few indigenous people who were trying to 
start small businesses (Interviews – 2 and 9BSS, 17 Mar. and 12 Apr. 2012).33 I was 
given examples of some diaspora indigenous people who have tried to invest in the 
transport, hotel, agriculture and other sectors in Gambella. But, after a while, their 
assets were confiscated by the military and many of them were imprisoned and 
branded as supporters of anti-peace forces (Interview – 2BSS, 17 Mar. 2012).34 
According to this interviewee, the highlanders’ businessmen took advantage of what 
the military called anti-peace forces to conspire against any indigenous person 
whom they perceived as a competitive business rival. This has triggered conflicts 
between the indigenous peoples and the highlanders, which always extends to the 
military intervening in favour of the highlanders (Interview – 2BSS, 17 Mar. 2012).   
 
Another cause of conflict between the indigenous peoples and the highlanders is the 
paradoxical position of the highlanders in regional politics. On one hand, the 
highlanders are formally/constitutionally excluded from regional politics. According to 
the regional constitution, Gambella belongs to the indigenous peoples. The preamble 
of the Gambella Peoples’ National Regional State (GPNRS) constitution, echoing the 
                                                          
33
 These two interviewees are from the indigenous communities who are running their own small-
scale businesses (small shops) and small scale-farms (10-15 hectares each).  
34
 Anti-peace foces or in Amharic Tsire-Selam Ahiloch is a generic term used by the Ethiopian 
government for all the armed opposition groups such as the OLF, ONLF etc. However, the 
government also applies this term sometimes to peaceful opposition groups and it has become 
synonym for dissidnets.    
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country’s constitution, starts with “We the nationalities and peoples of the Gambella 
regional state” (GPNRS, 1995, p.1), exclusively referring only to the five indigenous 
groups. On the other hand, the highlanders are connected with the higher form of 
power, the federal government and the military, turning them into ‘significant others’ 
in regional politics.  
 
For the indigenous peoples who are caught up in conflict over the regional political 
power and resources, alliance with highlanders means more support from the federal 
government and the military. This is the strategy the Nuer political elites apparently 
employed to win the support of the federal government in their quest for more Anywa 
land and power in the regional politics. The strategy seemed to have worked well in 
their favour. In 2003, in the name of restructuring, the government merged four 
Anywa woredas and later increased the two Nuer woredas to four, giving them more 
representation in the regional government (Interview – 16GOV, 12 Apr. 2012). This, 
in turn, changed the conflict map from what used to be indigenous peoples and 
highlanders, to specifically Anywa and highlander/federal government conflict.  
 
As consequences of the merging of the woredas and the Anywa-Nuer conflict in 
Itang, many Anywa government employees and policemen were dismissed from 
their jobs (Interview – 16GOV, 12 Apr. 2012). A few of those policemen, claiming to 
represent Anywa discontent, resorted to violence against not only the government 
establishments but also highlanders. This is because many Anywa believed that all 
the actions the central government had taken against them and the continued 
encroachment of the armed Nuer group into their land was a result of highlanders’ 
conspiracy (Interview – 16GOV, 12 Apr. 2012). On December 13, 2003, Gambella 
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town witnessed an extreme form of violence in what Genocide Watch called 
‘Genocide’ and Human Rights Watch called ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ (Genocide 
Watch, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2005).  
 
Drawing on my experience in Gambella from that time, the trigger of this massacre 
was the killing of eight government officials (highlanders) travelling from Gambella 
town to Itang. Without investigation of who carried out the killing, the military officials 
(highlanders) immediately disarmed all the indigenous policemen and blamed the 
killing on the Anywa banditry. In order to mobilize highlanders, the military displayed 
the bodies of the eight officials to the public. On the same day, the military and 
civilian-highlanders indiscriminately marched against the Anywa residents in 
Gambella town – the civilian-highlanders with machetes, pangas and stones and the 
military with machine guns, shooting and bombing strong Anywa houses in the town. 
According to Human Rights Watch, over 424 Anywa people perished from December 
13 to15, 2003 (HRW, 2005). Since then, up to late 2006, a spiral of revenge killings 
characterized the Anywa and highlanders/Ethiopian state’s relationship.  
 
The above-mentioned political tension between the Anywa and the Ethiopian state is 
further compounded by the prospect of the discovery of oil in the Gambella region. 
The Gambella basin is one of the five potential petroleum areas in Ethiopia (Ministry 
of Mines (MOM), www.mom.gov.et, 2011). In 2006, PETRONAS, a Malaysian oil 
company started oil exploration in the Gambella region. The exploration is largely a 
bilateral affair between the oil company and the federal MOM. According to the 
federal constitution, the federal and regional states jointly share the royalty from 
petroleum and mining exploitation. Article 100:3 of the Constitution (Concurrent 
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Taxation powers) specifies “the Federal State and the Federal government jointly 
levy and collect income tax and royalties on big mining, petroleum and gas 
operations”. Because most of the major potential oil sites are in Anywa territories, the 
Anywa believe that what took place on December 13, 2003 was an attempt by the 
government of Ethiopia to clear the region of indigenous peoples for oil exploration 
and extraction of other natural resources (Interviews – 1 and 2IND, 22 Mar. 2012).  
 
These multiple conflicts have therefore made the Gambella region one of the most 
volatile regions in Ethiopia. Against this background, it would not be difficult to 
imagine the contribution of the contemporary LSLAs to the escalation of conflicts in 
the region, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Nine.   
 
 
5.6. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has shown that the peoples of Gambella were from the very beginning 
integrated in to the Ethiopian state only as inferior citizens. In fact, as Collins argued, 
it was more the land and its resources that drove imperial Ethiopia to the lowland 
region of Gambella rather than any interest in the peoples who inhabited that land 
(Collins, 1983). Hence, the first experience of the indigenous peoples of Gambella 
with the Ethiopian state was that of political and economic marginalization at best 
and slavery at worse. Even after the abolition of slavery nationwide, the 
marginalization and social stigmatization continued to characterize the relationship 
between the lowland indigenous communities and the highland mainstream 
Ethiopian societies. The Derg’s attempt at integration and empowerment of the 
indigenous peoples of Gambella were soon overshadowed by its efforts to control 
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and impose socialist ideologies that were alien to the indigenous peoples.  Against 
this background, the introduction of ethnic federalism and promotion of the former 
Gambella district into an autonomous regional state could be seen as the most 
progressive step ever taken by the successive Ethiopian regimes to empower 
peripheral regions. Nevertheless, ethnic federalism, while improving some of the old 
problems related to inter-ethnic power relations, entrenched and re-introduced others 
in different forms. These challenges, particularly those related to ethnic self-






Chapter Six: Implementation of Right to Self-
Determination in Gambella Regional State under the 
Federal Constitution of Ethiopia 
 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
Despite the contentious debate among academics, politicians, and the ordinary 
populace over whether or not ethnic federalism is a viable political system for the 
country, both the supporters and the critics do agree to a certain extent that the 
major problem at the moment is not primarily about the legal framework that created 
the system per se. The key problem lies in the considerable gap between the 
constitutional principles and the actual political practice (Assefa, 2006; Clapham, 
2006). This kind of argument is very pervasive amongst both the supporters and 
opposition political parties, as is reflected in the following explanation by one of the 
political opposition group in southern Ethiopia, provided by Tronvoll:  
 
The provisions in the Constitution, I cannot deny, are really good. But its implementation is 
very weak. The EPRDF says that self-administration is there. But self-administration will be 
real only when people like Abate [the then president of the Southern Nations Nationalities and 
Peoples Regional State] is really in power and not only in office. Therefore, I don’t tell my 
people that they are exercising their rights, because they are not in the real sense exercising 
their powers. Everything that is done in the south, including in Gedeo, is in the interest of the 
TPLF and EPRDF, and not in the interest of the Gedeos and the southern peoples. Their 
consent is not requested, even though there are Gedeoffa speakers in office. Those Gedeoffa 
speakers are not using their knowledge of the language to talk to their people and 
communicate their rights. Thus, there are Gedeo people in office, but not in power (Tronvoll, 




Although from its inception the new political system employed right to self-
determination as the guiding principle along which it mobilized the peasantry and 
garnered the support of other ethnic groups, today it is widely accepted that Ethiopia 
remains very much controlled by a strong central government (Aalen, 2002; 
Clapham, 2006; ICG, 2009; Kidane, 2001; Tronvoll, 2000). The federal government, 
despite the constitutional devolution of some powers to regional states, maintains 
strong control and influence over internal politics of the federal sub-units through 
parallel structures and “ethnic-based satellite parties” (Kidane, 2001, p.23).  In the 
case of minority regions, here again there is a wide consensus that the interference 
of the federal government is even stronger, as summarized by Aalen as follow:  
 
All in all, it appears that the four lowland regions [minority regional states] are the units in the 
Ethiopian federation, which experience the most severe central interference in regional affairs. 
They are governed by formally independent parties, but are nevertheless practically run by 
officials from the Regional Affairs Department and centrally assigned party cadres without 
formal positions. The EPRDF member states in the highlands [majority regional states], 
however, are facing less open interference in regional affairs than the lowland regions (Aalen, 
2002, p.88).   
 
In this chapter, I will discuss in detail the implementation of right to self-determination 
in the Gambella regional state against the three categories identified earlier in 
Chapter four namely, socio-cultural self-determination, political self-determination 
and economic self-determination. Hence, by drawing on various sources, this 
chapter will attempt to answer the first subsidiary research question: how is the 





6.2. Socio-Cultural Self-Determination  
 
From its historical inception along the Red Sea coast to its contemporary status, 
Ethiopia has always been equated with the northern Abyssinian cultures of the 
Amhara and Tigray ethnic groups, both in the governmental presentation and foreign 
understanding, as was well articulated by Wallelign Mekonen four decades ago:  
 
Ask anybody what Ethiopian culture is? Ask anybody what Ethiopian language is? Ask 
anybody what Ethiopian music is? Ask anybody what the “national dress” is? It is either 
Amhara or Amhara-Tigre!! To be a “genuine Ethiopian” one has to speak Amharic, to listen to 
Amharic music, to accept the Amhara-Tigre religion, Orthodox Christianity and to wear the 
Amhara-Tigre Shamma in international conferences. In some cases to be an “Ethiopian”, you 
will even have to change your name. In short to be an Ethiopian, you will have to wear an 
Amhara mask (Walleligne, 1969, p.2).  
 
In 1996 during the fifth-anniversary of the EPRDF in power, one high official from the 
Gambella regional state government stated in his speech that:  
 
The time when speaking Amharic was seen as a marker of Ethiopian citizenship and 
civilization is over and will never come back. Under the new system [ethnic federalism] you 
can be truly Ethiopian and a civilized citizen without the need to master Amharic (GPNRS, 
1996, p.1).  
 
These kinds of statements, which directly or indirectly condemn the northern 
supremacy, particularly the Amhara, for imposing their culture over the rest of 
Ethiopians, were very common in the early years of ethnic federalism both from 
federal and regional government officials. Despite some historical unifying factors 
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and shared national pride, after 1991, Ethiopian political history was categorically 
denounced and blamed for the instability that the country had witnessed over the 
years (Andreas, 2003). For instance, during the first election in 1995, Dawit 
Yohannes, the then speaker of the HPR and spokesperson for the ruling party, 
explained why ethnic federalism was introduced: 
 
The EPRDF is challenging the political environment of Ethiopia. We do not have loyalty to 
history, it has proved to fail. We do not either perceive to contain Ethiopia as an absolute 
entity as our main goal, hence we also accepted Eritrean independence. We must find a 
solution which is beneficial for the Ethiopian people today, therefore history will not provide 
the answer. History has been used as a veil, covering up differences within Ethiopia. People 
have believed that we have had unity in this country, but this has never existed. What they 
call unity was a geographical entity dominated by one ethnic group. An Amhara peasant had 
never met an Eritrean, likewise an Afar nomad had never heard of a Nuer, let alone seeing 
one. And this they call unity! At the stage Ethiopia is now you cannot force people to form a 
unity (Tronvoll and Oyvind, 1995, pp. 47-48).  
 
For the ordinary people who might not understand the ideological differences 
between the Marxist-Leninist regime and the new federal democratic regime, the 
contrast between the past and the present was simplified by the new officials. The 
past is characterized as ‘one ethnic group supremacy’ while the present is presented 
as ‘the government of all Ethiopian ethnic groups’ (HOF, 2006). In order to 
demonstrate the latter, several projects and initiatives were carried out both at 
regional state and federal level to promote cultural diversity and ethnic equality 
throughout the country.   
 
At the federal government level, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MOCT) played 
a frontline role in promoting cultural diversity. Although the Derg also recognized 
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cultural diversity, the EPRDF actively promoted the celebration of cultural identities. 
As indicated on the website of the MOCT, its mission is defined as: 
  
To study, preserve, develop and promote the cultural wealth and the national tourism 
attractions of the nations, nationalities and people of Ethiopia and to build the positive images 
of Ethiopia with a view to adding a sustainable socio-economic and political values with 
popular and stakeholder’s participation (MOCT, www.tourismethiopia.gov.et, no date).  
 
At the regional state level, similar ministries were established to preserve and 
promote regional cultural diversities. In 2006, ‘December 8’ was designated as the 
‘Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Day’ to be observed as a national holiday to 
promote various cultures and at the same time to encourage exchange of knowledge 
among various Ethiopian ethnic groups (HOF, 2006). As can be seen during the 
celebration of this day (pictures at, HOF, www.hofethiopia.gov.et, 2010) different 
ethnic groups come with their traditional clothes, musical instruments, and traditional 
drinks, demonstrating the cultural diversity of the country. According to HOF, this day 
is designated to help the previously dominated Ethiopian ethnic groups be proud of 
themselves as individual groups but also be tolerant of other groups’ cultures and 
ways of life (HOF, www.hofethiopia.gov.et, 2010).   
 
In Gambella regional state, although Amharic was retained as the official language 
for the regional government, the major three local languages (Anywa, Nuer and 
Majang) were introduced as the medium of instruction and as subjects in the primary 
schools and high schools in the respective woredas belonging to these ethnic groups 
(GPNRS, 2002). This was a radical change from the past where school textbooks 
from primary to secondary levels had barely mentioned the name Gambella let alone 
its peoples and their cultures. Moreover, an amount of literature was printed in those 
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languages by the regional Ministry of Education (Ethiopian Folktales, 1997). 
Likewise, regional minorities in the Gambella region like the Kumo and Opo whose 
identities and languages had been stigmatized began to openly talk about their 
identities and promote them in different ways (Interview – 2GOV, 15 Mar. 2012).35  
Hence, it can be argued that ethnic federalism proved itself to be a game changer in 
the socio-cultural landscape of Ethiopia.  
 
In line with the efforts of rebuilding cultural self-confidence, some re-traditionalization 
measures were also introduced in the early years of ethnic federalism in the 
Gambella region. For example, some villages reinstated the role of chiefs, which had 
been abolished during the Derg regime (Interview – 3IND, 23 Mar. 2012). Traditional 
clothes, dance and musical instruments were also revived and young generations 
were encouraged to take lessons. Similarly, around the same period (early 1990s), a 
few villages also revived the cultural practice known as ‘naak’ (the extraction of six 
lower teeth) which was banned during the cultural revolution of the Derg. However, 
this practice was also soon discouraged on the grounds that it contributed to the 
spread of HIV/AIDS and it was classified as a harmful traditional practice (Interview – 
6IND, 26 Mar. 2012).36 Hence, even though those re-traditionalization efforts did not 
really go far, simply because most people did not aspire to them and the younger 
generation appears to be modernist in its outlook and aspirations, ethnic federalism 
had at least achieved one thing – that is, it had helped formerly marginalized ethnic 
groups regain ethnic pride and had offered them freedom and choice to express their 
cultures either in private or in public.  
  
                                                          
35
 This interviewee who is now an elected official used to work as a Development Agent (DA) among 
the Opo and Kumo people.  
36
 This interviewee works for a NGO as Gender Coordinator.  
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6.3. Political Self-Determination  
 
The transformation of the former Gambella district into a regional state brought many 
visible changes in terms of political representation of the indigenous communities. 
One of the salient changes was the appointment of indigenous peoples in all the 
newly created political positions within the regional government. The first 20 
ministerial positions created in 1992 within the regional government were all filled by 
members of the indigenous communities (GPNRS, 1992). For the first time in 
Ethiopian history, the people of Gambella were represented in the central 
government by three MPs in the HPR. Hence, in stark contrast to the imperial 
government’s policy of co-option of local elites and the Derg’s appointment of a few 
local people to the district administration, during the era of ethnic federalism, regional 
administration was virtually handed over to the indigenous people. In a dramatic 
reversal of power relations, the highlanders, who had long dominated the regional 
politics of Gambella, during both the imperial and Derg regimes, now assumed a 
subordinate political status within the new political system.  
 
However, this honeymoon period of excitement about political self-determination did 
not last long. Despite the appointment of members from the indigenous communities 
in the regional administrative posts and representation at the federal government 
level, it was soon realized that actual decision-making power remained in the hands 
of the federal government. As one former high regional official said, “what were given 
to the region were only the offices and not the power” (Interview – 5IND, 24 Mar. 
2012).37 Those regional officials who attempted to exert their constitutional powers 
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 This interviewee at the moment works for an international NGO but had worked for eight years at 
the regional government of Gambella as head of different regional ministries.  
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vis-à-vis the centre were soon removed from their positions under a variety of 
charges (Interview – 8GOV, 23 Mar. 2012).  
 
Moreover, apart from the formal and constitutional governance structures, the federal 
government seems to have created or used parallel powerful structures through 
which it maintained its grip on regional states and particularly minority regions. In the 
case of the Gambella region, I discuss below four of these structures, which arose in 
my conversations with concerned people on the question of political self-
determination in the region.  
 
 
6.3.1. The Ministry of Federal Affairs 
 
Before being promoted to a ministerial status, this body used to be known as the 
Department for Regional Affairs under the office of the Prime Minister. Initially, the 
department was established to facilitate communication between the federal and 
regional governments and advise the Prime Minister on regional affairs (Assefa, 
2006). Soon, this department became mostly known for its unpopular interferences 
in the internal affairs of regional states, especially ‘minority regions’. Due to its lack of 
legal basis to interfere in regional affairs, the department was changed to an 
independent ministry with a legal basis, as outlined in the proclamation 256/2001.  
According to this proclamation, the powers and duties of this new ministry include:  
 
1. In cooperation with regions, ensure that public peace and order is maintained. 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 48 and 62:6 of the federal constitution, 
facilitate the resolution of misunderstanding arising between regions.  
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3. Give assistance to the regions, with particular emphasis on the less developed ones. 
4. Supervise and coordinate the executive organs (mainly the Federal Police 
Commission, the Federal Prison Administration, the National Urban Planning Institute 
and Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa City administration (Proclamation 256/2001)  
 
In essence, the above-listed functions do not make the new ministry different from its 
predecessor except for the elaborate legal structure within which it has been set up. 
Most interestingly, this proclamation explicitly states the particular emphasis of this 
new ministry on the less developed regions – i.e. minority regions.  
 
The reasons for special emphasis on minority regional states are explained by the 
federal officials on three grounds. In the first place, these regions have been 
historically isolated from the centre, making them the least developed regions in the 
country in terms of educated human resource, access to basic social services, and 
related development infrastructure. Hence, federal government’s intervention and 
special attention is seen as vital for accelerating development in those regions 
(Interview – 1 and 2GOV, 15 Mar. 2012).  
 
Secondly, these regional states are not only marginalized in terms of development 
but also physically located at marginal territories, which are frequented by cross-
border conflicts and armed insurgencies. In order to tackle those security threats, the 
federal government through the Ministry of Federal Affairs deploys security 
personnel to those regions to coordinate responses to national security threats 





Thirdly, unlike other regional states which have clear regional majority ethnic groups, 
minority regional states, such as Gambella and Benishangual-Gumuz, do not have 
clear regional majority ethnic groups. As such, those regions are governed by 
coalitions of different minority ethnic groups, which have to constantly negotiate their 
differences and find peaceful ways of accommodating their interests. Thus, the 
presence of external mediators – i.e. advisors from the federal government – is 
justified in order to help those regions resolve their differences without resorting to 
violence (Interview – 1 and 2GOV, 15 Mar. 2012).   
 
Despite the above-mentioned seemingly compelling reasons, the way in which the 
Ministry of Federal Affairs has been discharging its responsibilities in minority 
regions has been a subject of criticism from the indigenous communities of those 
regions. For instance, Aalen argued that:   
 
Although the representatives from Regional Affairs Department officially are known as technical 
experts, they participate in regional council meetings and intervene directly in regional affairs. 
They exceed their mandate as consultants and assistants, and become more like managers 
that the regional government is accountable to…these advisors virtually ran the regional 
governments and were an obstacle to self-determination (Aalen, 2002, p. 86). 
 
The presence of federal advisors in minority regional states is one of the bitterly 
contested issues in the federal-state relationship among the minority regional states’ 
authorities and ordinary communities of those regions. Before making a 
generalization, a distinction has to be made here about the kind of experts that the 
federal government sends to minority regions. In the specific case of the Gambella 
region, there are the political and security advisors, finance and economic experts, 
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and development advisors (Interview – 8GOV, 23 Mar. 2012).  
 
The last two categories are most often dispatched to a regional state for a limited 
period of time and work in a specific sector or assist those regional governments in 
specific time-bound projects. Their assignment could be as specific as assisting 
those regional governments with budgeting, or planning and implementation of 
specific projects. Those kinds of experts are generally welcomed by the regional and 
local governments due to limited manpower in certain technical sectors. In fact, 
according to one of my interviewees who used to be Deputy Head of the regional 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, on one occasion his ministry 
officially requested the federal government to provide experts in accounting and 
finance (Interview – 4GOV, 21 Mar. 2012).38  
 
Most of the problems with regard to federal-state relations lie in the so-called political 
and security advisors. Those advisors neither have specific job descriptions nor any 
legal framework within which they operate. Moreover, they do not even have a time 
limit, although they could be changed anytime upon the orders of the federal 
government. According to one advisor, they can stay in those regions “until those 
regions are able to run their own affairs” (Lul Seged, 2000 cited in Aalen, 2002, 
p.85). Yet, it is only up to the federal government to decide when those regions are 
able to run their own affairs.  
 
Apart from those ambiguities, in the Gambella region, the regional officials complain 
about the incompetence of those advisors and their military-style approach to solving 
                                                          
38
 This interviewee is an elected regional official who has worked at different regional ministries at 
different posts for more than 10 years.  
 150 
 
problems (Interview – 4GOV, 21 Mar. 2012). All the political advisors sent to the 
Gambella region over the last couple of years were actually former TPLF fighters 
who had no civilian administration experience, and only had military experience. As 
such, their political worldview was not only constantly clashing with the civilian 
political administration system but also sharply opposed to traditional political 
systems of the people they were expected to be coaching (Interview – 4GOV, 21 
Mar. 2012).  
 
Therefore, although the idea of establishing the Ministry of Federal Affairs to assist 
minority regions towards effective self-determination is in itself a novel one, the 
actual work of this Ministry so far, rather than encouraging local empowerment, is on 
the contrary perpetuating the dependency of minority regions on the federal 
government. Moreover, the Ministry has already to a great extent lost its legitimacy 
as a supporter and is now seen by minorities as a federal instrument for controlling 
minority regions (Assefa, 2006).  
 
 
6.3.2. Central Party Structure   
 
The structure and internal functioning of the ruling party is another element that has 
been apparently obstructive to the realization of political self-determination for 
minority regions. In principle, the ruling party – i.e. the EPRDF – is a coalition of 
regionally-based ethnic parties. The member parties are the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the 
Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), and the Southern Ethiopian 
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Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM). The EPRDF therefore only represents 
the four dominant regional states or ethnic groups (except for the SEPDM, which is 
made up of many Southern ethnic groups). Those same parties that form the central 
ruling party are also the ruling parties of their respective regional states.  
 
On the other hand, minority regional states are ruled by what are called the ‘EPRDF 
affiliate parties’, which are not direct members of the central ruling coalition. These 
are the Gambella Peoples’ Democratic Movement (GPDM), the Benishangul-Gumuz 
Peoples’ Democratic Unity Front (B-GPDUF), the Somali People’s Democratic 
League (SPDL), the Afar People’s Democratic Organization (APDO), and the Harari 
National League (HNL).  
 
This structure of the ruling party makes it clear from the outset that minority regions 
and their parties are not part of the central ruling elite. Since they are not members 
of the ruling coalition party, they are not represented in the Central Committee of the 
EPRDF where important national policies are actually planned and decisions made. 
As such, the party structure marginalizes and undermines the realization of political 
self-determination for minority regions in two fundamental ways.  
 
In the first place, although minority parties are not represented in the central ruling 
coalition party (i.e. the EPRDF), the ruling party is represented in the minorities’ 
parties and plays a pivotal role in their operation. In the above-mentioned minorities’ 
parties (i.e. EPRDF-affiliate parties), there is at least one representative of the 
EPRDF appointed by and accountable to the central committee of the EPRDF.   The 
representatives of the EPRDF in minority regions do not have clear written 
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mandates. However, from the experience of the Gambella regional state, they are 
responsible for developing the political positions of those regions and they could also 
appoint and/or dismiss executives of those parties (Interview – 11GOV, 3 Apr. 2012). 
On this ground, Assefa argues that the role of EPRDF representatives in minority 
regions “had gone so far as to make these states puppets of the central government, 
rather than autonomous states” (Assefa, 2006, p.154).  
 
Secondly, the central party controls minority regions and, in fact, even other majority 
regions through the practice of what is known in Amharic as gimgema (i.e., public 
evaluation of politicians and bureaucrats). According to Young (1997), the genesis of 
this practice goes back to the time during the TPLF’s armed struggle where they had 
to evaluate the mistakes and progress of their military strategies on a regular basis. 
It was legitimized on the claim that it made the then guerrilla commanders more 
efficient and accountable to their subjects (Young, 1997). Today, this practice of 
gimgema, in addition to being continued within the military and party system, is 
replicated at all levels of government and applied to both elected officials and civil 
servants.  
 
From the experience of the Gambella region, there appears to be no rules about how 
to carry out those evaluations. At the higher regional government level, the sessions 
are mostly conducted in meetings where only the evaluated leaders and the 
evaluation team (EPRDF party officials) are present. At lower levels, in woredas or 
kebeles, some evaluation sessions are open to the public where the audience can 
directly interact with the panel. Some evaluations are conducted on a regular basis, 
while others have a more immediate character initiated by either regional or federal 
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party leaders whenever they feel it is needed. At the end of every evaluation session, 
the panel can either keep or promote those who have performed well and warn, 
demote or dismiss those officials who have not done well. In the worst cases, some 
officials could be arrested during the evaluation sessions (Interviews – 4 and 6GOV, 
21 Mar. 2012).39  
 
Some argue that gimgema has the potential to enhance democracy and encourage 
accountability and transparency (Young, 2000). One woreda administrator added 
that gimgema provides space for people’s voices in their local administration and 
make leaders responsible to the citizens (Interview – 12GOV, 28 Mar. 2012). 
However, others argue that, since it is not formalized or established by law, it 
remains open to political manipulation and abuse (Abbink, 2000; Aklilu, 2000). For 
example, Aklilu argues that gimgema has become more punitive than correcting and 
educating (Aklilu, 2000). According to Aalen (2002) and Abbink (2000), gimgema is 
one of the most important tools for the party in power to discipline the lower/regional 
party cadres and bureaucrats and make them loyal to the central party line.   
 
The misuse and abuse of gimgema is highly manifested in the Gambella regional 
state where it has been used as a tool to dismiss and imprison local politicians who 
challenge the interference of the central government into regional affairs, or defend 
the interests of the indigenous peoples (Interviews – 4 and 6GOV, 21 Mar. 2012). 
Since the EPRDF took power, the past successive three regional presidents of 
Gambella were all removed from power, not by loss of democratic election from their 
constituencies, but through gimgema initiated and conducted by the federal 
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 Interview – 6GOV is also an elected regional official who has worked for different regional 
ministries.   
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government. Two of them were arrested immediately after supposedly failing to 
defend themselves during gimgema and spent more than four years each in prison 
(Interview – 8GOV, 23 Mar. 2012). The third, according to his account, sneaked out 
of the meeting (gimgema) during the lunch break and trekked to South Sudan after 
he sensed that he would face the same fate as his predecessors (Okello, interview 
with Anywa Radio Service (ARS), 13 Dec. 2011).  
 
 
6.3.3. The National Army and Federal Security Units   
 
Since the Gambella regional state is located at an unstable border with South 
Sudan, there is a big military presence in the region to counter threats of 
insurgencies and other insecurity issues. In addition to the regular army, at the time I 
was carrying out my research, there were other specialized security units operating 
in the region such as the federal police, counter-terrorism force and the special force. 
The way in which those federal security agents operate in the region is another 
contested issue by members of the indigenous communities (Interviews – 1 and 
2IND, 22 Mar. 2012). In fact, the security agents have been implicated for various 
gross human rights violations in the region by different international human rights 
organizations (Genocide Watch, 2004; HRW, 2005 and 2012; International Human 
Rights Clinic (IHRC), 2006).  
 
Apart from human rights concerns, the big presence of federally commanded 
security units has also been posing a threat to political self-determination of the 
Gambella region. Firstly, because of their direct command structure with the federal 
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government, those security units in most cases tend to carry out their responsibilities 
in the region with complete impunity and above the regional government/constitution 
(Interview – 15GOV, 4 Apr. 2012).  Although there is a regional police force (mainly 
composed of members of the indigenous communities) that is, in principle, charged 
with the responsibility of enforcing law and order in the region, the federal security 
units (almost all highlanders) also sometimes engage in police work on behalf of the 
federal government, thus overshadowing the regional police force (Interview – 
15GOV, 04 Apr. 2012). The coordination and relationship between the federal 
security units and the regional police seems to be very weak at best and hostile at 
worst.  
 
For instance, during the December 13, 2003 massacre of the Anywa in Gambella 
town, the army disarmed the local police before carrying out the massacre in order to 
prevent any local resistance (HRW, 2005). Since then, there has been an 
atmosphere of mistrust between the federal and regional security bodies. In fact, 
there is a widespread perception among the indigenous communities that the federal 
security units in the region are there only for the highlanders and the interests of the 
federal government, even if that comes at their expense (Interviews – 1 and 2IND, 
22 Mar. 2012).   
 
Particularly at times when there are insecurity concerns in different woredas, the 
federal security units take direct control not only of the security issues but also of the 
day-to-day administrative issues of the respective woredas. In 2003, while I was 
working for the government as a civil servant in Gog woreda, the military went to one 
kebele to arrest alleged bandits. On their way there, they were attacked by bandits 
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(from the Anywa ethnic group) and three of them were killed. When the military came 
back they called for gimgema (evaluation) of the woreda officials who were all 
members of the indigenous Anywa ethnic group. During this gimgema, the panel, 
which was composed of high military officials (all highlanders), dismissed the whole 
woreda cabinet except for one member, accusing them of supporting/sympathizing 
with the bandits, and appointed new members in their positions. Hence, the army 
and other federal security units in general play a de facto role as superiors of the 
woreda and regional government officials, which obscures the idea of self-
determination in the region.  
 
 
6.3.4. Capacity Building Programmes  
 
Finally, another less obvious challenge to political self-determination is the various 
capacity-building programmes that are tilted towards the ruling party’s 
policies/programmes and ideology of ‘revolutionary democracy’ and ‘developmental 
states’. Funded by the World Bank and other international donors, the government 
runs a multi-million dollar programme known as the ‘Public Sector Capacity Building 
Programme (PSCAP)’. The objectives of the Programme supposedly are: 
 
1. To improve the scale, efficiency and responsiveness of public service delivery at the 
federal, regional, and local levels.  
2. To empower citizens to participate more effectively in shaping their own development. 





The donors see this Programme as crucial to supporting Ethiopia’s general efforts 
towards poverty reduction and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) by strengthening the human and institutional capacity of the government 
(Development Assistance Group – Ethiopia, 2010).      
 
However, in its 2010 report entitled ‘Development without Freedom: How Aid 
Underwrites Repression in Ethiopia’, Human Rights Watch accused the Ethiopian 
government, particularly the ruling party, of using foreign aid to crush political 
opposition by conditioning access to critical government development programmes 
on membership/loyalty to the ruling party (HRW, 2010). The report documented the 
ways in which the government uses donor-supported programmes as a tool to 
consolidate the power of the ruling party. Of particular relevance to this section, the 
report argues that:  
 
Foreign aid-funded capacity-building programs to improve skills that would aid the country's 
development are used by the government to indoctrinate school children in party ideology, 
intimidate teachers, and purge the civil service of people with independent political views 
(HRW, 2010, p.52).  
 
The experience of the Gambella regional state strongly supports the Human Rights 
Watch’s report findings in other regional states. Since 2006, the regional government 
of Gambella in collaboration with the federal government has been carrying out 
various summer political training programmes for students, teachers, civil servants 
and party cadres (Interview – 13GOV, 03 Apr. 2012).40 Similarly, in the autumn of 
2009, in preparation for the 2010 national election, over 700 teachers and civil 
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 This interviewee is an elected official at the woreda level and he works as the secretary of the ruling 
party (GPDM) at the woreda level.  
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servants from the Gambella region were taken to Awassa, capital of SNNPRS, 
where they were given training by EPRDF officials for six weeks (Interview – 13GOV, 
03 Apr. 2012). Although the organization and contents of these trainings varied 
across different groups, their underlying message was all about promoting 
‘revolutionary democracy’ and ‘developmental state’ as the best models for 
democratization and development for countries like Ethiopia (Interview – 13GOV, 03 
Apr. 2012). However, in terms of content, there is nothing new in the way these 
concepts are articulated other than glamorizing the ruling party (EPRDF) and its 
achievements over the last two decades in power on one hand; and demonizing the 
opposition parties, international media and human rights organizations on the other 
(Adal, 2010).  
 
For instance, in most of the documents ‘revolutionary democracy’ is only presented 
as the opposite of liberal democracy or defender of collective rights and sometimes 
as the guardian of the poor against free-market forces. According to Adal Isaw, a 
revolutionary democracy advocate:  
 
Revolutionary democracy rejects the philosophy of aggrandizing the individual as if he or she, 
by uncoordinated design, is the source of economic and political development. Political and 
economic development is the result of a planned collective effort, not the result of a 
spontaneous interaction of self-seeking individuals (Adal, 2010, p.6).  
 
With regard to ‘developmental state’, one document issued by the ruling party in 
2007 draws a distinction between what it calls the ‘developmental actors’ – i.e. the 
government and the ruling party – and ‘the rent-seeking’ actors – by implication non-
governmental actors (EPRDF, 2007 cited in Dessalegn, 2011). The former are 
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depicted as the ones committed to the development agenda of the country and 
betterment of the populace, while the latter are portrayed as guided by selfish 
motives and seeking only personal gain in the form of property, wealth or simply 
status (EPRDF, 2007 cited in Dessalegn, 2011). As Dessalegn puts it: 
 
In Ethiopia today, it is argued, all civil society organizations, opposition political parties, 
individuals and groups in private enterprise, and other groups are described as rent-seeking 
entities, while in contrast EPRDF, the ruling Party, is claimed to be the only one which has 
developmental credentials (Dessalegn, 2011, p.7).   
 
Therefore, capacity-building programmes in Ethiopia today, rather than 
strengthening federalism by encouraging diversity of ideas and innovation, are used 
by the ruling party as soft power to consolidate its power by winning the hearts and 
minds of its followers in particular and the general populace at large. As such, 
government-sponsored capacity-building programmes seem to be aimed at 
maintaining the ideological dependency of regional states on the central party and 
impeding the development of new ideas and models that could have otherwise 
nurtured ethnic federalism in general and local self-determination in particular.  
 
 
6.4. Economic Self-Determination  
 
As already discussed in Chapter four, economic self-determination is defined in this 
thesis as “the ability of the peoples to take control over their mineral resources and 
use those resources for their own ends” (Farmer, 2005, p.419). Although there has 
been no major extraction of natural resources so far in the Gambella region, I have 
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tried to investigate this question by looking at the involvement of the regional 
government in the oil exploration projects by PETRONAS – Malaysian Oil Company 
– and gold mining project by MIDROC – a private company – in the Gambella region.   
 
In 2003, PETRONAS and Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau (ZPEB) of 
China signed a contract for an oil exploration project in Gambella region with the 
federal Ministry of Mines (MOM). Likewise, MIDROC Gold Mine Plc. had been 
carrying out both exploration and production of gold in the Dimma woreda of the 
Gambella region since 2009/2010 (MOM, 2011). In both cases, the regional MOM 
seems to be virtually excluded from all governance structures of those operations. In 
my interview with one official from the regional MOM, he stated that: 
 
Anything that has to do with minerals and resources beneath the earth’s surface belongs to 
the federal government.  The regional government is only responsible for resources on the 
earth’s surface such as sand and construction stones (Interview – 10GOV, 27 Mar. 2012).  
 
Hence, it seems that not only is the regional government excluded from these 
operations but also they are persuaded that it is not their mandate to be involved in 
the exploration and extraction of natural resources under the earth’s surface. Even 
though it is difficult to draw a general conclusion from these two cases, they can at 
least help to predict the possible mode of cooperation between the federal and 
regional governments in case of large-scale discovery and extraction of natural 
resources in the future.  
 
Therefore, despite the discrepancies in the implementation of both socio-cultural and 
political self-determination in the Gambella regional state, economic self-
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determination in practice seems to be even the weakest of all. That is why this thesis 
has chosen to focus on one of the components of economic self-determination (i.e. 
LSLA) as a point of departure to analyse the state-communities’ relations under the 
system of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.  
 
 
6.5. Conclusion  
 
My findings on the implementation of the right to self-determination in the Gambella 
region suggests mixed results so far. At the socio-cultural level, the ethnic federal 
system in general seems to have created an enabling environment for the previously 
marginalized and stigmatized communities to freely express and promote their 
cultures. However, on the political front, in spite of the visible symbolic 
representation of the indigenous communities in the regional government, regional 
autonomy seems to have been sabotaged by parallel federal structures that control 
the region behind the officially elected indigenous leaders. Economically, although 
there has been no major extraction of natural resources in the Gambella region so 
far, the experience with gold mining in the region suggests an absolute exclusion of 
the regional government from both the governance structures involved in the mining 
operations and the benefits incurred. As such, economic self-determination – i.e. the 
ability of the people to control and manage their natural resources in their own 
interests – seems to be one of the weakest aspects of self-determination or ethnic 
federalism in general in the Gambella region. That is why I have chosen one aspect 
of economic self-determination (i.e.LSLA) as a prism through which I critically 
investigate the state-communities power relation (social contract) articulated under 
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the system of ethnic federalism. Hence, each of the next three chapters will look at a 







Chapter Seven: Modalities and Actors of Large-
Scale Land Acquisitions vis-à-vis Indigenous 





The aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed analysis of large-scale land 
investments that have been taking place in the Gambella region since 2007/2008 
and therefore provide an answer for the second subsidiary research question: what 
are the modalities of large-scale land acquisitions vis-à-vis the indigenous 
communities of Gambella? In the first two sections, based on a close reading of 
relevant official documents and interviews with concerned people, I will provide an 
introductory background to LSLA and the gradual policy shift from small-scale 
farming to large-scale industrialized farming.  Then in the next five sections I will 
discuss the modalities of large-scale land investments with regard to both the formal 
and informal processes involved in how investors acquire land, the coordination 
and/or frictions between different relevant ministries or departments, community 
consultation/participation, the content of land lease agreements, and an analysis of 
the major gaps in those land lease agreements. Finally, in the last three sections the 
chapter will discuss the data about the available land for investment being marketed 
by the federal government, estimated actual land that has been leased out so far to 




7.2. Background to LSLA in Ethiopia  
 
Since the second half of the 1990s, the Ethiopian government has implemented 
three generations of LSLAs in various parts of the country. Data from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MOARD, 2012), the responsible ministry for 
LSLA, indicates that large-scale land leases in Ethiopia did not just start in the 
aftermath of the 2007/2008 global food crisis as presented in different reports (HRW, 
2012; OI, 2011a).  
 
According to data from the MOARD (2012), the first generation of LSLA can be said 
to have taken place from the mid-1990s to 2002. During this period, the majority of 
large-scale land leases were predominantly made to local investors and the sizes of 
the lands leased to these domestic investors were as small as 500 ha or even lower. 
In most cases, those investors were not only Ethiopians but also native to the 
localities in which they invested. Most of them were successful businesspersons in 
urban areas or from the diaspora who wanted to give something back to their local 
communities (Lalem, 2010). Most of these land transactions were processed at 
respective regional states with close collaboration with concerned woreda 
governments. During this period, those investments seem to be generally welcomed 
by local communities for four main reasons. Firstly, those investors were producing 
food for domestic markets. Secondly, since most of those investors were native to 
the areas in which they invested, they were seen by their hosts as one of ‘them’ and 
not as exploiters. Thirdly, since the areas acquired by most of those investors were 
relatively small, they did not cause much displacement; and finally, the local 
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communities also directly benefited from local job creation (Interview – 1BSS, 15 
Mar. 2012).41  
 
The second generation of LSLAs can be associated with the boom of the cut-flower 
industry in the country from 2003 onwards. The export share from this industry has 
been growing by an average of more than 100% annually since 2004 and it has 
created more than 139,000 jobs since then (Ayelech, 2007; UN COMTRAD, 2008). 
At the moment cut flowers are the fifth largest exportable commodity of the country 
(EHPEA, www.ehpea.org, 2011). Despite the significant number of domestic 
investors involved in this industry, foreign investors have been at the forefront in 
terms of production outputs and export to Europe and other western markets 
(Demeke, 2007). In addition to the involvement of foreign investors and export-
oriented production, during this period the displacement of small-scale farmers 
began to be witnessed even though it remained relatively small (Tarekegn, 2008). 
Similarly, since most of the lands demanded by those investors were located in the 
vicinity of Addis Ababa, and due to the growing number of foreign investors, the 
federal government through the MOARD began to be actively involved in the process 
of those land deals, taking over the role previously executed by regional and woreda 
governments.  
 
Encouraged by the success of the cut-flower industry and pushed by the global food 
crisis and financial meltdown, what I categorize as the third generation of LSLA 
began in 2007/2008. As will be discussed later, in the Gambella region the number 
of investors jumped from less than 10 in 2006 to 56 in 2007, and by 2011 the 
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 This interviewee is a large-scale agricultural land investor in Gambella who has some investments 
(2000 hectares land lease) in his home town in the Oromia region.  
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number had reached 896 (Gambella Investment Agency (GIA), 2011). This 
generation of investors is very different from its predecessors in several aspects. 
Unlike the former investors, these new ones acquired tracts of lands as large as 
25,000 ha to 100,000 ha (Ruchi Agri Plc, 2010 and Karuturi Agro Products Plc, 2010 
respectively). Given the enormous size of the lands acquired, dispossession and 
displacement of local communities became widespread during this third generation 
of LSLAs (HRW, 2012). Moreover, with the creation of Agricultural Investment 
Support Directorate (AISD) under the MOARD in 2009, the federal government 
monopolized all activities related to LSLA, to the detriment of relevant regional state 
governments and local communities. This chapter, and in fact this thesis, focuses on 
this last generation of LSLAs in Ethiopia, particularly in the Gambella region.   
 
 
7.3. Policy Shift from Small to Large-Scale Agriculture   
 
Before I proceed to discuss the actual land investment process in the Gambella 
region, it is important to first discuss the land investment policy environment that has 
been put in place by the Ethiopian government. Based on my analysis of the relevant 
rural development policy documents, it seems that the current large-scale land 
investment in Ethiopia is not a phenomenon born only in the wake of the recent 
global food crisis. There has been a strategic shift within the last decade in the rural 
development and poverty alleviation policies of the government from smallholder 
cultivation to large-scale farming. Hence, the recent global food and financial crises 
served only as catalysts to what the government had been planning, preparing for 
and promoting long before those crises erupted. In order to see this shift, we need to 
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have a quick look at some of the most important rural development policy documents 
that this government has put in place over the last two decades.  
 
 
7.3.1. Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) 
 
Since coming to power in 1991, the current EPRDF government has strongly 
promoted smallholder cultivation and crop production as the backbone for the 
country’s economic growth in general and poverty alleviation in particular (Workneh, 
2008). In pursuit of this policy goal, increased support was made available to 
smallholders, mainly through donor assistance and domestic resources in the form of 
provision of improved seeds, credit services, new technology packages, and a 
variety of human capacity development programmes (Workneh, 2008). To this end, a 
number of pro-peasant policy documents were produced directed at the 
empowerment of small-scale farmers. 
 
The initial strategic document in the direction of empowerment of small-scale farmers 
is the ‘Agricultural Development Led Industrialization’ (ADLI) strategy, put forward by 
the government of Ethiopia in 1993. One of the principal objectives of this strategy is 
to modernize and increase the productivity of small-scale farmers through the supply 
of appropriate technology, certified seeds, fertilizers, rural credit facilities and 
technical assistance (Mitik, 2010). This strategy was not only rural-centred, it also 
depicted small-scale farmers as the engine of growth for the national economy as a 
whole. Under this strategy, the development of agriculture in general is believed to 
lead to industrialization by providing the required raw material, capital base, surplus 
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labour and capital accumulation (Dercon and Zeitlin, 2009). Along this line, different 
sectoral policies were streamlined and formulated in the subsequent years, which 
include, the launching of a nationwide agricultural extension programme; the 
ratification of laws that liberalized the procurement and distribution of inputs 
(improved seeds and fertilizers); and efforts to boost rural credit facilities for small-
scale farmers (Getachew, 2003). Hence, it could be concluded that, in its first 
decade in power, the EPRDF’s development policy as a whole was categorically in 




7.3.2. Rural Development Policy and Strategies Document 
 
However, from the beginning of 2000, this small-scale-centred strategy began to shift 
gradually and subtly. The first sign of this shift appeared in the ‘Rural Development 
Policy and Strategies Document’ published by the government in 2003. Even though 
a significant focus remained placed on the shoulders of small-scale cultivators as an 
engine of growth, the document also acknowledged the fundamental role of large-
scale farming. The document, as quoted below, explicitly speaks of an unavoidable 
‘role change’ from small-scale farmer to large-scale investor and from peasant 
agriculture to capitalist farming. 
 
Experiences of developed economies clearly show that as an economy grows there is a 
tendency for some small farmers to quit the sector and seek employment in other sectors, and 
there are others who accumulate enough capital to go big in the sector. This implies that there 
is a direct correlation between agricultural growth and the role of private investment in the 
sector. This in turn means that assuming the objective of accelerated agricultural 
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development is achieved; it is likely that there will be a role change. The key actor in the 
sector's development will be relatively large-scale private investors and not the semi 
subsistence small farmers (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED), 2003, 
p.3). 
 
In addition to alluding to this strategic policy shift from small-scale cultivation to 
large-scale farming, the document also pointed out the importance of attracting 
foreign land investors and outlined efforts to be undertaken to assure them that the 
government at all levels would be ready to facilitate and assist them.   
 
There are two investment areas that seem to be particularly suited for foreign investment in 
the agricultural sector. The first is to develop unutilized vast land with high irrigation 
possibility. … The second investment opportunity is to produce high-value agricultural 
products (e.g. flowers, vegetables) where the scale of operation could be small or medium … 
… The country's demand for participation in both areas is immense, and assurances are 
given that government institutions at all levels will do their level best to facilitate and assist 
foreign investors…While underlining the importance of encouraging domestic private 
investment through well-conceived incentives, the focus of attention should be on attracting 
foreign investors. Historically, efforts made to attract foreign investment are almost exclusively 
directed towards non-agricultural sectors. This needs to change if Ethiopia is to achieve its 
agricultural objectives (MOFED, 2003, p.4). 
 
As articulated in this document, from 2001 onwards the position of the Ethiopian 
government was already very predictable with regard to large-scale land investment 
and foreign investors. Since then, other policy documents across various sectors 
have started to emerge in this direction, encouraging foreign investors and preparing 




7.3.3. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Programmes  
 
In 2002, the Ethiopian government started to publish poverty reduction papers and 
programmes. The first one, known as the ‘Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Reduction Program (SDPRP)’, clearly mentioned the important role of large-scale 
commercial farming for the agricultural development of the country.    
 
The government will make every effort to enhance and buttress the contribution private sector 
(domestic and foreign) will make to agricultural development endeavors. The federal 
government, in collaboration with regions, will work hard to allocate land for commercial 
farming, make sure that there are adequate infrastructure facilities, and streamline and make 
efficient land lease procedures for entrepreneurs who wish to set up large – scale commercial 
farms. For those who want to rent land from farmers and take part in agricultural activities, the 
federal government, again in collaboration with the regions, will work out an efficient 
arrangement, which will safeguard the interests of all parties concerned (MOFED, 2002, p.iii). 
 
The second poverty reduction document, which covered the period 2006-2010, was 
called the ‘Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 
(PASDEP)’. It was published in 2005 and accentuated the commercialization of 
agriculture and acceleration of private sector development. While it acknowledges 
the importance of the small-scale cultivation outlined under the previous strategies 
and policies, it unambiguously stated the strategic shift to large-scale farming led by 
the private sector.  
 
During the PASDEP period, Ethiopia will build on the development strategies pursued under 
SDPRP (expanding education, strengthening health service provision, fighting HIV/AIDS, 
Food Security Program, capacity-building as well as decentralization). It will also continue to 
pursue on the ADLI strategy, but with important enhancements to capture the private initiative 
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of farmers and support the shifts to diversification and commercialization of agriculture 
(MOFED, 2005, p.46). 
 
In order to accelerate the development of the private sector, the document outlined 
the main areas of intervention by the government to create a fertile ground for the 
private sector including:  
 
 Continued simplification of business processes and licensing requirements;  
 Strengthening of the regulatory framework and establishment of a level playing field with 
regard to property ownership through judicial strengthening, implementation of free 
competition policy, and enforcement of contracts;  
 Continued reforms to establish land tenure security for investment and trade purposes 
(MOFED, 2005, p.48). 
 
The current five-year development strategy for the period 2011-2015, known as the 
‘Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP)’, forecast that the agricultural sector would 
grow at the rate of 14.9% annually and envisaged the doubling of farm output by the 
year 2015. According to the plan, the country will meet all the MDGs targets by 2015. 
The plan also predicts that the country will achieve its aspiration of becoming a 
‘middle income’ country by 2028. For all these to happen, the plan puts a greater 
emphasis on accelerating agricultural growth, particularly private investment in large-
scale farms. Within the GTP’s five-year period, it is envisaged that 3.3 million ha of 




7.3.4. Legal Framework for Investment  
 
From the discussion in the preceding section, it could be observed that there was a 
clear policy shift from small-scale farmer to large-scale commercial farming over the 
last decade in Ethiopia. However, those policies alone would have not been enough 
to attract investors without concrete legal instruments. In this regard, the Ethiopian 
government has also been simultaneously laying down conducive legal frameworks 
for large-scale land investors – particularly foreign ones. The most significant legal 
instruments in this direction are the ‘Investment Proclamations No. 280/2002’ and 
the ‘Investment Incentives and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors 
Council of Ministers Regulations No.84/2003’.  
 
A close reading of these documents clearly shows a generous disposition towards 
foreign investors, particularly export-oriented ones. According to Article 11 of the 
‘Investment Proclamation’, the capital requirement for a foreign investor ranges from 
zero (if the investor exports 75% or more of his/her outputs) to $60,000 (if the 
investment is made jointly with domestic investors) to $100,000 (if the foreign 
investor invests wholly on his/her own). For foreign investors who want to invest in 
areas of engineering, architectural, accounting and audit services, project studies or 
business and management consultancy services or publishing, the minimum capital 
requirement ranges from $25,000 (if the investment is made jointly with a domestic 
investor) to $50,000 (if the foreign investor invests wholly on his/her own).  Foreign 
investors have the right to open and operate foreign currency accounts in authorized 
local banks in the country and they can make remittances (accruing from their 
investment) out of Ethiopia in convertible foreign currency (Investment Proclamation, 
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2002, Article 19:2 and 20:1). Expatriates employed in those enterprises may remit, in 
convertible foreign currency, salaries and other payment accruing from their 
employment (Investment Proclamation, 2002, Article 20:2). In addition, both foreign 
and domestic investors are guaranteed against expropriation or nationalization 
except as required by the public interest, although what is to be considered as public 
interest is not defined (Investment Proclamation, 2002, Article 21:1). In case either of 
these take place, full compensation is payable at the prevailing market value, with 
foreign investors having the right to be compensated in foreign currency and the right 
to remit received compensation out of Ethiopia (Investment Proclamation, 2002, 
Article 21:2, 3).    
 
Under the ‘Investment Regulation No. 84/2003’, various attractive incentives are 
enumerated for investors who export a large proportion of their output. Any 
investment project, domestic or foreign, which is engaged in the agricultural and 
other sectors and exports at least 50% of its outputs, or supplies 75% of its 
products/services to an exporter as a production input, shall be eligible for income 
tax exemption for five years. This income tax exemption could be extended for up to 
a seven-year period by the Investment Board under special circumstances or for 
more than seven years upon the decision of the Council of Ministers. However, an 
investment project, whether it be foreign or domestic, that exports below 50% of its 
outputs shall be eligible for income tax exemption for a period of only two years. This 
period could be extended to five years by the Investment Board under special 
circumstances or, if the investment is made in a relatively underdeveloped region, 
the investor would be entitled to another one year of income tax exemption 




With regard to custom duties, the aforementioned regulation provides for three types 
of exemptions. The first one is for the importation of duty‐free capital goods and 
construction materials necessary for establishing a new enterprise or for the 
expansion or upgrading of an already existing enterprise; secondly, an investor is 
eligible for duty-free importation of spare parts, the value of which is not greater than 
15% of the total value of the capital goods imported; and finally, the Regulation also 
provides for duty-free importation of vehicles, the number of which has to be 
determined by the investment board depending on the type and nature of the 
investment (Investment Regulations, 2003, Article 8). 
 
In conclusion of this section, firstly, it is understandable from the above-discussed 
policy papers, poverty reduction strategies and legal instruments that there has been 
a clear policy shift in Ethiopia from small-scale to large-scale commercial farming 
over the last decade. Secondly, unlike the prevailing discourse on land grabbing, 
which has tended to focus only on the international drivers of the recent wave of 
large-scale land deals (Cotula et al., 2009; De Schutter, 2011; GRAIN, 2008; 
McMichael, 2010; Zoomers, 2010), the Ethiopian experience as shown in this section 
demonstrates that this phenomenon is also made possible by the host government’s 





7.4. Process of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions   
 
The actual process of land acquisition in Ethiopia varies from region to region and 
sometimes even from investor to investor. It seems that there has been no uniformly 
standardized process of land investment throughout the country. This might be due 
to the fact that land administration, as stated earlier in Chapter four, is 
constitutionally allocated to the regional states and therefore each region has 
developed its own way of allocating land to investors. However, even in one region 
like Gambella, different investors have gone through different processes of acquiring 
their land (Interviews – 1 and 3BSS, 15 and 17 Mar. 2012).42 The complication is 
also compounded by the fact that land investment in general involves various 
government ministries whose roles sometimes are either overlapping or unclear 
when it comes to actual processes involved in providing land to investors.   
 
As stated earlier, to provide a uniform land investment process, a specific unit called 
the AISD was created in January 2009 under the MOARD. According to 
Proclamation 29/2001, which created this particular unit, the unit is charged with 
processing all land investments from 5,000 ha and above in all regions of the 
country. Among others, the unit is also responsible for creating a conducive and 
attractive environment for land investors; providing the necessary technical and 
administrative support to investors; and formulating policies, strategies, rules and 
regulations that can accelerate the investment process and make it more efficient 
(Proclamation 29/2001).  
 
                                                          
42
 Interview – 3BSS: Is a senior staff for a foreign large-scale commercial farm in Gambella. 
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Whereas the AISD has been now charged with all agricultural investment of over 
5,000 ha, the regional governments, in theory, still have the mandate to process any 
land investment that is below 5,000 ha. However, in practice, in Gambella regional 
state for example, the regional investment authority officials – including some of the 
regional cabinet members – stated during my field research that since the creation of 
the AISD anything that has do with land investment has now been transferred to 
federal government (Interviews – 3 and 4GOV, 21 Mar. 2012).43  
 
This being said, with the establishment of the AISD, there seems to have emerged a 
uniform pattern of land investment throughout the country. Whether at the federal or 
regional state levels, land investment at the moment involves three major phases. 
The first phase is the attainment of an investment certificate, followed by the second 
phase of signing a land use agreement, and then the final phase of land acquisition.  
 
 
7.4.1. Investment Certificate  
 
In theory, attainment of an investment certificate appears to be an easy process, 
which can be accomplished in a short period of time. In order to obtain an investment 
certificate, a potential investor has to complete a short application form in which 
he/she describes the nature of the project, preferred region of investment, estimated 
capital investment, hectares of land required, estimated number of employees, raw 
material requirement, estimated annual production, destination market for 
production, utility requirements, and implementation schedule. After an application is 
                                                          
43
 Interview – 3GOV: Is a senior expert at the Gambella Investment Agency (GIA) responsible for 
large-scale agricultural investment related issues.  
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submitted, the investment authority will check if it is filled out correctly. If everything 
is fine, then the authority is expected to issue an investment certificate within four 
hours, after a fee of 600 birr (about $35) is paid. One of the senior staff of a foreign 
investor interviewed for this research expressed his satisfaction with regard to this 
first phase of acquiring an investment certificate (i.e. Interview – 3BSS, 17 Mar. 
2012). Another investor stated that he even received his certificate within less than 
four hours (Interview – 4BSS, 18 Mar. 2012).44  
 
 
7.4.2. Land Lease Agreement  
 
The second phase, ‘signing land use agreement’ between the investor and the 
concerned federal or regional government body, is also a relatively short process. As 
stated earlier, for investors seeking more than 5,000 ha, the agreement is negotiated 
with the AISD at the federal level. Otherwise, any land lease agreement below 5,000 
ha, can, in theory, be processed at regional state level. The land rent agreements 
vary from region to region but, in general, are short documents of between eight to 
fifteen pages (MOARD, 2012). The content of those land deals will be thoroughly 
analyzed later in this chapter.    
 
  
                                                          
44




7.4.3. Land Acquisition  
 
The third phase of ‘land acquisition’ is very different from region to region and from 
investor to investor. Some investors stated that they first identified the land with 
concerned woreda officials and then went to the federal government to carry out the 
required legal procedure of acquiring land (e.g. Interview – 7BSS, 02 Apr. 2012).45 In 
Gambella regional state, this seems to be the dominant procedure for domestic 
investors who acquired land before the creation of the AISD. However, after the 
AISD was formed, the process of acquiring land seems to have changed 
dramatically with agreements signed in Addis Ababa and then woreda government 
officials only receiving orders to give land to investors who come to their woreda with 
valid official agreements. In other words, the woreda government is restricted to 
handing out lands to investors without any active participation in the negotiation 
process. This will be discussed in detail later in this chapter under the sub-topic ‘local 
participation in LSLA’. However, first I shall discuss the role of different relevant 
ministries/departments in the process of LSLAs in the Gambella region.  
 
 
7.5. Inter-Ministerial Coordination and Frictions   
 
Since land investment touches upon various issues mandated to different ministries, 
its process would have required strong coordination between all the relevant 
ministries. However, my evidences suggest that inter-ministerial coordination is 
extremely weak when it exists and in most cases it does not exist at all. In the 
                                                          
45
 This interviewee is an administrator for a domestic owned large-scale commercial farm in the 
Gambella region.  
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Gambella region, the regional investment agency and the federal body (i.e. AISD) 
seem to have taken complete control of land investment, regardless of its 
implications for other agencies and concerned stakeholders.   
 
One of the foremost stakeholders in this regard is the Environmental Protection 
Authority (EPA). In theory, all development programmes, be they land investment or 
any other development projects that will have an impact on the environment, are 
required to obtain authorization from the federal or regional EPA before they are 
implemented (Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Proclamation, 299/2002). 
According to Article 7 of this Proclamation, project initiators – government or private 
– are required “to undertake an EIA of his project by approved experts and to fulfil 
the terms and conditions of authorization during implementation of the project.” 
However, none of the investors in the Gambella regional state interviewed for this 
research have obtained authorization from any EPA or carried out an EIA.  
 
In fact, this is not only a problem in Gambella regional state. Even in other regions 
investment certificates are issued and land rent agreements are signed before any 
EIAs are conducted. According to Mr. Solomon Kebede, head of the EIA service, the 
federal government’s desire to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and set up a 
one-stop shop for land investment has resulted in attention not being paid to EIA, 
which is seen as a bureaucratic hurdle in the way of the desperately needed 
investments. He said that, “although politicians and investors talk about EIA, there is 
actually no political will to implement it and it is not a compulsory requirement for 




In the Gambella region, the conflict between the EPA and the investment agency 
seems to be even more dramatic. As a matter of institutional mandate, while the 
regional EPA is mandated to look after ‘protected forests’ among others, the regional 
investment agency is mandated to facilitate large-scale land investments in the 
region. In such case, one would expect greater coordination between these two 
agencies to make sure that a forest with ‘protected’ status under the care of EPA is 
not given away to an investor by the investment agency. However, both in theory 
and in practice, there is no mechanism created to facilitate such coordination and to 
avoid conflicts. According to a former Director of the regional EPA:  
 
In the beginning when the region started to receive applications for land investment, although 
there was no written working procedure between the investment agency and our office [EPA], 
the investment agency used to informally consult us on specific cases where they think we 
should be consulted. In some cases we also proactively contact them when we hear of 
investors approaching protected forests. Both agencies used to have informal smooth working 
relationship. However, things changed with the coming of the foreign investors and domestic 
investors who get their license from Addis Ababa and come to Gambella only to get the land. 
These investors are politically powerful and they can indirectly remove any regional official 
who stands in their own way. This is how I lost my position as a director of EPA. Once, one 
investor wanted to take part of a protected forest under our care. The investment agency 
informed them that the area is a protected forest and therefore not open for investment. They 
directly contacted the Ministry of Federal Affairs, a political ministry that has nothing to do with 
land investment. The Ministry, in turn, contacted the regional council, again the regional 
political body that has nothing to do with land investment. Then the regional council ordered 
the investment agency to immediately give the land to the investor. The investment agency 
officially informed us about the order from the regional council. Then I officially wrote to the 
regional council with a copy to the investment agency that the land in question is a protected 
area and therefore not open for investment. I mentioned that the investment agency should 
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look for another option. The reply I got from the regional council is a letter of dismissal from 
my position as director of EPA (Interview – 7GOV, 23 Mar. 2012).   
 
I tried to obtain access to communications between these agencies to confirm the 
authenticity of this story but I was unable to. However, there are numerous similar 
stories across different sectors and levels of government in which specific officials 
have been dismissed from their positions for demanding more consultations and 
transparency on large-scale land investment deals or just simply for defending the 
mandate of their agency against some large-scale land investment projects.   
 
Another concerned government body with regard to large-scale land deals in the 
Gambella region is the Gambella National Park Authority. Gambella National Park is 
located in the heart of the region and covers a territory of 5,061 square kilometres.46 
Since its designation as a national park, almost no work had been carried out to 
practically demarcate its boundaries. However, in 2005, the Gambella National Park 
Authority, in collaboration with the Federal Wildlife Conservation Authority and the 
Horn of Africa Regional Environment Centre and Network (HoA-REC), carried out a 
high-level survey to estimate the amount of wildlife in the National Park and then to 
start the process of actual protection of the Park. This project was supported by the 
governments of The Netherlands and Germany. Its aim was to establish a Peace 
Park between South Sudan and Ethiopia so that animals could move freely between 
these two countries. According to one respondent, who used to be the Director of the 
Gambella National Park Authority, even though they had strong support from all the 
                                                          
46
 The park was established primarily to protect two species of endangered wetland antelopes namely 
the white-eared kob and the nile lechwe. In addition to these species, the park is also home to 
elephants, lions, African buffalo, tiang, roan antelope, hartebeest, lelwel, guereza monkey and olive 
baboon. Several birds reported to be only found in this areas, according to the park authority, include 
the long-tailed paradise whydah, shoebill stork, and red-throated and green bee-eaters. 
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government branches when the project was launched, things changed dramatically 
with the coming of large-scale land investors (Interview – 6GOV, 21 Mar. 2012). He 
stated that:  
 
Since 2007/2008 large-scale investors started to encroach into the heart of the park taking the 
land close to the water sources therefore blocking the wildlife from accessing water. Not only 
the wildlife are blocked but also the communities in those areas with whom we were working 
together to develop a community based park protection system were also blocked from 
accessing water by those investments (Interview – 6GOV, 21 Mar. 2012).   
 
According to this respondent, he tried to persuade both the regional government and 
the investment agency to work out a mutual solution in which agricultural 
developments could be carried out and wildlife in the Park could be protected at the 
same time. He was informed several times that no further investors would be given 
land in the area that is designated as a National Park area. But the regional 
government does not prevent a large number of investors coming from Addis Ababa 
who have acquired all the necessary paper work from the AISD to be given land in 
the region. Hence, every time another investor comes from the federal government, 
the regional government gives another piece of land from the area that was originally 
part of the National Park. As this interviewee kept complaining about the continued 
encroachment of investors, he received a letter of transfer to be the head of another 
agency in the region (Interview – 6GOV, 21 Mar. 2012).  
 
While the conflicts between the Investment Agency, the EPA and the National Park 
Authority are the most dramatic ones, other bodies too complain about their 
mandates being undermined by large-scale land investment projects. The regional 
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Ministry of Water Development is one of the government’s ministries that have been 
complaining about the lack of inter-ministerial consultation and coordination in the 
process of land investment projects in the region. According to a senior official within 
this ministry, although it is well known that these projects will have an enormous 
impact on the mandate of their ministry, they are deliberately sidelined in the process 
in order to make land investments fast and easy for investors (Interview – 5GOV, 21 
Mar. 2012). What concerns this official most is not only the lack of consultation with 
their ministry but the lack of any provision in those land deals that obliges investors 
to manage water resources in accordance with the relevant policies and ensure 
access for local populations. According to the land lease agreements analyzed for 
this research (MOARD, 2012), the investors could use the water resources without 
any limit including situating dams which would deny access to downstream users not 
only in Ethiopia but also in South Sudan, to where all the rivers in Gambella regional 
state flow.    
 
 
7.6. Community Consultation/Participation in LSLA 
 
Both the critics and supporters of LSLA agree on the fundamental necessity for 
community consultation in the process of land investments. Among the World Bank’s 
seven ‘Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment’, one of them (Principle 4) 
is about consultation with those materially affected by land investment. The principle 
states that “All those materially affected are consulted, and agreements from 




According to the secondary data I have looked at, in Mozambique for example, at 
least on a theoretical basis, community consultation and hearing is a mandatory part 
of the process of large-scale land acquisition (Saloma and Nhantumbo, 2009).  In 
Tanzania, the steps for land acquisition begin with the Tanzanian Investment Centre 
(TIC), where investors are required to demonstrate financial viability of the proposed 
project. From there it goes to district level, then from district level it goes down to 
village level where the concerned village through the ‘Village Assembly’ (comprising 
all adults residents of a village) has to finally approve the land transfer (Sulle and 
Nelson, 2009). Regardless of whatever limitations might exist in the implementation, 
in these two countries at least community consultation is legally entrenched and is a 
mandatory requirement without which land lease agreements could not be signed 
(Cotula et al., 2009).  
 
 
7.6.1. Community Consultation/Participation in Theory  
 
In the Ethiopian case, community consultation is not part of the formal process of 
land acquisition. As discussed earlier, the process of land acquisition involves only 
the federal government – where land investment certificates are obtained and land 
lease agreements are signed – and the regional state government – where land is 
physically acquired by the investors. Leave alone community consultation, which is 
supposed to take place at the village level, even the other lower government 
structures such as the zonal and woreda governments are not included in the formal 
process of land acquisition. This means that land investment in the Gambella region, 
in theory, is only the business of the federal and regional state governments. The 
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zonal government – the body below the regional government; the woreda 
government – the next level below the zonal; and the kebele council – the lowest 
unit, are all excluded from the formal processes of LSLAs. In other words, in theory, 
all the government structures below the regional state level do not have any power to 
influence the process of land investments or negotiate land deals in accordance with 
their specific circumstances.  
 
 
7.6.2. Community Participation in Practice  
 
Although community participation has not ever been part of the formal large-scale 
land acquisition processes, in practice different woredas have implemented varying 
degrees of community participation at different periods. For the sake of analysis, I 
have identified three different levels of de facto community participation at different 
phases of large-scale land acquisitions, which I am going to discuss as follows.  
 
 
A. Phase One: Strong de facto Community Participation   
 
Between 2000 and 2006, when most of the investors were local investors acquiring 
limited amount of land – i.e. below 5000 ha – the involvement of the communities 
through woreda administration seemed to be very strong. During those years, 
according to the interviews I have conducted, in fact, the real negotiation used to 
take place between the investors and the relevant woreda cabinets (Interview – 
11GOV, 28 Mar. 2012). It is to be noted here that woreda cabinets are 
representatives of different villages/communities. After identifying the land and 
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reaching a consensus, the investor and the woreda officials only come to the 
regional state government to carry out formal paper-work and signing of the land 
lease agreement (Interview – 11GOV, 28 Mar. 2012). 
 
In general, according to woreda officials interviewed, during this period, the woreda 
government used to be the strongest stakeholder in matters relating to land 
investments (Interviews – 11 and 13GOV, 28 Mar. and 03 Apr., 2012). That is why, 
during this period, there was no single incident of displacement of local communities 
since any investments that would encroach into communal lands would be resisted 
by the woreda cabinet. Hence, although community participation was not formally 
instituted in land investment processes at this time, there seems to have been strong 




B. Phase Two: Weak de facto Community Participation    
 
From 2007 to 2008, when large-scale foreign investors began to come to the 
Gambella region, the role of the woreda governments became very limited. The 
regional government took greater control over large-scale land acquisition processes 
in terms of negotiating and concluding land lease deals. However, during this period, 
respective woreda officials remained co-signatories of any land lease agreement 
between the regional state government and investors.  
 
According to some woreda officials, even though the role of the regional government 
became stronger during this period, there was still room for informal consultation and 
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understanding between the regional government and the relevant woreda officials 
(Interviews – 11 and 13GOV, 28 Mar. and 03 Apr., 2012). One of these woreda 
officials who used to be a woreda administrator told me a story that demonstrates 
the existence of informal consultation and understanding between the woreda and 
regional governments during this period. He stated that when he was a woreda 
administrator, one investor wanted to take a piece of land that is used by one 
community in his woreda. When the regional government invited him to the regional 
capital to co-sign that particular land lease agreement, he said he refused to do so, 
citing the concern of the community. He then explained the whole situation to the 
regional government and promised to give another area to the investor. According to 
him, the regional government accepted his concerns and the investor was given 
another place which was not his first choice (Interview – 11GOV, 28 Mar. 2012).  
 
During this period, one of the former regional state executives (Interview – 8GOV, 23 
Mar. 2012) stated that they too used to refuse land investments that they perceived 
as environmentally destructive. He said that when he was in power, Sheik Mohamed 
Al Amoudi, owner of Saudi Star Plc, approached the regional government for the 
Majang forest in order to turn it into a tea plantation. According to the interviewee, 
despite immense pressure from the federal government, the regional government of 
Gambella refused the project on the ground of its environmental implications for the 
region and the impact it would have had on the indigenous Majang communities who 
live in that forest (Interview – 8GOV, 23 Mar. 2012).  
 
Therefore, although during this period the role of local communities and woreda 
governments became very limited in matters of large-scale land investments, there 
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were still informal consultations and understandings between relevant woreda 
officials and the regional government. Moreover, the regional government also 
seems to have taken into account advice from woreda officials and sided with 
concerned local communities in cases of conflict of interests between investors and 
local communities.  
 
 
C. Phase Three: No Community Participation    
 
After the centralization of large-scale land investment processes – i.e. after the 
creation of the AISD in January 2009 – things seem to have dramatically changed 
with regard to local consultation and participation. Although in principle regional 
states retain the power to negotiate land leases that are below 5,000 ha, in practice, 
at least in Gambella, all the land transaction processes have been transferred to the 
federal government, according to an interview given by the regional president to the 
Voice of America (VOA) radio Amharic programme (Omot, interview with VOA, 4 
Jun. 2011). In 2010, the regional government wrote a circular letter to all woredas, 
instructing them not to engage in any discussions with potential investors since all 
the powers had been transferred to the federal government (Interviews – 11 and 
12GOV, 28 Mar. 2010).  
 
Hence, since the centralization of large-scale land acquisitions, both the woreda and 
regional government have been completely excluded from the negotiation processes 
of large-scale land deals. The only role they can play is to formally hand over the 
land to large-scale investors after all the paper work is completed in Addis Ababa. 
Since at the moment 1.2 million ha of land from the Gambella region is supposedly 
 189 
 
reserved in the federal land bank for large-scale investors, the federal government 
can lease any amount from this reserve without the need for any further consultation 
with regional or local governments (Interview – 12GOV, 28 Mar. 2012).  
 
There are, however, two problems with regard to this 1.2m ha that is claimed to be 
reserved in the federal land bank. The first problem is related to the way in which 
these hectares are transferred to the federal land bank to be administered and 
marketed by the federal government. Some members of the regional cabinet 
interviewed stated that the issue of land administration power transfer had not been 
discussed in the regional cabinet (Interviews – 4, 5 and 6GOV, 21 Mar. 2012). They 
only learned about it – like everyone else – from the late Prime Minister Meles when 
he stated in one of his interviews that Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz regional 
states had transferred their land administration power to the federal government 
(Meles, Interview with Ethiopiafirst, 19 Nov. 2009). Even after the statement from the 
Prime Minister, the issue of power transfer was not discussed in the regional cabinet, 
according to those members of the regional cabinet interviewed. The next time they 
heard about this issue was when the regional governor stated in one of his 
interviews that the regional government had delegated its land administration power 
to the federal government (Omot, Interview with VOA, 4 Jun 2011). Hence, the issue 
of power transfer seems to be only discussed between the federal government and 
the governor of the Gambella regional state without deliberation from either the 
regional cabinet or the regional legislative council (Interviews – 4, 5 and 6GOV, 21 




The second problem with this 1.2million ha of land is that it is not actually 
demarcated on the ground. At the federal government level, they claim that there is 
1.2million ha of land available for investment in the Gambella regional state. At the 
Gambella regional state level, this figure is broken down according to different 
woredas in the region. However, at the woreda level, when I asked the woreda 
officials about which exact location is reserved to be administered by the federal 
government, none of them were able to show me any location.  
 
The actual practice of land allocation so far is that when the regional government 
receives an investor from the federal government who has carried out all the paper 
work, the regional government will send him/her to one woreda to be given the 
amount of land indicated in the agreement. At the woreda government level, after 
receiving all the required documents from an investor, since there is no such 
demarcated land waiting for investment, they select three people from the woreda 
cabinet to identify a suitable parcel of land based on the size of land and type of crop 
that the investor plans to grow. According to those agreements signed by the federal 
government, the woreda governments have to hand over land within 30 days of 
receipt of application. Since any delay in handing over land to the investors will have 
harsh consequences, woreda officials are put under extreme pressure to sometimes 
give investors lands that are inhabited or used by local communities.    
 
At the community level, in nine kebeles that I visited for this study, according to all of 
my FGDs participants, no consultation had been carried out with the kebele councils 
during this period, let alone consultation with ordinary villagers. No prior information 
had been given to kebele councils concerning land investment in their communal 
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lands. For instance, part of the land given to Karuturi belongs to Ilea kebele. When I 
asked one of the members of the Ilea kebele council if they were consulted about the 
land deal, he said that they only learned about it when they saw the bulldozers 
clearing the trees (FGD – 8 – P1, 10 Apr. 2012). When the kebele representatives 
asked one of the bulldozer operators why they were cutting down the trees, he 
replied that he is just an employee of ‘Karuturi’ and they should ask them. That was 
the first time the Ilea villagers heard the name ‘Karuturi’, the company that had 
already signed a 300,000 ha land lease agreement. Then the kebele council went to 
woreda level and the woreda said that they too do not know about the land deal and 
that the council members should ask the regional state government about it. The 
kebele council members went to the regional state council three times to enquire 
about the destruction of their communal forest and the answer they received from 
the state is that the land does not belong to them; it belongs to the government (FGD 
– 8, 10 Apr. 2012). The only consultation that many villages had with their respective 
woreda governments was about the ‘villagization’ programme, which will be 
discussed in depth later.   
 
Therefore, according to my personal observation and discussions with all levels of 
government and communities, there seems to be an absolute lack of community 
participation in the process of contemporary large-scale land acquisitions taking 
place in the Gambella region. Although there had been strong informal community 
participation prior to the centralization of large-scale land investment process, the 
centralization of the process has removed all the informal consultative channels and 
restricted all the lower government structures (i.e. the regional state, zone, woreda, 
and kebele) merely to implementing bodies of the decisions of the federal 
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government. As a result, this seems to have profoundly tilted the balance of power in 
favour of the federal government whose policies and decisions now have to be 
strictly followed not only by the regional government but also by the kebele councils.   
 
 
7.7. Contents of Land Lease Agreements  
 
The contents of the land lease agreements vary, depending on each regional state 
and whether the deal is negotiated at the regional or federal level. At the federal 
level, as already stated, the AISD has developed a uniform system for all large-scale 
land investors that seek more than 5,000 ha of land. Due to the high number of 
investors that have signed land lease agreements in different regions, it was beyond 
the scope of this research to access and analyze all the land lease agreements. 
However, 24 land lease agreements from federal to regional state levels have been 
viewed and analyzed for this research.  
 
 
7.7.1. Parties to Agreement  
 
Land lease agreements in general involve two parties. All of the lease agreements 
analyzed for this research begin with a title that involves, on one side, the land 
acquirer – i.e. an investor, foreign or domestic – and on the other side, the land 
provider – the Ethiopian government, federal or regional. Although foreign investors 
might have the backing of their countries of origin, there is no foreign government 
that has directly signed a land lease agreement with the Ethiopian government. 
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Hence, despite the prevailing discourse in the media about foreign countries 
grabbing land in developing countries, evidence in Ethiopia does not show direct 
involvement of foreign governments in large-scale land investment. All the land lease 
agreements obtained for this research only involve the private investors and the 
Ethiopian government. Since land is state property in Ethiopia, it is not surprising that 
there is no deal signed between two private entities. At the federal government level, 
it is the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development that is responsible for signing 
land lease agreements. However, at the regional state level, it varies from region to 
region. For instance, in Gambella and Oromia regional states, land lease 
agreements are signed by the Investment Agency/Commission rather than by the 
regional MOARD. However, in Amhara region, land lease agreements are jointly 
signed by the regional Environmental Protection Authority and the Land 
Administration and Use Authority (Imeru, 2010).   
 
 
7.7.2. Land Size  
 
Following the names of the parties to the agreement at the top of the lease 
agreements and an introductory note about the parties involved, land lease 
agreements specify the size of the land made available to the investor, the location 
(Region, Zone, Woreda and Kebele) of the land, and the purpose for which the 
investor has acquired the land (See Appendix – 1). Until recently, there has been no 
limit on the amount of land that an investor can acquire and the purpose for which 
the land is to be used. With the enactment of the guideline called ‘Directives for 
Implementation of Rental Fees for Agricultural Land Investment’ in 2009, the 
MOARD has outlined some restrictions with regard to land size that could be 
 194 
 
transferred to a single investor and a standardized amount of rental fees (MOARD, 
2009a). According to this document, the maximum size of land that an investor can 
ask for depends on the type of crop that they plan to grow. The largest area 
(maximum 50,000ha) is given for investors who plan to grow biofuel plants, including 
palm oil trees. This is followed by oil crop investors or agro industry crops such as 
sugar cane and cotton investors who can rent a maximum land size of 20,000ha. 
The smallest area (maximum 5,000 ha) is given to those who would like to grow 
coffee and tea. However, in practice, this regulation seems to be ignored not only by 
the regional states, but also by the MOARD itself, the author of the regulation. As we 
can see in the following selected land lease agreements signed between the 
MOARD and various investors after the publication of this directive, the Ministry has 
clearly violated its own rules.  
 
Table 3: Land lease agreements beyond the official threshold limit   




























Sugar cane   20,000 25,000 Gambella 25/11/2010 
Ruchi Agri 
PLC 
Soya beans 20,000 25,000 Gambella 05/04/2010 
 




7.7.3. Land Lease Period  
 
Land lease periods vary greatly among regions and also within regions between 
irrigated lands and rain-fed lands. At the federal level, the majority of leases are 
signed for 25 years. For more capital-intensive crops such as sugar and agro-fuels 
the lease period could be as long as 45 years. At the regional level, lease periods 
range from 20 years minimum to 99 years maximum. In Gambella regional state for 
example land leases are between 35 years and 99 years. The federal government is 
working with the regional governments at the moment to renegotiate any land lease 
that goes beyond its maximum lease period, which is 45 years (Interview – 3GOV, 
21 Mar. 2012). In Oromia, land lease lengths are between 20 and 45 years. 
However, as in the case of land size discussed above, the federal government itself 
has also signed some agreements that violate its official lease period limit. For 
example on 1st March 2010, MOARD has signed a 50-year land lease deal with 
Shmpori, an Indian company, to grow biofuel plants in Benishangul-Gumuz regional 
state (MOARD, 2012).   
 
 
7.7.4. Land Lease Fees  
 
Like land lease sizes and periods, land lease fees also vary across different regions 
and investors. The federal government explains this variation on the basis of location 
of the land in question, access to markets, transport, communication, banking, and 
availability of other services. Lands that are closer to Addis Ababa and other urban 
centres with adequate roads and other basic services have high lease value. This is 
also true with lands that are close to water sources (river, dam, etc). According to 
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land deals analysed for this study, the maximum and minimum annual lease fees 
could be summarized as in the following table.  
 
 
Table 4: Land Rent Rate in Selected Regions (ETB/ha/year) 
Region Minimum Rent  Maximum rent 
Amhara 14 ($0.9) 79 ($5.2) 
Benishangul-
Gumuz 
15 ($1) 25 ($1.6) 
Gambella 20 ($1.3) 30 ($2) 
Oromia 70 ($4.6) 135 ($9) 
SNNPRS 30 ($2) 117 ($7.8) 
Tigrai  30 ($2) 40 ($2.6) 
 
Source: Dessalegn (2011, p.15)  
 
 
The Ethiopian land lease rate is criticized for being incredibly low. According to 
Ghosh, an Indian economist, the value of lands that Indian companies are taking in 
Ethiopia at a rate of $2 per hectare per year, could be between $340-350 per hectare 
per year in India (Ghosh, Interview with NewsClick, 13 Sept. 2011). Because of their 
incredibly low rental rate, some have called the land deals in Ethiopia ‘the deal of the 
century’ (The Guardian, 21 Mar. 2011). Since the fees are set in Ethiopian Birr in 
those land deals, those rates remain the same despite the high inflation in the 
country and the continued depreciation of the Birr against every major currency 
around the world. However, in the document mentioned earlier – i.e. ‘Directives for 
Implementation of Rental Fees for Agricultural Investment’ – the MoRAD has 
proposed increments of land rental fees to be implemented by respective 
government bodies. This new document establishes a maximum of 2,660 Birr ($177) 
per hectare per year for irrigated land and 2,541 Birr ($169) per hectare per year for 
 197 
 
rain-fed land. For lands located more than 100 km from Addis Ababa the value would 
start to gradually decrease based on distance from Addis Ababa. In this document, 
the minimum value is set to be 158 Birr ($10) per hectare per year for irrigated land 
and 111 Birr ($7) per hectare per year for rain-fed land for lands that are located 
more than 700 km from Addis Ababa such as Gambella. In practice, however, the 
Gambella region has not yet amended its land rental rates according to this federal 
directive (Interview – 3GOV, 21 Mar. 2012).   
 
 
7.7.5. Rights and Obligations of the Lessee and the Lessor  
 
The major part of those land lease agreements are devoted to the ‘Rights and 
Obligations’ of both the lessee – i.e. investor – and the lessor – i.e. the government. 
Here, I can only refer to some of the most important and relevant rights and 
obligations enumerated in those agreements. Under the ‘rights of the lessee’, some 
include:  
 
 To develop and cultivate the land upon signing the land lease agreements and receiving all 
the clearances from respective government agencies;  
 To build infrastructure such as dams, irrigation system, water boreholes, roads, power 
houses, bridges, residential buildings, offices, and other social service facilities; and  
 To get additional land based on the performance and production on the lands already 
received (MOARD and Karuturi Agro Products Plc, 2010, pp.2-3).  
 
Having being endowed with those rights and others, the investors are, on the other 
hand, obliged to provide good care and conservation of the leased land and natural 
resources. In this regard, specific obligations are directed towards the conservation 
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of tree plantations, prevention of soil erosion, and carrying out of environmental 
impact assessment (EIA). Other obligations focus on the need for the investor to 
start work as soon as possible (within six months of signing the land lease 
agreement) and the detail of what percentage of the land they are expected to put 
into use in the consecutive years.  
 
The lessor – i.e. the government – is given the following rights under those land 
lease agreements: 
 
 To monitor and establish the fact that the lessee is discharging and accomplishing its 
obligations diligently;  
 To restore lands that is not developed by the investors within the expected year of 
development; 
 To terminate the land lease agreement upon justified good cause; and  
 To amend the land rent (MOARD and Karuturi Agro Products Plc, 2010, p.4).  
 
Under ‘obligation of lessor’, according to those land lease agreements, the 
government is obliged:  
 
 To deliver and hand over the vacant possession of leased land free of impediments to the 
lessee within thirty days of the down payment being effected;  
 To provide special investment privileges such as exemption from taxation and import duties of 
capital goods and repatriation of capital and profits; and  
 To provide adequate security, free of cost, against any riot, disturbances or any other 
turbulent time, to enable the investors to carry out their entire activities in the said premises 




Based on the above provisions in the land lease agreements, different conclusions 
could be drawn. However, for the sake of space, I will focus on discussing what I see 
as some of the major gaps inherent in those land lease agreements, as follows.  
 
 
7.8. Major Gaps in Land Lease Agreements  
 
There could be several limitations to these land deals when analyzed from different 
perspectives, but the key ones for my purposes are: (1) lack of recognition and 
respect for existing land rights, (2) unregulated use of water resources, (3) voluntary 
environmental impact assessment and (4) weak monitoring, evaluation and 
enforcement mechanisms.   
 
 
7.8.1. Lack of Recognition and Respect for Existing Land Rights  
 
As already discussed in this chapter, the formal process of large-scale land 
acquisitions in Ethiopia does not require community participation. According to 
Vermeulen and Cotula (2010), countries that do not include community consultation 
as a requirement for land lease deals do not tend to recognize and respect existing 
land rights. Lack of consultation with local communities in itself is an indication that 
governments do not recognize them as the legitimate owners of the land they 
inhabit. This is one of the most important areas of concern not only for the critics of 
large-scale land investment but also for its supporters. The World Bank, one of the 
leading advocates of large-scale land investments, argues that “to maximize benefits 
and ensure they are broadly shared, institutional arrangements must include 
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recognition and respect for existing land rights” (World Bank, 2011, p.91). Principles 
that are emerging at the international level to regulate large-scale land investments 
give due attention to recognition and respect for existing land rights of the land 
users. One of the ‘Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment’ is about 
‘Respecting land and Resource Rights’. This principle, according to its authors (FAO, 
IFAD, UNCTAD, World Bank) simply means that:  
 
Existing use or ownership rights to land, whether statutory or customary, primary or 
secondary, formal or informal, group or individual, should be respected. This requires: (i) the 
identification of all rights holders; (ii) legal recognition of all rights and uses, together with 
options for their demarcation and registration or recording; (iii) negotiation with land 
holders/users, based on informed and free choice, in order to identify the types of rights to be 
transferred and modalities for doing so; (iv) fair and prompt payment for all acquired rights; 
and (iv) independent avenues for resolving disputes or grievances. While a countrywide 
systematic identification and registration of rights is desirable in the long run, countries with 
limited resources may do well to initially focus efforts on areas with high agro-ecological and 
infrastructure potential and expand from there (FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD, World Bank, 2010, p.2).   
 
Although Ethiopia has started a land registration and certification programme in other 
parts of the country, this programme has not been started yet in the regions where 
the majority of land investments is taking place, such as the Gambella and 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional states.  
 
Another related important principle is the principle of Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC). This principle is derived from Article 32 of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The fundamental idea behind this principle is that 
indigenous peoples have the right to give or withhold their consent to any proposed 
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development project that may affect the lands they customarily own. In other words, 
states and non-state actors who want to use the customary lands belonging to 
indigenous communities must enter into non-coercive negotiation with them. The 
principle stresses that indigenous communities have the right to make decisions 
according to their traditional decision-making system (Anderson, 2011).  
 
Although FPIC in its original sense emerged as a principle to protect indigenous 
peoples, over the years, the scope of its application has been spreading to all other 
local landholders and resource users. This can be seen to be true from the fact that 
many countries (e.g. the Philippines and Australia) and companies (e.g. APRIL, Pulp 
and Paper Company) are at the moment incorporating the principle of FPIC into their 
national or sub-national legislations (Wilson, 2009). Although the FPIC principle is 
not that well known among many African policy makers and civil societies, few 
countries have nonetheless enacted policies requiring consultation with local and 
affected communities as part of the land investment process. According to 
Vermeulen and Cotula:  
 
Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania, for example, require that all land transfers must be 
approved by the communities or customary leaders that have rights over the land in question, 
with further requirements for protection of access rights, fair compensation and opportunities 
for review of the agreements (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010, p.907).   
 
In the Ethiopian case, it is already stated that the formal processes of large-scale 
land deals do not require consultation with the local communities. This is due to the 
fact that the government describes those lands they are leasing out to investors as 
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unused and nobody’s lands, as described by Mr. Metasebia Tadesse, Minister 
Counselor at the Ethiopian embassy in India, that:  
 
Most Ethiopians live on highlands; what we are giving on lease is low, barren land. Foreign 
farmers have to dig meters into the ground to get water. Local farmers don’t have the 
technology to do that. This is completely uninhabited land. There is no evacuation or 
dislocation of people (Anupama and Vidya, 2011, p.1).  
 
The late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi also mentioned the same line of argument 
several times when asked why his government is leasing out huge lands to foreign 
investors. In one of his responses to this question, already quoted at beginning of 
this thesis, he stated:    
 
Our policy is that in the lowland areas where we have abundant and unutilized land we would 
lease that to private sector. In the highland and where there is land shortage we would allow 
the farmers to retain indefinite use rights (Meles, World Economic Forum on Africa, May 
2010) 
 
Hence, based on this policy that describes lowland regions, such as the Gambella, 
as places with abundant and unutilized lands, large-scale land investments here do 
not take into account and respect existing land rights. Even under circumstances 
where villagers were displaced, which will be discussed later in Chapter nine, they 
did not receive compensation since they were not considered as rightful owners of 
those lands. This is in stark contrast to the Ethiopian constitution which gives strong 
recognition to customary land rights as stated in Article 40:5 that, “Ethiopian 
pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing and cultivation as well as the right 
not be displaced from their own lands.”  
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7.8.2. Unregulated Use of Water Resources  
 
One of the critical areas of concern in relation to large-scale land investments is their 
impacts on water resources. As one report indicated, “large-scale land deals are not 
just about land grabbing. They are taking land where there is water available, so it is 
also water-grabbing” (OI, 2011a, p.37). The availability of water in a particular area is 
one of the important factors by which investors determine which land to acquire 
since in most cases control over the land also means that river water can be diverted 
or groundwater can be extracted to irrigate farms (Bues, 2011). The way in which 
large-scale farming is carried out may also result in water pollution or contamination 
with agrochemicals, as biofuel production often demands the use of a large amount 
of water as well as the clearing of trees from vast tracts of land, disturbing the water 
cycle and both the quality and the availability of water resources (Smaller and Mann, 
2009). In times when water is becoming an increasingly scarce resource, such 
practices related to land investments can severely undermine the capacity of local 
communities to access water in particular or to produce food in general (Höring, 
2011).   
 
To minimize such adverse effects of land investments on local communities, experts 
and specialized international organizations, including supporters of large-scale land 
investments, are calling upon host states to include in their land deals clear 
mechanisms for regulating water resources and ensuring access for local 
communities (World Bank, 2005). In Mali, for example, as a way of regulating and 
controlling water use, land lease agreements contain binding provisions that require 
investors to pay an extra annual water fee for the amount of water they use on their 
farms. Failure to pay such water fees could lead to termination of the land lease 
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agreement. According to the Oakland Institute, the idea behind these provisions is to 
reduce water wastage and force investors to act more responsibly in the ways in 
which they use water resources (OI, 2011b).  
 
However, in many developing countries, the extraction and use of water by large-
scale land investors is not adequately regulated to safeguard access for local 
communities or to protect their water resources from contamination or pollution. In 
cases where regulations exist, enforcement mechanisms or institutions are either not 
in place or are too weak to perform their duties (Höring, 2011).  
 
In the Ethiopian case, although there is federal legislation in place which requires 
appropriate use of water resources and protection mechanisms, such as water 
conservation, prohibition of waste discharges and the retention of riparian vegetation 
along stream banks (Water Resource Proclamation Regulation, 2005), the 
implementation of these laws remains extremely ineffective (Bues, 2011). In fact, as 
briefly discussed in the previous section, the Ministry of Water Resources 
Development, the responsibly body for overseeing the implementation of these laws, 
at least in Gambella regional state, is not consulted at all in the process of land 
investments in the region (Interview – 5GOV, 21 Mar. 2012).  
 
On the contrary, land lease agreements analyzed for this study allow investors to 
use the water resources almost without control and at their will without any 
safeguards for local communities or the downstream users. For instance, in all the 




The investor is free to build infrastructure such as dams, water boreholes, power houses, 
irrigation system, roads, bridges…at the discretion of lessee upon consultation and 
submission of permit request with concerned offices subject to the type and size of the 
investment project whenever it deems so appropriate (MOARD and Karuturi Agro Products 
Plc, 2010). 
 
Although it is stated that investors have to submit permit requests in order to 
construct dams or water boreholes, it is not specified to which government agency 
the request has to be submitted or the criteria upon which such permits are to be 
authorized. Most importantly, the practice so far is that investors use the available 
water resources in whatever way they want, including limiting local access – as 
already seen in the Pokedi and Illea villages in Gambella where Saudi Star and 
Karuturi displaced and blocked some local communities from accessing water 
resources (FGD – 8, 10 Apr. 2012). Saudi Star has clearly stated that water will be 
their biggest asset and that they are already in the process of constructing 30km of 
cement-lined canals and another dam (in addition to the one they are currently 
using) on the Alwero river to ensure that there is adequate water for rice production 
on their 139,000 ha land in the Gambella region (OI, 2011a).   
 
In conclusion, ambiguous/incomplete provisions and the absence of clear 
safeguards and regulations about the use of water resources is one of the major 
gaps in those land lease agreements, which might have a great impact not only on 
the immediate communities, but also for the downstream users in other countries 




7.8.3. Voluntary Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)  
 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is defined in different ways by different 
organizations and experts. According to Goodland and Mercier (1996), EIA is “the 
process of evaluating the direct and indirect environmental and social implications of 
a proposed development project” (cited in Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 
2005, p.5). The United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) defines 
EIA as: 
  
A decision-making process, and a document that provides a systematic, reproducible, and 
interdisciplinary evaluation of the potential effects of a proposed action and its practical 
alternatives on the physical, biological, cultural and socio-economic attributes of a particular 
geographical area (U.S. EPA, 1998, p.9).  
 
In a more elaborated form, the United Nations Environment Porgramme (UNEP) 
defines EIA as:  
 
A systematic process to identify, predict and evaluate the environmental effects of proposed 
actions and projects. This process is applied prior to major decisions and commitments being 
made. A broad definition of environment is adopted. Whenever necessary, social, cultural and 
health effects are considered as an integral part of EIA. Particular attention is given in EIA 
practice to preventing, mitigating and offsetting the significant adverse effects of proposed 
undertakings (UNEP, 2002, p.103). 
 
Despite some minor differences in areas of focus, various definitions of EIA embody 
the following major elements: the assessment of environmental impacts at the 
planning stage of a project to enable sound decision making in a timely manner; a 
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comprehensive evaluation of the environmental and social impacts as well as 
cultural and health effects of a project; the application of consultative and 
participatory principles; and the exploration and evaluation of mitigating measures 
and other alternatives (ECA, 2005). As such, EIA could be seen as a flexible 
procedure that can vary in depth, breadth, and type of analysis, depending on the 
kind of project in question. It can be conducted at one point in the project cycle, 
stretched over a certain period of time to account for seasonal variations, or carried 
out in discrete stages (World Bank, 1989).  
 
Different countries have adopted different ways of incorporating EIA principles into 
their land lease agreements. Some have made it mandatory to have an EIA report 
before signing land lease agreements, e.g. Ghana, Tanzania and Mozambique; 
while others leave it as voluntary for the investor to carry out an EIA at any time of 
the investment, e.g. Ethiopia (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010).  
 
In the Ethiopian case, there are many direct and indirect policies and regulations 
pertinent to environmental protection as a whole and EIA in particular. The overall 
environmental policies, programmes and strategies adopted by Ethiopia will be 
discussed later. In this section, however, only the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Proclamation (299/2002) will be discussed. According to the preamble of this 
proclamation, its aims are to predict and manage the environmental effects of 
proposed development programmes; to harmonize and integrate environmental, 
economic, cultural and social considerations into a decision-making process; to 
implement environmental rights and objectives enshrined in the constitution; and to 
bring about administrative transparency and accountability. The proclamation in its 
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Article 3:1 explicitly prohibits any development project that requires EIA to be 
implemented without authorization from the concerned federal or regional 
environmental authority. Article 7 of the proclamation requires a proponent 
(government or private project initiator) to undertake an EIA of his/her project by 
approved experts and to fulfil the terms and conditions of authorization during 
implementation of the project. According to Article 8:2, an EIA report is required to 
contain:  
 
(a) The nature of the project, including the technology and processes to be used;  
(b) The content and amount of pollutant that will be released during implementation as well as 
during operation;  
(c) Source and amount of energy required for operation;  
(d) Information on likely trans-regional impacts;  
(e) Characteristics and duration of all the estimated direct or indirect, positive or negative 
impacts;  
(f) Measures proposed to eliminate, minimize, or mitigate negative impacts;  
(h) Contingency plan in case of accident; and  
(i) Procedures of self- auditing and monitoring during implementation and operation.   
 
Indeed, the content of the Ethiopian EIA proclamation is, in principle, a progressive 
step towards environmentally-friendly development in the country. However, before 
we discuss the implementation of this proclamation in light of the contemporary land 
investments, it is important to consider the enforcement mechanisms of the 
proclamation, which have been very weak, for a number of different reasons. In the 
first place, there is a problem of qualified human resource to oversee the 
implementation of the proclamation. According to Melaku (2008), the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA) is one of the under-capacitated institutions and the field of 
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EIA in Ethiopia in general is a relatively young and undeveloped one. As such, leave 
alone the regional EPAs where many projects take place, even at the federal level 
the EPA is not competent to carry out its duties (Melaku, 2008).  
 
Secondly, although even in developed countries there is always a dilemma between 
long-term environmental concerns and short-term economic growth needs, in poor 
countries like Ethiopia this dilemma is even worse. In Ethiopia, according to 
Mulugeta (2009), there is strong political support for short-term development projects 
over long-term environmental concerns. Finally, during the current financial crisis 
where investments are desperately needed to create jobs, land-rich developing 
countries are in stiff competition to attract investors. One way of attracting those 
investors is by reducing bureaucracy and making the process of land investment less 
time consuming (Cotula et al., 2009). Environmental concerns in this regard, and the 
EIA requirement in particular, are seen as a bureaucratic hurdle that has to be 
relaxed.  As Mulugeta argued, “the government [Ethiopian] does not want to risk 
losing investors by strict implementation and requirement of EIA” (Mulugeta, 2009, 
p.12).  
 
Against this background, it is not surprising that EIA is only made voluntary in the on-
going land investment in Ethiopia despite the fact that the law requires it to be 
mandatory for such projects. For instance, in relation to the booming floriculture 
industry in Ethiopia, Mr. Solomon Kebede, the head of the EIA service, identified 
several reasons for the lack of regulation of the sector, among which are:  the lack of 
sufficient laws to regulate this particular sector; weak implementation of the existing 
environmental and related laws; strong political backing for the floriculture sector; 
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lack of interest from other government agencies such as the land allocation 
agencies, custom offices, and credit associations,  to request EIA; lack of political 
commitment from law enforcement agencies to enforce environmental laws; and the 
government’s obsession with attracting FDI. These could be mentioned as some of 
the most pressing reasons for the deregulation of the floriculture sector (OI, 2011a).  
 
This is pretty much the same with land investments in the Gambella region, 
particularly after the centralization of the land investment process. None of the land 
lease agreements analyzed for this study make direct reference to respecting related 
environmental laws of the country. Although investors are required to conduct an EIA 
in those land lease agreements, there is no punitive clause for non-compliance, thus 
EIA is only voluntary. As has been confirmed during the field research, investors who 
are now in their third and fourth year of operation have not yet conducted any EIA 
nor have the concerned government agencies requested them to do so (Interviews – 
6 and 7BSS, 1 and 2 Apr. 2012).  
 
To make things worse, many of the farm managers and administrators who actually 
run the farms on a daily basis do not know about EIA or the environmental laws and 
policies of the country (Interviews – 6 and 7BSS, 01 and 02 Apr. 2012).47 This is also 
true of woreda-level government officials who actually interact with farm managers 
on a daily basis. They too do not know about EIA and do not have copies of the 
federal legislation on the environment in general and EIA in particular (Interviews – 
12 and 17GOV, 28 Mar. and 16 Apr. 2012).48 Therefore, in addition to the problem of 
EIA being voluntary, it remains questionable as to what extent the government 
                                                          
47
 Interview – 6BSS: Is a farm manager for a foreign owned large-scale commercial farm in the 
Gambella region.  
48
 Interview – 17GOV: Is an elected senior official at Majang Zone, Godere woreda.  
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institutions are capable of monitoring and evaluating environmental impacts of these 
mega projects.  
 
 
7.8.4. Weak Monitoring, Evaluation and Enforcement Mechanisms   
 
Even if we put aside the gaps in those land lease agreements and look only at the 
implementation of the issues addressed in them, we still find that their monitoring, 
evaluation and enforcement mechanisms are very weak in the few cases where they 
are observed, and in the majority of cases monitoring and evaluation have not been 
conducted at all (Interview – 4GOV, 21 Mar. 2012).  
 
Some of the land lease agreements analyzed for this study contain some important 
clauses concerning provision of social services to local communities, such as 
construction of schools, health centres, water pumps, roads, etc (MOARD and Ruchi 
Agri Plc, 2010; MOARD and Sanati Agro Farm Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., 2010; MOARD 
and BHO Bio Products Plc, 2010). In addition, some investors have included in their 
land deals the intention to support local farmers in terms of provision of improved 
seeds, technological expertise, transportation and market opportunities (MOARD 
and Saudi Star Plc, 2010).  However, in practice, most of the promises and 
provisions in these land lease agreements are not observed on the ground. Local 
communities interviewed during field research complained that both the government 
and the investors had promised many things when they started work but none had 
so far been delivered and the communities did not believe that the investors were 
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going to live up to their promises (FGDs – 2 and 3, 31 Mar. and 1 Apr. 2012).49 This 
view is shared not only by ordinary local communities but also by some regional and 
woreda government officials, as reflected in the response of one of the woreda 
officials as follows: 
 
In the beginning when investors started to come, we at the woreda government level thought 
it is going to be good thing for the woreda and its people. Investors promised lots of good 
things that would help our people. Therefore, we supported them and tried our best to 
convince farmers to be cooperative with investors and even to leave their farms in return for 
social services, enhanced farming knowledge and access to technology and national and 
international markets. We thought investors would train local farmers and provide them with 
technology like tractors and machines so that farmers too could modernize their farming and 
get access to national and international markets. But now three years after investors have 
started working, I am not optimistic anymore about this trend. The investors are only 
concerned about their benefits and they don’t seem to care about the local people. When we 
ask them about their promises, they say it is not their business to build schools, that is the 
business of the government and that we should contact the regional government (Interview – 
12GOV, 28 Mar. 2012).   
 
None of the farms investigated for this study have gone through or received any 
monitoring and evaluation from the concerned government bodies. Government 
officials interviewed for this research clearly stated that monitoring is limited to 
ensuring that at least some part of the farm is made operational by the investor and 
that the investor pays appropriate annual fees (Interview – 3GOV, 21 Mar. 2012). 
Apart from this there is no monitoring of benefits, production and environmental 
concerns.  
                                                          
49
 These focus group discussions were conducted in Thenyi and Perbongo-Oma villages respectively. 




Moreover, during field research, I asked the concerned regional government 
agencies whether investors have submitted reports of their work, which would at 
least enable desk monitoring and evaluation. The agencies were unable to provide a 
single report from investors, suggesting that even desk evaluation and monitoring 
does not exist. In those land lease agreements analyzed for this study, investors are 
not under any obligation to provide any periodic report about their investments to the 
concerned government agencies. They are expected to “provide correct data and 
investment activity reports [only] upon request by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development” (MOARD and BHO Bio Products Plc, 2010, p.3). However, 
three years after operation, none of the investors interviewed for this research has so 
far been requested by the MOARD to provide any information about their investment 
activities (Karuturi, Ruchi, Saudi Star, Verdanta, 2012). Therefore, the lack of 
adequate monitoring, evaluation and enforcement mechanisms makes the already 
precarious agreements even less meaningful, since the provisions of those 
agreements are not enforced.  
 
 
7.9. Available Land for Investment in Ethiopia  
 
Different sources, both governmental and non-governmental, present different 
figures with regard to the amount of land made available for large-scale investments 
in Ethiopia. Even among various government departments there are considerable 
differences about the amount of land claimed to be available for investment in the 
country. For instance, while the MoRAD (2008) in one of its early documents claimed 
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that the country has 111million ha land available for investment, the then Ministry of 
Mines and Energy (2007)50 in its bio-fuel strategy document suggested that the 
country possesses 24 million ha of unutilized land suitable for growing bio-ethanol 
and bio-diesel crops.  
 
To make things even more complicated, leave alone differences among various 
government departments, even the MOARD itself has at different times been 
presenting different figures in different documents concerning the available land for 
large-scale agriculture in the country. For example, in 2008 the Ministry posted a 
promotional document aimed at attracting foreign investors in which it claimed that 
there are 74 million ha of land suitable for crop production in the country. The 
document notes that, out of this 74 million ha of arable land, only 18 million ha are 
utilized meaning that there are 54 million ha of land available for investment. 
However, in other pages of the same document, under a section in which the 
available arable land in each regional state is stated, the sum of the all available land 
from all regions of the country is only 10 million ha – showing a considerable 
difference from the above-claimed 74 million ha nationwide (MOARD, 2008).  
 
However, since 2009, in different press interviews, official promotional documents, 
and public statements, the official figures about the available arable land in the 
country have significantly dropped to around 3.5 million ha (MOFED, 2010b). These 
contradictions and discrepancies in the figures indicate the lack of a credible and 
accurate land suitability assessment and suggest that there is a good measure of 
guess work and arbitrariness in land estimations. 
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At the moment, according to the MOARD, there are 3.5 million ha of land available 
for commercial land investment in the country. Since 2009, with the creation of the 
AISD, the federal government has centralized the land investment process with 
particular emphasis on minority regions (lowland regions) on the grounds that those 
regions do not have the capacity to negotiate with big foreign investors. Accordingly, 
as stated earlier, the federal government claimed that those regions have transferred 
a certain amount of land to be registered in the federal land bank and marketed by 
the federal government on their behalf. The following table shows the amount of land 
claimed to have been transferred to the federal land bank by respective regional 
states.  
 





Area of the 
Region (ha) 
Percentage of the region’s 
land made available for 
investment  
Gambella 1,200,000 2,580,200 46.5% 
B/Gumuz 691,984 4,928,900 14% 
Afar 409,678 9,670,700 4% 
SNNPR  180,625 11,093,100 2% 
Oromia 1,057,866 35,300,700 2.9% 
Amhara  420,000 15,917,400 2.6% 
Total  3,540,153 79,491,000 4.4% 
 
Source: MOARD, 2009 and 2010; Oakland Institute, 2011a; and interviews with respective investment 
agencies. In the case of Gambella regional state, there is a difference between what the region claims 
that it has transferred to the federal land bank – which is 1,200,000 ha (the amount stated above) – 
and what the federal government claims that it has received from the regional government (829,199 




Despite the federal government’s claim that the transfer of those lands to itself is a 
voluntary action by those regions, as discussed earlier, interviews with some of the 
Gambella regional state’s government officials indicate that those transfers were only 
concluded between the federal government and the regional governor through 
pressure of the former (Interviews – 4 and 9GOV, 21 and 27 Mar. 2012).51 Moreover, 
as also discussed earlier, experience from the Gambella regional state shows that 
those lands that are claimed to have been transferred to the federal land bank are 
not actually demarcated on the ground.  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MOARD) in one of its 
documents, entitled ‘Agricultural Investment Potential of Ethiopia’, identified the 
available land in each region according to different sectors. The following table 
summarizes the available land for investment in each region of the country and 
according to each sector, as presented in this particular document. 
 
Table 6: Total Available land for investment by sector in each region (in 
thousands ha)  
 
Sector  Gam. B/ Gum. Afar Soma. Orom. SNNPRS  Amha. Tigr. Total 
Cotton 316 303 200 225 407 601 679 269 3000 
Pulses  25   526 390 689 20 1650 
Oil Crops 19 715 8 4 185 4 541 125 1601 
Maize 200 200  250 150 300 300  1400 
Horticulture     150 346 270  766 
Palm oil 100    50 300   450 
Coffee 20    246 155 5  426 
Rice   50  100 25 75 30  280 
Rubber 50     150   200 
Tea 15    55 75 5  150 
Total 720 1,293 208 579 1,794 2,396 2,519 414 9,923 
  
Source: Summarized from the MOARD (2009).  
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There are, therefore, significant differences between these figures and the ones 
presented previously which are already in the federal land bank. In addition to the 
above-mentioned official figures, some senior officials at the AISD, during different 
interviews with various media outlets, have suggested that more large tracts of land 
will be made available in the near future as there is work going on to identify more 
land, particularly in lowland regions (Esayas, interview with NHK World, 31 Jan. 
2010). According to Esayas, having a land bank at the federal government level 
makes the land investment process effective and efficient both for national 
stakeholders and foreign investors.  
 
 
7.10. Land Leased out to Investors  
 
Sources both from within and outside Ethiopia present different figures concerning 
the actual size of land that has been leased out so far to investors at different times 
(Cotula, et al., 2009; MOARD, 2010; World Bank, 2011). For example, according to 
Cotula’s et al. (2009) report, from 2004 to 2009, 602,760 ha of land were granted to 
foreign and domestic investors in Ethiopia. However, according to the World Bank’s 
(2011) report, from 2004 to 2008, 1.2 million ha of land were granted to 406 
investors in five regions.  
 
This lack of consistency in the figures about the amount of land leased out to 
investors is not only prevalent among non-government reports but also widely 
evident among different government levels and various departments. At the 
government level, there seems to be weak inter-governmental (federal, regional and 
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local) and inter-departmental (MOARD and Investment Commission) coordination 
and sharing of data pertinent to large-scale land investments. This weak coordination 
and communication is compounded by the secrecy involved in those land deals and 
lack of actual on-ground delineation of land that has been leased out to investors, 
leading sometimes to differences between the size of land offered on the agreement 
and the actual land acquired on the ground. Even after the centralization of land 
investment with the creation of the AISD, much confusion seems to still remain 
unresolved as the communication between the central body (AISD) and regional 
investment offices remains extremely weak.  
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the records of federal and regional governments 
concerning the size of land leased out to investors vary considerably in all cases 
investigated for this research. In order to reach more approximate figures, I have 
tried to use triangulation by cross-checking the figures provided by the federal 
government against the regional government records and have carried out limited 
verification visits to some of the woreda governments involved. Yet, even after 
checking the available records from the federal government against records from the 
regional government and the woreda governments, it is still difficult to claim that the 
following list provides 100% accuracy of the land leased out so far to the investors in 
the country. Since there have been many replacements of land lease agreements 
that were formerly signed between the regional governments and the investors, 
sometimes the regional government or the woreda governments provide different 
land lease agreements from that of the federal government for the same investor. 
Moreover, in many cases, both the investors and local government officials believe 
that the actual land given out to investors could be higher or lower than the land size 
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on the land lease agreement since there is no accurate delivery/handing out 
mechanisms for those lands (Interviews – 7BSS and 15GOV, 2 and 4 Apr. 2012). 
  
For instance, in Gambella regional state, one official at Abobo woreda agricultural 
bureau stated that many investors have gone far beyond the land they were given 
(Interview – 11GOV, 28 Mar. 2012). In one of my focus group discussions, farmers 
from Chubo village claimed that they have had several disputes with their 
neighbouring investors because the investors have encroached into their field or 
crossed the line that the woreda official had informed them was the boundary 
between their farms and the investors’ farm (FGD – 1, 30 Mar. 2012). The following 
graph gives an overview of the land that has already been leased out to investors in 
various regions of the country based only on the records of the various government 
levels and departments.  
 
Figure 6: Land leased out to large-scale investors in Ethiopia  
 
 
Source: Federal (MOARD, 2012) and regional databases and reports from other organizations 
(Cotula et al., 2009; Dessalegn, 2011; OI, 2011a; World Bank, 2011). I only undertook cross-checking 












The above graph does not represent the full land investment in the country. Although 
it does show the level of land investment in various regions of the country, there are 
many domestic investors in each region who are not accounted for in this graph. As 
such, the actual size of land that has already been leased out to investors could be 
higher than what is presented here. Yet, it is also to be noted that most of the 
investors who have rented lands have not yet fully utilized their land lease, and some 
have not even started working on their lands. So, again, the actual land that is in 
operation could still be far lower than what is presented in the above graph.  
 
 
7.11. Investors  
 
According to the Gambella Investment Agency (GIA), the number of investors started 
to sharply rise from 2007 and since then it has been doubling and tripling over the 
last three to four years (Kassaun, interview with the Guardian, 21 Mar. 2011). The 
following graph, adopted from the GIA, shows the sharp rise of agricultural investors 







Figure 7: Agricultural investors in Gambella  
 
 
Source: Gambella Investment Agency (2011) 
 
A large number of investors in Ethiopia in general and in Gambella regional state in 
particular are domestic investors. Although foreign investors are known for the vast 
tracts of land they have been acquiring, nearly 50% of the overall land leased out to 
investors in Ethiopia so far has gone to domestic investors, who account for 95% of 
large-scale land investors in the country (Dessalegn, 2011). Domestic investors in 
Ethiopia include diaspora Ethiopians who are now going back as investors. The 
Ethiopian government through its Embassies abroad has been strongly encouraging 
the diaspora to come back home and invest in the country. As a matter of fact, there 
is an independent department called ‘Diaspora Engagement Affairs General 
Directorate’ under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with its own branches throughout all 
the regions to facilitate diaspora investment back into Ethiopia (MOFA, 2011). For 
instance, according to the Benishanugl-Gumuz regional state Investment 


























investors, 40 are diaspora and only nine are classified as foreign investors (OI, 
2011a).  
 
When it comes to the experience of the Gambella regional state, out of the 896 
investors, only six are foreigners and the rest are domestic investors. Most of these 
domestic investors have small-scale lands below 2,000 ha (GIA, 2011). So in my 
research I focused only on the first 15 large-scale investors who have acquired 2,000 
ha and above. In the case of these 15 large-scale land investors, as illustrated in the 
following figure, nine are domestic investors and six are foreigners.  
 
 
Figure 8: The first 15 large-scale investors in Gambella 
 
 
Source: Author’s direct communication with Gambella Investment Agency  
 
However, when it comes to the actual land sizes that have been leased out to these 







been leased out and the 9 domestic investors only account for the remaining 5%, as 
illustrated in the following figure.    
 




Source: Author’s direct communication with Gambella Investment Agency   
 
Unlike foreign investors, domestic investors have limited capital and therefore use 
more labour-intensive farming, which is good in terms of job creation. However, 
according to some daily labourers, working conditions under domestic investors are 
not good and the pay is less than what foreign investors pay to their workers 
(Interviews – 10 and 11, 2 Apr. 2012). In addition to the relatively unfavourable 
working conditions on domestic investors’ farms, regional authorities also complain 
about the lack of necessary knowledge and experience of some of the domestic 
investors in the area of commercial farming. For instance, in 2011, the regional 







withdrew land lease agreements for 27 domestic investors whom they claimed had 
no capacity of putting their land lease into production (Interview – 3GOV, 21 Mar. 
2012).  
 
It is important to note here that only two of the domestic investors are from the 
indigenous peoples of Gambella. The rest are highlanders. Due to various factors 
such as marginalization and poverty, the indigenous peoples of Gambella are 
virtually excluded from this land business. One of these indigenous persons from 
Gambella who had acquired small-scale farmland (15 ha) in the region complained 
that the overall land investment environment is not supportive of the indigenous 
peoples. He stated that, while other domestic investors from the highland part of the 
country could easily acquire access to a bank loan, indigenous peoples do not 
acquire access to these loans (Interview – 9BSS, 12 Apr. 2012).  
 
The issue of land investments among domestic investors in the Gambella region is 
not free from national politics. According to my findings, over 80% of the domestic 
investors in the Gambella region are from the Tigrean ethnic group – the politically 
dominant ethnic group. Because of their political dominance both at the national level 
and behind the regional officials in Gambella, the Tigreans are favourably treated in 
large-scale land allocations in terms of the quality of land they are given, easy 
access to bank loans, and protection of their assets by the security apparatus which 
they fully control in the region (Interview – 9BSS, 12 Apr. 2012). 
 
Out of the six foreign investors in the region, four are from India, one from China and 
one from Saudi Arabia. Chinese companies, although they are very visible in the 
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mining and infrastructure development sector countrywide, are not yet very active in 
the agriculture sector. Except for the Gambella region, records from the federal 
government do not show any Chinese company that has invested in agriculture in 
other parts of the country. This might change in the near future as Chinese 
companies are among the most dominant in land acquisitions in other parts of Africa 
(GRAIN, 2008). Because of their export-oriented production and the hard currency 
they bring to the country, foreign companies in general seem to be treated more 
favourably compared to their domestic counterparts, and they are also feared by 
local authorities because of their strong backing from top authorities at the federal 
level (Interview – 11GOV, 28 Mar. 2012).  
 
 
7.12. Conclusion  
 
Although large-scale land investments are not a completely new phenomenon in 
Ethiopia, this chapter has discussed some of the major traits that make the 
contemporary trend of LSLAs unique from its predecessors. The enormous sizes of 
lands that investors are acquiring, the involvement of foreign investors and their 
export-oriented production, and the re-centralization of the LSLAs’ process by the 
federal government all carry significant political, social and economic implications 
that deserve special attention. Based on my interviews with some of the relevant key 
ministries in the region, the re-centralization of the LSLAs’ process has undermined 
the mandates of other ministries such as the Environmental Protection Authority, the 
National Parks Authority/Federal Wildlife Conservation Authority and the Ministry of 
Water Development. Similarly, this apparent exclusion of the regional government 
from the negotiation and decision-making process related to LSLAs in the region, 
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also had undermined the principle of community consultation/participation, which is 
an important international principle for LSLA. As such, it is not surprising that the 
land contractual agreements signed by the federal government do not recognize, 
among others, the land and related resources rights of the indigenous communities 
who have inhabited/used those lands for decades if not centuries. Nevertheless, the 
government and investors continue to claim that land investments have brought 
numerous benefits to those indigenous communities. In my research, I have tried to 
critically review those claims through interviews, focus group discussions and 
questionnaires to determine the authenticity of those claims. The findings of my 







Chapter Eight: Reviewing the Benefits of Large-
Scale Land Acquisitions vis-à-vis Indigenous 





Both the Ethiopian government and land investors have been claiming that large-
scale land deals in lowlands regions bring multiple benefits for the indigenous 
communities of those regions. The aim of this chapter is to review these claims by 
focusing on some of the most frequently cited benefits such as:  (1) food security, (2) 
employment opportunities, (3) technology transfer and (4) increase in tax revenue for 
local governments. To this end, this chapter will answer the third subsidiary research 
question which is formulated as: is large-scale land acquisition benefiting the 
indigenous communities of Gambella? 
 
 
8.2. Food Security  
 
One of the arguments put forward by the Ethiopian government in support of LSLA is 
that it will improve the food security situation of the country in general and of the 
Gambella region in particular. Given the fact that Ethiopia is a food-import dependent 
country despite its abundant arable lands, LSLA, it is argued, will bring the needed 
capital and technology that will increase agricultural productivity and consequently 
the availability of food in the country at lower prices (Karuturi, interview with Channel 




Despite similar official statements, interviews and press releases from various 
government departments and top political leaders that link LSLA with food security 
(e.g. Karuturi, 2011b; Meles, interview with IMTN TV, 26 Jun. 2011; Shiferaw, 2011), 
there is no official study or document yet produced that outlines how LSLA is 
specifically expected to contribute to food security in the country. In other words, 
despite the claim by the government and investors that LSLA will help Ethiopia to 
overcome its chronic food insecurity problem, the linkages between these two 
components have not yet been formally established or outlined.  
 
However, based on the official statements and the overall discourse provided by the 
government and proponents of LSLA, two kinds of linkages between LSLA and food 
security can be identified. These are what I see as the ‘direct’ and the ‘indirect’ 
linkages. While the former refers to the arguments that directly connect LSLA and 
food security, the latter refers to the promise of general economic growth which is 
then expected to alleviate poverty in general and food security in particular at the 
household level.  
 
 
8.2.1. Direct Contribution of LSLA to Food Security  
 
The most frequently cited direct contribution of LSLA to food security is its potential 
to tackle the food supply problem by increasing agricultural productivity and therefore 
making food available in local markets at affordable prices. In the language of ‘food 
security’, LSLA will ensure ‘food availability’ – one of the four dimensions of food 
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security,52 in food-deficit countries like Ethiopia. For instance, former Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi alluded to this argument in one of his interviews with IMTN television.  
 
These land lease agreements we are designing with Indians and as well as other foreign 
companies are precisely designed to make sure that everybody benefits. Once people begin 
to see the results of the investments in terms of jobs creation, availability of foreign exchange, 
availability of various agricultural products in our markets and so on, they will see the 
benefits for themselves and it would be completely irrational for them to shoot themselves on 
the foot (Meles, interview with IMTN TV, 26 June 2011).  
 
According to this statement, LSLA will provide various agricultural products in 
domestic markets, i.e. it will tackle the food supply problem by ensuring ‘availability’ 
in local markets. In the same line of argument, Mrs. Genet Zewode, the Ethiopian 
Ambassador to India, stated that the involvement of Indian investors in the 
agricultural sector in Ethiopia will ensure food self-sufficiency and food security for 
Ethiopians who have been suffering from periodic droughts and famine at different 
times (Genet, interview with IMTN, 26 Jun. 2011).  
 
It is too early to verify this line of argument, i.e. the assumption that the increase in 
agricultural productivity will ensure food availability at local markets and lower food 
prices locally, since most of those projects are still in their early stages. 
Nevertheless, from the experience so far, it is still possible to draw initial conclusions 
and forecast the most likely scenarios about the contribution of LSLA to food supply 
in Ethiopia in general and the Gambella region in particular.   
 
                                                          
52
 According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the four dimensions of 
food security are, “Physical availability of food, economic and physical access to food, food utilization 
and stability of the other three dimensions over time” (FAO, 2006, p.1) 
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In the first place, as already discussed earlier, the land investment legal framework 
in Ethiopia in general does not take into account domestic food security needs. On 
the contrary, it encourages export-oriented production by providing various 
investment incentives to those investors who export a large amount of their outputs. 
In other words, according to the earlier-discussed investment legal framework, the 
more an investor exports, the better incentives he/she gets. As such, from the outset, 
the existing land investment policy framework itself favours export-oriented 
production over domestic food supply.  
 
Secondly, and not surprisingly, most of the investors at the moment are producing 
export-oriented crops/plants that are commonly neither eaten/used by the larger 
Ethiopian societies nor by the indigenous communities of Gambella. Looking at the 
24 large-scale land lease agreements analysed for this study, the first three major 
investment crops/plants are (1) Cotton – produced by 13 investors, (2) Soya beans – 
produced by 4 investors and (3) Rice – produced by 3 investors. However, in the 
Gambella region the major investment crops/plants by land size according to land 
lease agreements are (1) Rice – 496,000 ha, (2) Cotton – 19,000 ha and (3) Sesame 
– 10,000 ha. Most interestingly, Maize, which is the most common food in Gambella 
region is only mentioned by two domestic investors, whose combined total land 
holdings is only 5,000 ha.   
 
Hence, based on what is actually written on the large-scale land lease agreements, 
the claims about domestic food security by both the investors and the government 
seem to be flawed. According to those land lease agreements, investors are not 
under any obligation to produce certain types of crops for local markets. In fact, not 
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only are they free to produce any kind of crop of their choice and sell it anywhere, 
but they are also incentivised to do so. In short, contrary to what the investors and 
top government officials are saying in the media about the direct contribution of 
LSLA to food security, according to the land lease agreements there is no provision 
for domestic food security needs/priorities either for the immediate communities or 
for the wider Ethiopian populations.  
 
Finally, practically speaking, although most of the large-scale land investors have not 
utilized all of their land leases yet, at least some have already started to work on 
some portion of their landholdings. From what they have produced so far, my 
investigation shows that none of their products have been supplied either to the 
regional or national food markets. In the Gambella regional capital and other three 
woreda capitals where I conducted my research, I interviewed some major grain 
wholesalers including some retailers and my findings suggests that none of their 
supplies come from the large-scale land investors in the region (Interviews – 2 and 
5BSS, 17 and 24 Mar. 2012). The major sources of maize, the most commonly eaten 
grain in the Gambella region, remain the neighbouring regions of Oromia, SNNPRS 
and the South Sudanese refugee camps in the region (Interview – 4IND, 24 Mar. 
2012).53 My interviews with residents of Abobo woreda – the epicentre of large-scale 
land investments in Gambella region – also confirmed that so far there is no food 
item produced by large-scale land investors that is being sold in the woreda 
(Interviews – 10 and 11IND, 02 Apr. 2012).  
 
Moreover, the investors interviewed also confirmed that their primary target at the 
moment is the international food market; this is in order to make themselves eligible 
                                                          
53
 This interviewee works for an international NGO in the Gambella region as a food security expert.  
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for various incentives that the government is providing for those investors who export 
more than 50% of their products (Interviews – 3 and 4BSS, 17 and 18 Mar. 2012). 
Mr. Samuel Nebiyu, special advisor to Saudi Star Agricultural Development Plc, 
stated once that, “our target is to produce not less than one million tons of rice in the 
next five years for export and domestic market”. He added, however, that, “since rice 
is more used in the Middle East, our major target is to export our products to Saudi 
Arabia” (Samuel, interview with Ethiopiafirst, 16 Feb. 2010). As demonstrated in the 
following table, most of the staple food producers so far have been exporting their 
products either to their countries of origin or to other countries. 
 
 
Table 7: Destination Markets for staple food produced in the Gambella Region 
2011/2012  
 





Star   
Rice  20,000  Saudi Arabia  
2 Sannati Rice 8,000  India and 
international market 
3 Karuturi  Rice 20,000  India and 
international market 
4 BHO  Rice 8,000 India and 
International market 
5 Bazel  Rice 1,500 Domestic and 
International Market   
 
Source: Author’s direct and indirect communications with the investors, farm 
employees and other stakeholders.  
 
As can be seen from this table, out of the 57,500 metric tons of rice produced on the 
plot of lands that investors put into use in 2011, almost 100% was sold outside the 
country, with foreign companies such as Saudi Star Agricultural Development Plc 
exporting 100% of its products to its country of origin – Saudi Arabia. Although India 
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was the major destination for most of the products of Indian companies, according to 
one Indian company’s farm manager, some of their products were also sold to other 
countries (Interview – 8BSS, 10 Apr. 2012).   
 
Hence, so far, the claim that LSLA will supply food to local markets and therefore 
reduce prices seems not to be the case, at least in the Gambella region. In fact, the 
opposite has been happening in the region. Since the coming of the investors, the 
price of maize has been doubling and tripling (see below). The simple explanation 
from the consumers and local distributors is that since local farmers were displaced 
from their farms – mainly in Abobo and Gog woredas, which are the most productive 
woredas in the region – the local supply has almost disappeared (Interviews – 2 and 
5BSS, 17 and 24 Mar. 2012). This, in turn, has made the local distributors rely on 
imports from neighbouring regions, which has increased the prices because of the 
high transport costs. Another explanation is that, since the UNHCR has started 
repatriation of South Sudanese refugees and already closed two refugee camps in 
the region, this has also affected the region’s food supply and food prices since there 
is only less food coming to the region through the UNHCR (Interviews – 2 and 5BSS, 
17 and 24 Mar. 2012). Moreover, since those investments have brought more people 
into the region, the abnormal population growth has also sharply increased the 







Figure 10: Average Maize Price (100kg) in Gambella town and in three woredas 
in the Gambella region from 2007-2011.  
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of the quantitative data collected. In order to reach these figures, I collected 
the average maize prices in the three woredas and Gambella town for the last five years. Then I 
summed the average maize prices for each year in the research areas and divided them by four to 
produce the average maize price for each year for the last four years. These figures are only collected 
in the woreda towns (Abobo town for Abobo woreda, Pinyudo town for Gog woreda and Itang town for 
Itang woreda).   
 
In a nutshell, it remains to be seen whether the current trend will change as those 
investors utilize more of their land leases. But it is most unlikely to change since 
what drives those companies is profit not local food security needs, as stated by one 
investor, “We are not charity organizations, we are here to make profits not to 
distribute our wealth. We take our products where there is profitable market for it, 
whether here in Ethiopia, Africa, or anywhere” (Karuturi, interview with Arte TV, 20 
Nov. 2011a).  
 
 
8.2.2. Indirect Contribution of LSLA to Food Security   
 
According to the Ethiopian government and investors, LSLA, in addition to its above-























through its contribution to general economic growth and job creation (Wondirad, 
interview with Channel4 News, 19 Feburary 2012). In the language of ‘food security’ 
defined earlier, LSLA will ensure ‘food access’ both for the country through hard 
currency earned from increased export of agricultural products and for the individual 
citizens through employment opportunities. I will briefly discuss the problem with the 
first argument here and keep the second one about employment opportunities for the 
next section.  
 
As discussed in Chapter seven, since coming to power, the current Ethiopian 
government has been promoting small-scale farming and pursuing a self-sufficiency 
food security strategy. However, since the beginning of the last decade, the 
government began moving gradually and subtly toward large-scale commercial 
farming and trade-based food security strategy (Lavers, 2012). By shifting towards a 
trade-based approach to food security, the government argues that if it has enough 
foreign exchange reserves, even if the investors sell their food outside Ethiopia, then 
it can import food from other countries. In the words of Lefort:  
 
The mechanism that they [Ethiopian government] set up can be summarized as follows: 
Ethiopia rents out land to investors so that they can export their produce, and then [the 
Ethiopian government] import the same produce, grown somewhere else, to feed its own 
people (Lefort, 2011, p.1). 
 
This strategy goes against the very first reason that triggered the contemporary 
global land rush, which is the fragility of trade-based food security strategy (Lavers, 
2012). In other words, it was the unreliability and unsustainability of this trade-based 
food security strategy that compelled countries like Saudi Arabia to seek secure food 
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sources by directly acquiring lands (through state affiliated companies) in other 
countries like Ethiopia (Cotula, et al., 2009; GRAIN, 2008). Therefore, it is ironic for 
Ethiopia to promote export-oriented production hoping that if it has enough foreign 
exchange reserves then it can always secure food from the international market 
whose unreliability sparked this phenomenon in the first place.  
 
 
8.3. Employment Opportunities  
 
Employment opportunities are perhaps the most repeatedly cited benefit of LSLAs by 
its proponents (Al Amoundi, interview with ETV, 24 Mar. 2011; Wondirad, interview 
with the Guardian, 21 March 2011). However, up to now there has been no study 
conducted about the nature of these employment opportunities, such as the kinds of 
jobs that those investments have created, the wages they pay and the actual 
beneficiaries of these jobs. This section is an attempt to review the job creation claim 
by proponents of LSLA by looking at three selected projects. The sample projects 
are selected for their comparatively high number of employees and also for the large 
size of their farms. To enable comparison between foreign and domestic investors, 
the biggest two foreign-owned farms and the biggest domestic-owned farm are 
selected.   
 
Nevertheless, before I proceed to discuss the sample projects, it is important to note 
that employment opportunities are also determined by the kinds of crops that 
investors choose to produce. Some crops by nature require more labour and less 
technology, while others can be produced with more technology and less labour. The 
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following figure, adopted from a World Bank publication, shows an estimation of 
labour force needed for various crops per 1,000 ha.  
 
 
Figure 11: World Bank Estimation of Average Work Force Required for Various 
Crops per 1,000 ha 54 
 
 
Source: Adopted from the World Bank (2011, p.39) 
 
In the Gambella regional state, the first 15 large-scale land investors who comprise 
76% of the total land investment in the region are all producing grains and soya 
beans, except for five of them that also produce cotton. According to the above 
World Bank estimation, grains and soya beans are among the kinds of crops that 
can be largely produced using technology. The average workforce required for each 
crop is only 10 to18 people per 1,000 ha respectively (World Bank, 2011, p.39). 
Hence, the kinds of crops that investors are producing in Gambella regional state are 
                                                          
54 Sugar cane ethanol (a): Rain-fed, one-third mechanized harvest (Brazil) 
Sugar cane ethanol (b): Irrigated, mechanized harvest (Mozambique) 
Sugar cane ethanol (c): Irrigated, manual harvest (Tanzania)  
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already ranked the lowest in terms of jobs creation in the contemporary technological 
farming era.   
 
With this in mind, going back to the sample projects, I conducted small-scale 
questionnaires to find out the number of jobs those projects have created, the nature 
of those jobs (permanent or contract), proportion of highlanders and indigenous 
employees and the average salary/wages for different levels of jobs. In most cases I 
cross-checked the answers I received from farm managers with farm employees. In 
cases where I was unable to get answers from farm managers I also relied on 
information provided by junior farm employees (see Appendix – 4 for the 
questionnaires).  
 
Despite the differences in the number of jobs and salary scale for different projects, I 
will discuss the nature of jobs created by those projects under three main categories. 
In the first category are the farm managers, administrators, and administrative 
assistants. In other words, I discuss the office-based jobs under the first category. In 
the second category are the technical staff such as the machinery operators, 
mechanics, and agro-industrial experts. In the last category are the daily labourers. It 
is to be noted here that all these three categories are in the production sector, which 
is the relevant sector to the Gambella region. There are other categories in the 
processing sector, which I disregard in this discussion since the processers for these 




8.3.1. First Category (Office Jobs)  
 
There are very few managerial and administrative positions created by the relevant 
land investments (see Figure 12). These positions are dispersed in Addis Ababa and 
Gambella region where the farms are located. They include, company executives, 
communication and marketing staff, engineers and related professionals, 
administration staff (finance, human resources, secretaries), and so on. Regardless 
of the variations from investor to investor, the set-ups of most of those farms are very 
similar. All the executives of those farms, both foreign and domestic, reside in the 
capital Addis Ababa where the farms’ headquarters are also located. The major 
decisions about production and marketing also take place at the headquarters. In the 
Gambella region, the companies have their offices at respective woredas and 
kebeles where their farms are located. These offices include farm managers, 
secretaries, and different supervisors such as technical supervisors, different crops’ 
production supervisors, security supervisors and so on.   
 
According to my observation and interviews, in the case of Indian companies, most 
of their managerial and senior expert positions are occupied by Indians. However, for 
the Saudi company, the managerial positions and senior expert positions are shared 
between Pakistanis and Ethiopians. In the case of domestic companies, most of their 
office-based jobs are occupied by family members or cousins from their hometowns. 
Hence, essentially these jobs are out of reach for the indigenous peoples who are 
not related in one way or another to the investors.  
 
In terms of wages, these positions are better paid compared to similar positions in 
the regional government. The salary scale for office-based jobs ranges from around 
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$300-600 per month, depending on each company. However, as is shown in the 
following figure, the number of jobs in this category is very limited (see Figure 12). 
For instance, the largest investor in the region, Karuturi Agro Products Plc, had only 
17 staff members in the first category out of its 1,256 total employees at the time of 
my field research (March/April, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 12: Distribution of jobs across different categories at Karaturi Agro Plc  
 
 




8.3.2. Second Category (Technical Jobs) 
 
The second category of jobs created by LSLA includes the machinery operators, 









knowledge and experience is necessary to run the machinery or carry out other 
technical duties. As such, the involvement of the indigenous peoples in these kinds 
of technical jobs is very minimal. Many of the employees in this category are 
highlanders who have gained experience in mechanized farming in other regions. 
Since foreign companies pay better than domestic or state-owned farms, many 
highlanders who used to work for domestic investors or state farms in other regions 
migrated to Gambella to obtain the better job opportunities offered by foreign 
companies in the region. The average salary per month in this category ranges from 
$200-300, which is far above the government’s salary scale for first-degree holders, 
which ranges from $100-150.  
 
Because of the disadvantaged position of the indigenous communities in competing 
for these jobs, Karuturi Agro Products Plc has taken its own initiative by training 
some indigenous people to operate tractors and other machinery to enable them to 
access these jobs. Some interpret this action by Karuturi as a pre-emptive reaction 
to various incidents of violence which targeted foreign employees working for Saudi 
Star Agro Plc. However, whatever the intention behind this initiative, Karuturi has 
managed to employ a higher number of indigenous communities in its second 
category jobs than any other company in the region. As indicated in the following 
figure, out of its total of 119 employees in this category, Karuturi Agro Products Plc 
has 35 indigenous people working as tractor operators and supervisors. The next 
biggest company in the region – i.e. Saudi Star Agro Plc – has only six indigenous 









Figure 13: Proportion of Indigenous vs. Highlanders in the Second Category 

















8.3.3. Third Category (Labour Jobs)  
 
The majority of employment opportunities created by those large-scale land 
investments are the daily labourer jobs. Most of these jobs are seasonal and their 
duration could vary from crop to crop. In terms of payment, daily labourers are the 
lowest paid in the overall job pyramid, receiving $1-2 per day.  
 
The ‘highlanders vs. indigenous’ composition in the third category of jobs varies 
among investors. The location of the farm also determines the ethnic composition on 
every farm since villagers prefer to work in farms close to them. However, generally 
speaking, foreign investors have a better reputation for employing indigenous ethnic 
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groups compared to domestic investors. In this regard, Karuturi Agro Products Plc, 
according to the farm manager, has deliberately appointed 10 indigenous people in 
supervisory/recruitment positions in order to make it easy for indigenous peoples to 
obtain access to these daily labourer jobs (Interview – 8BSS, 10 Apr. 2012). As 
such, in its third category of jobs, Karuturi has a higher number of indigenous 
peoples than highlanders, as demonstrated in the following figure.  
 
Figure 14: Proportion of Indigenous vs. Highlanders in the third category of 
jobs at Karuturi Agro Plc  
 
  
Source:  Author’s direct and indirect communication with Karuturi Agro Plc and its 
employees.  
 
However, among domestic investors, the number of indigenous people working even 
in this lowest third category of jobs seems to be very limited. For instance, as 
demonstrated in the following figure, the largest domestic investor in Gambella 
employed only 43 indigenous people out of its roughly 300 daily labourers at the time 
I was conducting my research (March/April, 2012). There was not a single 













Figure 15: Proportion of Indigenous vs. Highlanders in the third category of 













Source: Author’s direct and indirect communication with the investors and their 
employees.  
 
At the end of this section on job opportunities, in general, therefore, we can make 
two important conclusions. In the first place, despite the claim that LSLAs are 
providing job opportunities to local communities, the majority of those jobs are 
actually low paying and seasonal jobs that cannot sustain people with families 
(Interviews – 10 and 11IND, 02 Apr. 2012). As demonstrated in Figure 12, nearly 
90% of jobs created by large-scale land investments are the lowest paying seasonal 
jobs. Hence, for instance, when Sheik Al Amoudi, the owner of Saudi Star Agro Plc, 
stated once that his company had created 707 jobs for the local people, this number 
could be misleading since the actual permanent jobs created could approximately be 




Secondly, from the above discussions, the significant imbalance between the 
number of indigenous people and highlanders working in those farms is very salient. 
Many reasons are mentioned by both the investors and the indigenous communities 
as the contributing factors for the limited number of indigenous workers in those 
farms. From the investors’ side, some farms managers say that, compared to 
highlanders, indigenous people are not hard working and they do not respect 
working hours (Interviews – 1 and 6BSS, 15 Mar. and 01 Apr. 2012). However, from 
some of the indigenous peoples’ side, they argue that they are being discriminated 
against by supervisors who are responsible for recruiting daily labourers (Interviews 
– 12 and 13IND, 03 Apr. 2012).55 Some of the unemployed young indigenous people 
I interviewed complained about discrimination in the employment procedures of 
those farms (Interviews – 14 and 15IND, 04 Apr. 2012). Even some indigenous 
young people who are already working for those farms said that they only obtained 
the jobs through complaining to the farm managers. They said that managers want 
to employ indigenous people but supervisors (mainly highlanders) on the field who 
are responsible for recruiting daily labourers discriminate against indigenous people 
(Interviews – 12 and 13IND, 03 Apr. 2012). This might explain why the number of 
indigenous people employed in domestic investors’ farms is even far lower than on 
foreign investors’ farms. As indicated in Figures 14 and 15 respectively, the number 
of indigenous people working on domestic farms is very low (e.g. Bazen 14%) 
compared to the number working on foreign farms (e.g. Karuturi 74%). Some 
indigenous people hold the view that foreign managers are friendlier towards the 
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indigenous people than local (highlander) managers are (Interviews – 12 and 13IND, 
03 Apr. 2012).  
 
Another factor is the wage on those farms and the timing of daily labourers’ jobs. As 
indicated earlier, many of the indigenous people only get positions in the lowest 
paying jobs. For these kinds of jobs, investors take people in the age range of 15-35 
years old. Hence, the jobs created by LSLAs are already limited to certain groups of 
people. For those who have family and have their own farm, what they earn on these 
jobs is far less than what they can earn working on their own farm. Moreover, since 
most of these jobs are only available seasonally during the rainy season, which is 
the same season that the local farmers also need to work on their farms, the timing 
of daily labour jobs might also then be another reason why there are limited numbers 
of indigenous people working in those farms.  
 
Other indigenous people raised security as one of their greatest concerns that 
discourages them from seeking jobs in those farms. As will be discussed in the next 
chapter, the relationship between the indigenous people and highlanders has been 
characterised by tensions since 2003. As such, indigenous people do not want to 
work in environments where they are a tiny minority among highlanders. They are 
afraid that small disagreements might endanger their lives or, if a conflict breaks out 
somewhere between the two groups, the highlanders might take revenge on them 
(Interviews – 10 and 11IND, 02 Apr. 2012). In fact, those fears are not unwarranted; 
there was an instance in Abobo woreda where a daily labourer indigenous person on 
one of those farms was beaten to the point of death by her highlander colleagues 
(Interviews – 10IND, 02 Mar. 2012). As such, indigenous people go to work in areas 
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where there are many other indigenous people and where they feel secure. This 
creates a vicious cycle in a sense that the lack of indigenous people on some farms 
by itself also hinders other indigenous people from working there.  
 
This is compounded by the fact that most of the indigenous people involved in 
labouring work at the moment are women,56 whereas most of the highlanders 
involved in this work are young men. As such, it is very difficult for indigenous 
women to find themselves working among young highlanders, as there is fear of 
rape and other kinds of abuse (Interview – 10IND, 2 Apr. 2012). Moreover, to protect 
those farms, there are military bases around all of them. Given their negative 
reputation and the implication for various human rights abuses in the region, the 
military are seen as a threat not only by women but also by the indigenous people in 
general. Therefore, all of these security reasons might have played a prominent role 
in discouraging indigenous people from seeking jobs on those farms.   
 
 
8.4. Technology Transfer  
 
In Ethiopia, the level of technological change and transfer of modern agricultural 
technology has been very low (Workneh, 2006). The major agricultural technology 
development that has taken place in the country has mainly been limited to 
agricultural research and extension programmes initiated and supported by various 
international donors (Dessalegn, 2008). These agricultural research and extension 
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 It was beyond the scope of this research to look into why most of the indigenous people working (as 
daily labourers) and seeking jobs at those farms are women. This is a research question that might 
need further investigation in its own right.  
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programmes in Ethiopia can be traced back to the establishment of agricultural 
education and research centres such as the Alemaya, Ambo and Jimma agricultural 
and technical schools that were founded in the 1940s and 1950s (Mulat, 1999). 
These agricultural research institutes mainly focus on the improvement of crop 
varieties, development and testing of technologies for soil and water management, 
and introduction of farming equipment that are less time and energy consuming 
(Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR), 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, for multiple reasons, the establishment of these research institutes 
and injection of huge funds into various agricultural extension programs have not 
greatly improved agricultural productivity in the country over the last five decades 
(Dessalegn, 2008). Likewise, despite the change of governments and agricultural 
policies, the farming methods of rural Ethiopian communities have remained the 
same throughout the years (Workneh, 2006). In the highland areas, rural farmers are 
still using oxen ploughing while in the lowland areas rural farmers are still using 
various hand tools. These primitive farming systems – among other reasons – have 
been blamed for inadequate agricultural productivity in the country and continue to 
be one of the major explanations for the pervasive food insecurity in the country 
(Workneh, 2006).  
 
Against this background of poor agricultural technology, the current LSLAs are 
believed to revolutionize the agricultural sector. Until recently, the amount of modern 
farming machinery in the country has been very limited. For instance, the number of 
tractors in private hands has not been more than 1,000 in the overall country of over 
85 million people, of whom 85% depend on agriculture (Esayas, Interview with NHK 
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World TV, 31 Jan. 2010). However, with the coming of large-scale foreign investors, 
the amount of tractors and other complex modern farming equipment has sharply 
increased in the country. For instance, just one of the foreign investors – Karuturi 
Agro Products Plc – had nearly 100 tractors as of April 2012. Hence, regardless of 
whether the local communities are benefiting from these technologies or not, it is to 
be acknowledged that large-scale investors are changing the technological face of 
the Ethiopian agriculture. However, the question in this section is to investigate the 
claim about technology transfer from large-scale investor to small-scale indigenous 
farmers. In other words, are these technological developments taking place in a pro-
poor manner or are they exacerbating and entrenching the marginalization of the 
indigenous communities? 
 
In order to answer this question, I have looked at two sets of data. The first set is the 
legal and policy framework that governs large-scale land leases to determine 
whether it provides for technological transfer from large-scale investors to small-
scale farmers. In the experience of other countries, either separate legislation is 
established that particularly addresses technological transfer from big investors to 
small-scale farmers or, in other cases, details about technological transfer are 
included in the land lease/sale agreements themselves (Cotula et al., 2009).  
 
The Ethiopian investment proclamation identifies areas of investment reserved only 
for the government, such as the transmission and supply of electrical energy and 
postal services, with the exception of courier services. The proclamation also 
identifies areas of investment that investors are only allowed to invest in through joint 
venture with the government, such as manufacturing of weapons and ammunition, 
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and telecommunication services (FDRE Proclamation No. 280/2002, Article 4). 
Under this proclamation, except for the aforementioned areas, all other areas of 
investment are open for foreign investors. Agricultural investment falls under the 
areas of investment that are open for foreign investors in which they are free to 
invest either on their own or in joint ventures with domestic investors. This is also 
true with regard to land lease agreements. In the land lease agreements concluded 
between large-scale investors and the federal government, there are no provisions 
that oblige those investors to support their adjacent small-scale farmers with their 
technology or knowledge. Therefore, the land investment legal and policy framework 
in Ethiopia in general is silent on technological transfer from large-scale investors to 
small-scale farmers. As such, the claim about ‘technological transfer’ by the 
Ethiopian government and investors seems to be only political rhetoric which is not 
underpinned by any piece of legislation or policy framework.  
 
Furthermore, I interviewed small-scale farmers and concerned local government 
officials to determine whether there is any informal cooperation between large-scale 
land investors and their adjacent small-scale farmers. This is because, despite the 
lack of any legal obligation that requires them to transfer their technology to small-
scale farmers, some large-scale investors have stated on various occasions that 
they also plan to empower their adjacent small-scale farmers with technology and 
knowledge. For instance Mr. Haile Asegide, the Managing Director of Saudi Star Ago 
Plc, stated that they plan in their project to work together with local communities in 
terms of supporting them with technology and making them their development 
partners (Haile, interview with ETV, 16 Feb. 2010). Other large-scale investors have 
also made similar statements about transferring their technology to small-scale 
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farmers in their localities. However, after four year of operation, the relationship 
between most of the large-scale land investors and their adjacent small-scale 
farmers seems to be antagonistic rather than cooperative. Small-scale farmers 
interviewed for this research were accusing large-scale investors of encroaching into 
their lands, failing to keep their earlier promises and working with government 
authorities to displace them, rather than offering cooperation. One FGD participant in 
the relocated Thenyi village stated:  
 
When the government told us to leave our villages, they also told us that investors would clear 
the trees by bulldozers in the new locations we were told to move.  However, this did not 
happen. We are still cutting the trees using axe and this will take us two to three years until 
we get proper farms (FGD – 2 – P2, 31 Mar. 2012). 
 
Another indigenous farmer who has a larger farm (10ha) and used to rent a tractor 
from the local government stated that:  
 
The investors are not willing even to rent one of their tractors out of hundreds. It could have 
saved me transportation cost if I just rent a tractor from the investor here 2 miles away from 
my farm instead of from a local government that is 30 miles away from my farm (FGD – 4 – 
P3, 05 Apr. 2012). 
 
One of the large-scale farm manager interviewed for this research stated that their 
machines are fully occupied at the moment since they still have lots of trees to clear 
from the tracts of land they have been given (Interview – 8BSS, 10 Apr. 2012). 
Another farm manager stated that he needs an order from his superiors in Addis 
Ababa in order to allow machinery for any other activity outside their farm (Interview 
– 6BSS, 01 Apr. 2012). Hence, until now, there seems to have been no signs of 
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cooperation, whether formal or informal, between large-scale investors and small-
scale farmers, let alone any technology transfer.  
 
In conclusion of this section, therefore, I can say that it seems what is happening so 
far is only vertical technology transfer – i.e. the physical relocation of machinery from 
other countries to Ethiopia – and not horizontal technology transfer – i.e. transfer of 




8.5. Increase in Tax Revenue for Local Governments  
 
Another most cited benefit of large-scale land acquisitions is the increase in tax 
revenues for national or local governments (Cotula et al., 2009). It is claimed that 
governments get direct tax income from land lease fees, income tax from employees 
on those farms, and indirect increase in tax income from local businesses that thrive 
on the back of those investments (World Bank, 2011).  
 
However, research from different countries shows that, while the financial terms of 
land deals vary in different countries, official land rental fees tend to be lower and 
play a relatively less important role for host governments. In the eyes of host 
governments, broader economic benefits such as infrastructure development and 
employment generation are more important than direct financial gains from land 
rental fees (Cotula et al., 2009; Omot, interview with VOA, 19 Nov. 2011). That is 
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why land rental fees are made extremely low or even not charged at all in some 
cases (Cotula, et al., 2009).  
 
For instance, in Sudan, land rental fees are only between $2-3 in rural areas and 
$15-20 around Khartoum, which is much lower compared to the international value 
(Cotula et al., 2009). According to one Sudanese government official, it is a 
deliberate government policy to only charge negligible rent to international investors 
because the main benefit of incoming investment is seen in its broader economic 
repercussions (Cotula et al., 2009). In a similar way, an officer for the Angolan 
government stated that, “the Angolan government is not interested in making money 
out of the land.  The government is interested in stimulating the local economy, 
diversifying the primary economic bases from past focus on mining and industry” 
(Cotula et al., 2009, p.79). Therefore, expected broader economic gains explain why 
some governments have kept land rental fees much lower than international value in 
order to attract more investors.  
 
The Ethiopian case is not different from the above-mentioned cases. In fact it 
confirms Cotula’s argument that land rental fees are deliberately kept low and seen 
as less important by host governments. The highest land rental fee in Ethiopia is $9 
per hectare per year in the Oromia regional state (Dessalegn, 2011). This is much 
lower compared to other African states. The lowest land rental fee in the country is in 
the Gambella regional state where standard rates are set between $1.3 and 2 per 
hectare per year. The general low land lease fee in the country is one of the many 
initiatives that are imposed by the government in order to attract more foreign 
investors. Looking at various federal investment legislations and policies, one can 
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understand that, in the eyes of the federal government, land lease fee is not the most 
important thing. The most important thing to be gained out of those investments is 
the increase of exportable agricultural production (Lavers, 2012). That is why, as 
discussed earlier, the investment proclamation gives more incentives, including 
longer tax holidays, for investors who export larger amounts of their products.  
 
Another indicator for the lower importance of land lease fees for the federal 
government in Ethiopia is the fact that land fees in Ethiopia are paid to the woreda 
government level and not even to regional governments. Unlike most other African 
countries such as Ghana, Tanzania and Sierra Leone, where land rental fees are 
shared between different levels of governments (MAFFS, 2009), in Ethiopia rents are 
exclusively paid and used by respective woreda governments. One might argue that 
this is because of the federal system in the country. But, according to the federal 
constitution, the regional state government would be responsible for exercising 
power over natural resources, not the woreda governments (FDRE-Constitution, 
1994, Article 51). Moreover, as discussed in Chapter six, the federal government has 
a reputation of violating the power-sharing arrangement when it comes to important 
interests. The point here is that, had the land rental fee been seen as important by 
the federal government, they could have recentralized it anyway, as they have done 
in other areas. Hence, it is not necessarily the federal system that keeps the land 
rental fees at the woreda level but it could be the fact that those fees might not be 
the main interest for the federal government.  
 
Ironically, the power to determine land rental fees and to impose and lift up land rent 
‘holidays’ is vested in the federal government. According to the federal Investment 
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Incentives Regulation No. 84/2003, investors who export at least 50% of their 
products or supply at least 75% of their products to an exporter shall be exempted 
from income tax for five years, or six years if the investment is located in one of the 
lowland regions. The Council of Ministers, a federal body, could also extend the tax 
holiday period if they think it is necessary. Hence, although the woreda governments 
are in charge of collecting and using land rental fees, it is up to the federal 
government to decide when and how much the investor should pay to the woreda 
governments.  
 
This being said, evidence collected from three woredas in which this research was 
carried out show how large-scale land investments have sharply increased their tax 
income over the last three to four years. Although the largest investors (over 5000 
ha) do not pay their land rental fees yet because of the tax holidays imposed by the 
federal government, investors below 5000 ha who do not qualify for the federal tax 
exemption have been bringing in considerable income to the woredas in which their 
investments are located. The following graph shows how the tax income of those 




Figure 16: Tax Income of Three Woredas  
 
Source: Authors direct communication with Abobo, Gog and Itang woredas finance offices.  
 
In those woredas, general records do not show exactly the income from land lease 
fees and land investment related income. However, in Gog woreda for example, a 
senior official from the woreda finance office stated that the increase in tax income is 
due to the land lease fees collected from land investors (Interview – 14GOV, 3 Apr. 
2012). In addition to land lease fees, income tax collected from employees working 
in those farms has also contributed to the increase of revenues in those woredas.  
 
However, one official from Gog woreda accused the woreda government of 
mismanagement of the tax income. He said that the woreda government is not using 
this opportunity of increased tax income to develop and improve the infrastructure in 
the woreda (Interview – 15GOV, 4 Apr. 2012). In line with such anecdotal claims of 
mismanagement of tax income, it is confirmed by woreda government officials that 
local tax income is not used for development purposes (Interview – 14GOV, 3 Apr. 





























are two main lines of budgets, which they call the ‘recurrent budget’ and ‘capital 
budget’. The former refers to budget lines that are used to pay salaries, allowances, 
stationery, and related administrative and operation costs. The latter, however, is 
used for development projects and programmes such as construction of schools, 
clinics, roads, water wells and so on (Interview – 14GOV, 03 Apr. 2012).  
 
According to the woreda budgets and, in fact, of the Gambella region in general, all 
local income tax collections are put under the recurrent budget, which is used for 
salary and operational costs of the government. The government mainly uses foreign 
aid money for the capital budget, i.e. for development programmes and projects. 
Hence, all the taxes collected from investors and other businesses by woreda 
government are all allocated to the recurrent-budget line. But, even within the 
general recurrent-budget line, those taxes are allocated to a specific budget line of 
allowances for woreda officials (Interview – 14GOV, 03 Apr. 2012). By the time I was 
carrying out this research, the schools and clinics in all these woredas were closed 
because the teachers, nurses and health extension workers had not been paid for 
three months. In these woredas, local income could have covered some of those 
expenses, but since it is allocated for the recurrent-allowances budget line, schools 
and clinics were closed while woreda officials enjoyed their extra allowances from 
those local incomes.   
 
There are many allegations of corruption within various levels of the government. 
Some people argue that the increasing tax income from land investors has increased 
the level of corruption in the region since woreda government officials obtain money 
for which they cannot be held accountable (Interviews – 11 and 15GOV, 28 Mar. and 
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04 Apr. 2012). Some woreda government officials have been removed from their 
positions because of corruption cases. But in Ethiopia, where the charge of 
corruption is sometimes used by higher government officials as a cover to punish 
those who are not loyal to the system, it is difficult to prove whether those dismissals 




8.6. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has critically reviewed the benefits of large-scale land acquisitions vis-
à-vis the indigenous communities of Gambella in order to determine whether 
indigenous peoples are benefiting from those investments or not. In all of the four 
areas that have been investigated for this research, evidence suggests that, instead 
of economic empowerment and development, large-scale land investments seem to 
be furthering the marginalization of the indigenous communities of the Gambella 
region.  
 
In terms of food security, both the land investment legal framework and land lease 
agreements are silent about domestic food security needs. Instead, they encourage 
export-oriented production and provide attractive incentives for investors who export 
a higher proportion of their outputs. Hence, large-scale land investments seem to be 
driven by the requirement for exports and foreign earnings rather than the need for 
domestic food security. Concerning job opportunities, evidence from selected sample 
projects indicates that very few permanent jobs are created by those projects. The 
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majority of jobs created are temporary daily labourers’ jobs that pay poorly and can 
hardly sustain minimum living standards. Moreover, the majority of workers on those 
farms are actually migrants from highland parts of Ethiopia rather than people from 
indigenous communities from the Gambella region.  
 
Likewise, based on the analysis of the land investment legal framework and direct 
interviews with some small-scale farmers, it has been argued in this chapter that, 
both in theory and in practice, there seems to be no sign of any technology transfer 
from large-scale investors to small-scale farmers. Although large-scale land 
investors have introduced complex farming equipment to the country, this has not 
changed the farming methods of the small-scale farmer. Instead, small-scale farmers 
are defined as incapable and pushed out of their lands, in order to give way to the 
‘capable’ large-scale farmers. Finally, with regard to claims about financial benefits, 
although evidence has suggested an increase in tax revenue for respective woreda 
governments as a consequence of large-scale land investments, this increase in tax 
revenue has not been directed towards developmental activities of the respective 
woredas. Rather, some of my interviewees in those woredas believe the increase in 
local tax revenue has increased corruption and competition for woreda cabinet 
positions (e.g. Interviews – 11 and 15GOV, 28 Mar. and 4 Apr. 2012).   
 
On top of those challenges, based on my interviews and focus group discussions, I 
have identified some of the major negative impacts of LSLAs on the indigenous 




Chapter Nine: Negative Impacts of Large-Scale Land 




9.1. Introduction  
 
The negative impacts of large-scale land acquisitions on the indigenous communities 
of the Gambella regional state may turn out to be highly significant but, since most 
projects are in their early stages, it is not yet possible to assess these fully. Hence, 
this chapter does not claim to present a full-scale and comprehensive assessment of 
the negative impacts of large-scale land investments on the indigenous communities. 
However, based on what has already been done, this chapter will try to answer the 
last subsidiary research question namely, what are the negative impacts of large-
scale land acquisitions on the indigenous communities of Gambella? Based on 
my field research findings, I argue in this chapter that, at the moment, the most 
visible negative impacts of LSLAs on the indigenous communities of Gambella are: 
(1) the villagization programme/forced displacement; (2) cultural and environmental 
destruction; (3) escalation of conflicts and tensions; and (4) further marginalization of 
women – particularly rural women.  
 
 
9.2. Villagization Programme  
 
Villagization in Ethiopia is not a new phenomenon. It has a lengthy history starting 
from Haile Selassie’s regime when the government established the first known 
planned resettlement, in 1958 in Sidamo province (Mulatu, 1991). However, the most 
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well-known and documented resettlement programme in the country was the one 
engineered by the Derg regime right after the 1974 revolution as part of its grand 
land reform policy, followed by the second phase in the 1980s where the term 
‘villagization’ was actually employed (Mulatu, 1991).  
 
The villagization programme in the 1980s was intended to regroup the scattered 
traditional villages, homesteads and hamlets of the entire rural areas into a 
completely new pattern of grid-plan villages, laid out in accordance with central 
directives (Cohen and Isaksson, 1987). The objective was ostensibly to promote 
economic and social development and facilitate the delivery of social services such 
as clinics, clean water and educational facilities (Mulatu, 1991). According to 
President Mengistu Haile Mariam:  
 
Collecting the farmers into villages will enable them to promote social production in a short 
time.  It will also change a farmer's life, his thinking, and will therefore open a new chapter in 
the establishment of a modern society in the rural areas and help bring about socialism 
(Mengistu Haile Mariam, 1986 cited in HRW, 1991, p.2).  
 
The Derg’s programme of villagization was so ambitious that it planned to move 
more than 30 million rural peasants over a nine-year period. Towards the end of the 
1980s, available sources indicate that the Derg had managed to relocate 13 million 
rural peasants, mainly from the highlands of Wollo, Shewa and Tigray to the 
lowlands of Wollega, Kafa and Gambella, at an estimated cost of 767 million ETB 
(Mulatu, 1991). In stark contrast to the official rationale for villagization, which was to 
promote social and economic development, critics argue that the new villages 
became the source of forced labour for the government’s grand socialist projects, 
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such as state-owned large-scale commercial farms, road constructions and other 
infrastructure development projects (Gebru, 2009).  
 
Far from being voluntary, Human Rights Watch (HRW) argued that the programme 
was carried out with outright force, for example in eastern Ethiopia and Gambella 
regions where the Derg security forces committed extrajudicial executions, arbitrary 
detention, torture, rape, and destruction of property belonging to those who showed 
resistance to the programme (HRW, 1991). According to Gebru (2009), the sites for 
settlement were randomly selected by President Mengistu Haile Mariam and his 
inner circle advisors without any consultation with concerned ministries or experts in 
relevant fields, such as ecology, economics, anthropology and others. Moreover, 
Gebru (2009) argued that the programme was executed without the consent of either 
the settlers or the host communities. Hence, the new settlers faced harsh conditions 
in their new villages. One source suggests that about 50,000 Oromo people fled their 
new villages in eastern Ethiopia in 1986 and settled in refugee camps in Somalia 
(Ofcansky and Berry, 1991). According to Gebru (2009), between 1984 and 1986, as 
many as 33,000 settlers across the country may have died from tropical diseases 
and starvation, while at least 84,000, are believed to have abandoned their new 
villages. Hence, from an historical perspective, villagization in Ethiopia has been 
more akin to forced labour camps and has mostly been accompanied by gross 
human rights violations (Gebru, 2009; HRW, 1991; Mulatu, 1991).    
 
Others argue that the villagization programme was a security ploy by the Derg 
regime to depopulate the then stronghold of rebel movements, particularly the Tigray 
and Eritrea provinces (Getachew, 1989; Mulatu, 1991). However, Gebru (2009) 
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dismisses this argument. He contends that the populations transferred from the 
Tigray region were too small to have made any strategic difference and, above all, 




9.2.1. Background to Villagization in the Gambella Regional State 
 
The Gambella regional state has a long history of receiving settlers from the highland 
parts of Ethiopia, whether through voluntary movement or compulsory government 
programmes. The first official villagization programme in the Gambella regional state 
was in 1979 when the indigenous people of Gambella were evicted from the bank of 
the Baro River in order to make way for irrigated commercial agriculture. Then the 
government brought in settlers from the highland parts of Ethiopia to farms those 
irrigation schemes (Abela, 2003).  
 
However, the most prominent villagization programme took place from 1984 when 
the Derg brought in 60,000 settlers from the drought-affected highlands areas of 
Amhara, Tigray and Southern regions (Kurimoto, 1993).58 Contrary to the claims that 
the Derg had not consulted the host populations, some village chiefs have stated to 
me during my field research that they were consulted during this period about the 
coming of the settlers. The problem was, they were not given full information about 
the number of people coming or about any adverse impacts of this resettlement 
programme. For example, Perbongo village was one of the sites selected to receive 
                                                          
58
 Gebru (2009) puts the number of settlers brought to Gambella at 150,000.  
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a large number of settlers during the Derg’s regime. The chief of Perbongo village 
described the consultation he had with the Derg government officials like this:  
  
We (village council) were consulted by government officials about some guests coming to our 
village and that we should show a piece of land where those guests could stay. The way it 
was explained to us was as if those people would be only staying here temporarily for three or 
maximum five years until the conditions get better in their homelands. It was also as if they 
were only ten or fifteen families. Then we agreed to the coming of those guests and we 
showed a piece of land to the officials where they could stay. However, when those guests 
started to come, it was bus after bus and after bus nonstop for weeks. Then they filled all the 
land traditionally belonging to our village and even went further to other villages. I have not 
seen such a multitude of people in my life. We were only a few hundred in our village. But 
those guests were tens of thousands. We could not say anything afterwards (FGD – 3 – P2, 
01 Apr. 2012).  
 
Due to the large number of settlers that were brought into the Gambella region, the 
indigenous people were relocated from their farms and villages to provide more 
space either for the settlers or for various state projects (Kurimoto, 2005). Relocated 
indigenous people together with settlers were forced by the authorities to work on the 
new state farms. Those who did not take part in those activities faced harsh 
consequences. Moreover, free movement was forbidden. A person had to have a 
letter from a village chairman allowing him/her to leave or enter a village. Indigenous 
people were also restricted from fishing and hunting activities, which constitute a 
crucial part of their livelihoods and identity (Kurimoto, 1993).    
 
All the above resulted in ferocious resistance to the villagization programme in 
particular and the Derg regime in general. At the height of this resistance, the 
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Gambella Peoples’ Liberation Movement (GPLM) was formed, allying itself with other 
opposition fronts fighting the Derg until the collapse of the regime in 1991 (Interview 
– 15GOV, 4 Apr. 2012).    
 
 
9.2.2. Current Villagization Programme  
 
Two decades after the end of the Derg’s villagization programme and the fall of the 
regime itself, villagization is back again on the Ethiopian political scene. The former 
rebel movement and current dominant party – i.e. the Tigrean People’s Liberation 
Front (TPLF), which ferociously fought against the Derg’s villagization programme 
(Ofcansky and Berry, 1991; Young, 1997) – now, after assuming power, adopts the 
same policy.  
 
Towards the end of 2009, the Ethiopian government devised a plan to relocate 
approximately 1.5 million people in its lowland regions of Gambella, Benishangul-
Gumuz, Somalia and Afar. The plan envisaged moving one million people in the Afar 
and Somali regions in one year and the remaining half a million in Benishagual-
Gumuz and Gabmella regions over a three-years period (Davison, 2010a). 
According to the Ethiopian state media, another villagization programme was also 
launched towards the end of 2011 in the South Omo zone in the SNNPRS, 
associated with irrigated sugar cane plantations, where 30,995 pastoralist 
households were villagized (WIC, 2011a).  
 
The objectives of these new villagization programmes differ from region to region, 
according to Shiferaw Teklemariam, Minister of Federal Affairs (Davison, 2010a). In 
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the pastoralist regions of Somalia and Afar, the objectives are “primarily to resettle 
people in less arid areas near the Wabe Shebelle and Awash Rivers”, while in the 
Benishangul-Gumuz and the Gambella regions, the objectives are to “improve social 
service delivery” (Davison, 2010a, p.1). In his letter to Human Rights Watch’s inquiry 
about the villagization programme, the Minister replied that the aims of the 
villagization programme in Gambella are: 
  
To provide efficient and effective economic and social services (safe drinking water, optimum 
Health care, Education, improved agronomy practices, market access etc.), create an access 
to infrastructure (road, power, telecommunication etc.) and ensure the citizens’ full 
engagement in good governance and democratic exercise (Shiferaw, 2011, p.100).  
 
In line with these objectives, according to the Gambella regional state’s ‘Villagization 
Program Plan’, in the new villages 25 health centres, 19 primary schools, 51 water 
schemes, 18 veterinary clinics, 41 grinding mills, 49 storage facilities, and 195 
kilometres of rural roads will be developed  (GPNRS, 2010). According to the plan, at 
the end of the programme all the rural communities of Gambella will be grouped into 
towns of 500 to 600 households, each farming three to four hectares of land 
(GPNRS, 2010). However, the plan failed to mention critical issues such as access 
to water, fishing sites and cultural and environmental safeguards for local 
communities.  
 
In the first implementation year of the programme (2010/2011), the regional 
government of Gambella claimed that it had moved 26,000 households to the new 
villages – way above its original plan due to the apparent keen interest of the people 
towards this programme (Goaner, interview with WIC, 11 Jan. 2011). While 
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implementation of the programme rests on the shoulders of the woreda and regional 
governments, the originator of the policy and the key force behind the whole 
programme is the federal government. In each woreda there are two federal 
government representatives who oversee this programme under the name of 
‘development advisors’. At the regional government level, there is one coordinator of 
the programme, who is directly appointed by and accountable to the federal 
government (Interview – 4GOV, 21 Mar. 2012).   
 
Evidence collected for this research shows that the programme is far from being the 
‘voluntary resettlement’ preached by various government-controlled media outlets. 
One focus group participant in Abobo woreda, Chubo village said: 
  
We are not new to the resettlement programme. During the Derg regime we were told to 
move to one place in order to get services and development for our village. That did not 
happen until the fall of the Derg. After the fall of the Derg we returned to our villages. This 
time when the officials came to our village telling us about resettlement and development, we 
strongly refused because we know what it is. But then they [government] came by force 
[military force] so we had no option but to accept what we know it is not good for us. The big 
difference this time though is that they [government] will give our land to foreigners then we 
will not go back. The Derg did not give away our land to anybody, they just displaced us but 
when the right time came we went back to our villages. I am afraid our children might not be 
able to go back again this time (FGD – 1 – P3, 30 Mar. 2012).    
 
Human Rights Watch has documented detailed human rights violations including 
forced displacement, arbitrary arrest and detention, suppression of dissent, beatings 
and assaults, rape and sexual violence related to the villagization programme in the 
Gambella regional state which might not be necessary to replicate here (HRW, 
 268 
 
2012). However, unlike the Derg programme where people were moved from one 
region (ecological zone) to another, the current resettlement programme takes place 
within each region, and in the Gambella regional state it has also respected the 
ethnic boundaries of each ethnic group. Ethnic groups are moved within their own 
territories. Yet, if we take the Anywa ethnic group as discussed in Chapter five, they 
are categorized into three main livelihood groups: those who farm alongside the 
riverbanks; those who farm in upland areas; and those who practice shifting 
cultivation, following the forest. All the new resettlement villages for the Anywa ethnic 
group are planned in the upland areas (woodlands). Hence, those relocated from the 
riverbanks and from the forests face unique challenges and interruption of their 
livelihoods, which are inextricably linked with rivers and forests respectively.    
 
 
9.2.3. Villagization and Large-Scale Land Acquisition (LSLA)  
 
So what is the connection between villagization and LSLAs in the Gambella regional 
state? Up to now the Ethiopian government maintains that there is no connection 
between these two programmes. The fact that they are both taking place in the same 
regions at the same time is just a matter of coincidence, according to Kassaun, 
senior expert at the Gambella Investment Agency (Kassaun, interview with the 
Guardian News, 21 Mar. 2011).  
 
However, both qualitative and quantitative data I have collected for this research 
indicate that there is a strong correlation between the current villagization 
programme and the on-going large-scale land leases. First of all, the regions that are 
targeted for the villagization programme are also the regions that are targeted for 
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large-scale land investments (MOARD, 2011). As stated earlier in Chapter seven, 
the official government policy with regard to large-scale land investments is to direct 
them to lowland regions where there is low population density. Similarly, the 
villagization programme also targets these lowland regions that are already identified 
for large-scale land investment (Davison, 2010b). Although the government 
maintains that this villagization programme intends to bring development to the 
communities of those regions, it is a view held in these communities that the 
programme is to make more land available for potential commercial land investors or 
for expansion of the existing investors (FGDs – 1, 2 and 3, 30 and 31 Mar. and 01 
Apr. 2012).    
 
Secondly, in the Gambella region, villagization is targeting woredas that are more 
convenient for large-scale land investment due to their proximity to the regional 
capital, major road infrastructures and water resources. For instance, the woreda 
most affected by the villagization in the Gambella region is Abobo woreda, located 
only 40km from the Gambella regional capital. Abobo is one of the most fertile 
woredas in the region and has been supplying the region with maize and other 
agricultural products. The Alwero dam that was constructed during the Derg regime 
and remained unused until recently is also located in this woreda. When foreign 
investors began to flow into the region, most of them, such as the Saudi Star Agro 
Plc, were directed to this woreda. From the very beginning, Saudi Star Agro Plc. has 
publically stated their intention to expand their lease holding from their current 
holding of 10,000 ha to 500,000 ha over the coming five years (Haile, interview with 
Ethiopiafirst, 26 Feb. 2010). In October 2012, I heard the news that Saudi Star had 
signed another land lease deal of 129,000 ha in Abobo, which brings their total land 
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lease to 139,000 ha in the Abobo woreda (ARS, 2012). The point here is that Saudi 
Star cannot expand without villages in the Abobo woreda being relocated. Even 
under their previous land lease of 10,000 ha, five villages were relocated.59 
According to the Gambella regional state’s ‘Villagization Program Plan’, all the other 
villages in the whole woreda will be relocated by calendar year 2012/2013 (GPNRS, 
2010).  
 
Hence, for the local people, the villagization programme is a strategy by the 
government to make more land available to enable the existing investors to expand 
in the near future or for the potential investors that are still flowing into the region. 
Other woredas that are targeted for the villagization programme, such as Itang, Abol 
and Gog, are also the ones that are more convenient for large-scale land investment 
in terms of close proximity to the regional capital, accessibility and availability of 
water resources.  
 
Thirdly, according to my findings, the arguments that the government is giving for its 
villagization programme are very questionable. The arguments about social services 
and development infrastructures do not really apply to some of the kebeles that have 
been relocated. As I have already mentioned, the woredas that are targeted for the 
villagization programme in the Gambella regional state are those that are in close 
proximity to the regional capital and already have roads. Most of the kebeles in those 
woredas also already have schools, clinics and clean water provision. In my 
analysis, I found that there is a strong correlation between the number of investors in 
one woreda and the number of villages targeted for villagization.  As the number of 
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 These villages are: Awetajwieo, Ochakchalla, Thenyi, Lurakilu and Perbongo-Oma.  
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investors increases in one woreda, then the villagization programme also grows. For 
example, the first phase of villagization (2010/2011) targeted Abobo, the woreda 
most wanted by investors at the time. The second phase of villagization (2011/2012) 
targeted Gog and Itang woredas, where many investors were flowing at that time. 
Hence, while there is a strong correlation between large-scale investors and 
villagization programme, there is no correlation between the villagization programme 
and relative development needs of the respective woredas.  
 
Finally, the attention that the federal government has given to the villagization 
programme and the involvement of the military has created suspicion even among 
those sympathetic to the programme. If it were for pure development purposes, then 
one would expect that the government would have taken the time to engage in 
dialogue to convince people to move rather than using force to move them. 
However, in all the kebeles that were moved, temporary military camps were set up 
to prevent villagers from returning. Once the villagers are forced to move, anyone 
who goes back is accused of being ‘anti-development’ and faces harsh 
consequences. For woreda officials and other civil servants, if they question the 
programme in a meeting with federal representatives then they are also accused of 
being ‘anti-development’ and risk losing their job at best or going to jail at worst. 
Therefore, local officials suspect that the federal government would not have put so 
much pressure on the regional government for the villagization programme unless it 
has a vested interest attached to the programme, which is most likely to make more 
land available for commercial land investors (Interviews – 4 and 6GOV, 21 March, 




9.3. Environmental, Social and Cultural Impacts 
 
As stated in the introduction section of this chapter, due to the fact that many of the 
projects are either in their early stages or have not so far actually utilized all of their 
land leases, many environmental, social and cultural impacts of these projects are 
yet to be determined. Hence, because of this limitation, this section does not pretend 
to and cannot be expected to present a full-scale environmental, social and cultural 
assessment of the impacts associated with large-scale land investments. However, 
based on the current activities of the investors and the existing regulatory framework 
and enforcement mechanisms, some conclusions can be drawn about the 
environmental, social and cultural impacts of those projects on the indigenous 
communities in particular and on the country in general.  
 
Ethiopia already has more than its fair share of environmental problems in the form 
of periodical droughts, land degradation, biodiversity loss, toxic and household 
wastes, air pollution and general environmental vulnerability due to climate variability 
(MoWR and NMA, 2007). One of the biggest environmental threats facing the 
country is the alarming rate of deforestation. In the highland parts of Ethiopia, the 
rate of deforestation is estimated to be in the range of 80,000 ha and 200,000 ha 
each year. Consequently, it is estimated that Ethiopia loses 30,000 ha of its 
productive land every year with 2 million ha already having been irreversibly 
damaged as a result of erosion and soil degradation (Taddese and Peden, 2006). In 
the lowland regions, such as those of Gambella and Benishangual-Gumuz where 
most of the current large-scale land investments are taking place, there are no 
studies so far on the rate of deforestation. However, at the moment, it is clear that 
much of the land that has either already been leased to large-scale investors or is 
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still in the federal land bank marketed as available for investment is in areas that are 
covered by forest or woodland. All these huge tracts of land that have been leased 
out to investors are going through deforestation, with significant parts of those 
regions (10% and 13 % of the total area of Gambella and Benishangual-Gumuz 
regions respectively) already being cleared by bulldozers. If all of the area in the 
Gambella region marketed by the federal government as available for investment is 
leased out to investors, it means that 47% of the region will be cleared of forests and 
woodlands in the coming few years, excluding those areas that are already cleared 
by the indigenous communities as part of their shifting cultivation (OI, 2011a). Even 
in situations where indigenous communities are displaced from their farms, they 
would simply migrate deep into forests and woodlands and clear additional areas for 
their livelihoods, as the Majang people are doing (FGD – 9, 14 Apr. 2012).  
 
In addition to deforestation caused by both large-scale and small-scale farming, high 
financial return from charcoal production is also fuelling the scale of deforestation in 
the country as a whole and in the Gambella region in particular. Although charcoal 
production is forbidden by law in Ethiopia, it is a common practice and widespread in 
both rural and urban areas (Ayalneh, 2002). According to local testimonies and 
personal observation, instead of farming, some domestic investors in the Gambella 
region only cleared the trees on their plots of land for charcoal. After they had 
cleared all of the trees on their plot of lands, they just abandoned their landholdings 
and went back to their regions of origin. Among the 27 domestic investors mentioned 
earlier whose investment certificates were revoked by the government, many of them 
were those who just abandoned their land lease after they used the trees for 
charcoal. Based on my own observation, large-scale foreign investors do not seem 
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to be involved in the charcoal business. According to local testimonies, they clear 
their lands with bulldozers and then burn the debris and the cleared woods 
(Interviews – 12 and 13IND, 03 Apr. 2012).   
 
Deforestation has severe ramifications for the indigenous peoples of Gambella. The 
forests and woodlands are critical to all aspects of life for the indigenous 
communities. They use forest products for building materials, firewood, food, and 
medicines, among other purposes. In terms of food security, forests have been the 
major source of food supplies for most of the indigenous communities. For the 
Anywa, forests and woodland are crucial during periods of food scarcity. In certain 
areas, even during a good harvest season, the Anywa collect roots and fruits from 
their forests and woodlands to vary their nutrition. According to my personal 
experience and to the testimonies collected for this research, forests and woodlands 
cover ¼ of the livelihood needs of the Anywa people. Hence, deforestation in the 
Gambella regional state is already producing irreversible environmental and social 
damages to the Anywa communities.  
 
While deforestation in the Anywa areas has severely affected their livelihoods, the 
loss of livelihoods among the Majang people is even worse. As already discussed in 
Chapter five of this thesis, the case of the Majang people provides a striking 
illustration of the impacts of large-scale land investment on minorities and 
marginalized indigenous communities. As already discussed, the Majang’s total 
population is about 24,000, according to the latest national census (CSA, 2007). 
They live in thick forests between the highlands of Ethiopia and lowland Gambella. 
As forest dwellers, their livelihood is inextricably interwoven with forest products. 
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Hunting, beekeeping and shifting cultivation form the major source of their livelihood 
(Strauder, 1971). Since the Derg’s regime, the Majang people’s livelihood has been 
under constant assault from big state-owned tea and coffee plantations but also 
mainly from individual highlanders who have continued intruding into the Majagnir 
forests. As the highlanders migrate to Majang areas, the Majang migrate deep into 
forests to avoid conflicts. At the moment there are many villages, starting from 
Godere town itself, capital of the Majang zone, which keep the Majang name but are 
devoid of any Majang residents. Against this background, the current large-scale 
land investment just seems to be the final nail in the coffin of the Majang people’s 
cultural identity and livelihood.  
 
As a consequence of the deforestation, significant environmental impacts that are 
already being observed by local communities include: the loss of wetlands, impacts 
on water sources and water quality and quantity, decrease in quantity and quality of 
wildlife populations and habitat, and reduction in biodiversity. Other studies have 
shown the importance of wetlands for local communities in terms of regulating river 
flows, acting as a buffer against floods, and also serving as areas of high biodiversity 
and recharging groundwater supplies (Yilma and Kim, 2003). However, these areas 
are now being leased to investors without any safeguards for these investors to 
protect wetlands located in their lease areas. In fact, in one interview, the Karuturi’s 
farm manager stated that while “in India we face the problem of [obtaining] water for 
farming, in Gambella water is the problem for our farms. Here we spend lots of 
money draining wetlands in our farms” (Karmjeet, interview with the Guardian, 21 




Other experts are concerned about as yet unmeasurable environmental impacts that 
are commonly associated with industrial-style agriculture such as increased toxicity, 
creation of new weeds, disruption of nature’s system, and the spreading of 
genetically engineered genes to indigenous plants (OI, 2011a). So far, the use of 
pesticides and fertilizers seems to be still very limited. However, this could change 
sometime very soon. Some investors have stated that they plan to use chemicals 
once they start full-scale agricultural development on their farms. Yet, some of the 
farm managers interviewed for this research were not aware of any regulation 
regarding the use of chemicals (Interviews – 6 and 7BSS, 01 and 02 Apr. 2012). The 
draft Environmental Code of Conduct for Agricultural Investors (2010) contains 
several guidelines for pesticide use including lists of approved chemicals, basic 
environmental protection measures, and employee health and safety guideline 
precautions. The federal Pesticides Registration Proclamation (Proclamation No. 
20/1990) outlines safe handling procedures, registration procedures, and human 
safety considerations for pesticides. However, these laws seem to be not well known 
by the investors, including the regional government officials who are expected to 
enforce them. At the regional government level there is a shortage of both human 
expertise and material infrastructure in this particular field of agrichemicals, making 
the enforcement of these laws very improbable.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned environmental impacts, indigenous communities 
are also worried about the impacts of large-scale land acquisitions on their cultural 
identity and values. For instance, for the Anywa people forests are not just trees. 
Forests carry spiritual meanings that are inextricable from the Anywa identity and 
ancestral heritage. This is manifested in the Anywa traditional religion in which 
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certain forests are seen to be sacred. Not only do people refrain from cutting trees in 
these forests, but also walking through these forests with shoes and modern clothes 
is seen as inviting a curse upon one’s own fate. Certain trees are revered by the 
Anywa people because they are believed to be the dwelling places of ancestral 
spirits, and local chiefs are buried under these trees. That is why in Anywa traditional 
religion every forest belongs to a certain village and both the village and the forest 
carry the same name (Ojot, 2002). Therefore, according to local testimonies and my 
previous research work on the Anywa traditional religion, the on-going destruction of 
the Anywa forests is not only causing damage to the Anywa’s subsistence economy 
but also to their psychological and spiritual well-being as a community (Ojot, 2002).  
 
 
9.4. Escalation of Conflicts 
 
Against the background of marginalization of the indigenous communities and 
historical conflict dynamics in the Gambella region discussed in Chapter five, it would 
not be surprising to talk about the contribution of the current LSLAs to the conflicts in 
the region. By the time I was carrying out my field research, I personally witnessed 
and heard about anecdotal incidences of large-scale land investment-related 
conflicts between the indigenous communities and highlanders. Those conflicts 
intensified rapidly within a few months.  
 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter two, in January 2012, two indigenous people 
working as daily labourers for one foreign commercial farm were shot dead by the 
security personnel of the company (military forces) after a minor dispute. On 16 
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February 2012, unknown gunmen killed two policemen and attacked a vehicle 
belonging to Saudi Star Agro Plc, wounding two men. In retaliation, the government 
(military forces) immediately blamed the indigenous Anywa community and killed two 
indigenous Anywa people in Okuna village and arrested others whom they thought 
were relatives of the suspects. On 12 March 2012, 19 civilian people (all 
highlanders) travelling to Gambella were also killed by unknown gunmen. Without 
investigation, the government (military forces) retaliated on civilian indigenous 
Anywa people living in Gambella town and villages around Abobo woreda, killing 13 
people. About 21 people were also arrested, accused of being relatives of the 
suspects. The whereabouts of those people remained unknown by the time I left the 
region at the end of April. No group has taken any responsibility for these two attacks 
and there is no explanation from the government’s side concerning any possible 
motives behind those killings. According to the government mass media, the two 
attacks – i.e. the 16 February and 12 March 2012 – were only barbaric acts of 
terrorists (ETV, 13 Mar. 2012).  
 
On 28 April 2012, another incident happened. This time, unknown gunmen attacked 
one of the camps for Saudi Star Agro Plc workers and killed four Pakistani nationals 
(agricultural experts), six military personnel guarding the camp and three Ethiopian 
workers (WIC, 2012c). Few days later, a political organization called ‘Gambella 
Democratic Movement’ posted a press release online saying:  
 
On April 29, 2012, in Akobo District of Gambella, Meles Zenawi’s soldiers attacked the 
Military wing of Gambellan Democratic Movement (GDM) force. The attack was repulsed by 
the Commander-in-Chief of GDM, Ngeli O. Opiew, and his small contingent troops who were 
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traveling with him. Within 30 minutes of heavy engagement, the attackers ran away leaving 
their dead behind (GDM, http://www.gambelatoday.com/Home.htm, 6 May 2012). 
 
According to the press release, “GDM…was formed by sons and daughters of 
Gambella to fight for the right of indigenous people of Gambella”. The press release 
did not specifically refer to the April 28 attack on the Saudi Star Agro Plc farm. More 
specific to large-scale land investment, the press release stated that:  
 
GDM wants to announce that unless the terms of land grab in Gambella region are reversed 
in favour of Gambella people, there won’t be peace in the region. GDM will fight to stop the 
sale of Anyuaks’ land to foreigners and for the return of displaced Anyuaks to their ancestral 
lands from concentration camps. GDM will not sit by ideally and allow the likes of Karuturi 
Global, Saudi star, and others exploit Gambellan people (GDM, 
http://www.gambelatoday.com/Home.htm, 6 May 2012).  
 
Although this organization (GDM) has not specifically taken any responsibility for the 
previous attacks, it has directly linked the mounting insecurity in the region with 
LSLA. Before the escalation of those conflicts, early in February 2012, Human Rights 
Watch had accused the Ethiopian government of forcing thousands of Gambella’s 
indigenous peoples from their land to make way for large-scale commercial 
investors, leaving the indigenous peoples hungry and impoverished (HRW, 2012). In 
the same report, HRW warned the government of possible outbreaks of violent 
conflicts as a consequence of its ill-devised policies and programmes. The Gambella 
case illustrates how large-scale land acquisitions can fuel existing tensions or create 
violent conflicts. According to my focus group discussions in Abobo woreda, where 
most of the recent violence occurred, participants stated that the recent escalation of 
conflicts is a direct consequence of absolute lack of participation of the indigenous 
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communities in the process of large-scale land investments and their marginalization 
from related benefits (FGDs – 1, 2 and 3, 30 and 31 Mar. and 01 Apr. 2012).  
 
In addition to such conflicts directed towards the government and investors, massive 
influxes of labourers from highland parts of the country are also causing tensions 
with local populations. Many of my FGDs’ participants indicated their concern about 
the influx of labourers from other areas who are increasing pressure on the already 
limited resources. Past experiences show that many labourers coming from highland 
parts of the country normally quit their work as labourers and start other businesses 
such as charcoal production by clearing forests upon which the local communities 
rely for their livelihoods (Interviews – 10 and 11IND, 02 Apr. 2012). Studies 
elsewhere have suggested that environmentally-induced conflicts are most likely to 
occur under conditions of political instability and regional insecurity; rapid population 
growth and abnormal mobility; social inequality such as disparity in wealth among 
ethnic groups; economic deprivation and increased vulnerability; weak governance 
and legal environment; and inability of institutions to manage scarce resources and 
conflict (ACCORD, 2011; Clark, 2007; Kameri-Mbote, 2005). The contemporary 
large-scale land acquisitions in lowland regions seem to be creating those conducive 
conditions for environmentally-induced conflicts by encouraging, amongst others, 
abnormal mobility, political instability and economic deprivation or increased 
vulnerability of the indigenous communities. 
 
At the village level, even without outsiders’ involvement, land investment intensifies 
competition for resources among the indigenous communities themselves. As 
discussed in Chapter five, Gambella had already experienced various conflicts 
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among indigenous communities long before the coming of commercial land 
investors. Those conflicts are directly linked with land and water resources. The 
biggest ethnic groups in the region, the Anywa and the Nuer, have fought violent 
conflicts over these resources for the past decades. The fact that these resources 
are now becoming more limited means that inter/intra ethnic conflicts are very likely 
to increase both in volume and intensity. While conducting my field research, I did 
not witness any inter/intra ethnic conflict among indigenous communities related to 
those land investments but such concerns were repeatedly expressed by many 
indigenous communities whom I interviewed.  
 
Therefore, as discussed in Chapter five, given the fragility of the region with regard 
to resource-based conflicts among the indigenous communities and their historical 
marginalisation and exploitation by the centre, the current trend of LSLA tend to be 




9.5. Impacts on Women 
 
In the Gambella regional state, although access to land in general has not been such 
a burning issue as in the highland parts of Ethiopia, competition over access to good 
land close to water resources has been a very common source of contention in rural 
areas. Women-headed households most often do not acquire these lands close to 
water resources, which results in lower production in their households compared to 
those of their male counterparts. This situation is now compounded by large-scale 
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investors, who are pushing villagers far away from water resources. As this happens, 
women-headed households are given the most marginal lands, which are difficult to 
cultivate. Some women have left the new plots of lands they were given by local 
authorities and migrated to urban areas because of the unproductiveness of those 
lands. One woman from the relocated Thenyi village stated that:  
 
The land I was given was not good for anything. I tried it with maize, sorghum, sesame, and 
ground nuts, it did not produce anything. I moved to this place [Woreda capital] to try another 
life by making local beer. But I don’t have much experience in this; I have been good in 
farming and that is how I have been making living and raising my children. This is all because 
of the foreigners [investors] who have taken our land and moved us to a different place (FGD 
– 2 – P1, 31 Mar. 2012).  
 
In other villages, large-scale land investors have caused the movement of villagers 
not only from water resources but also from forests that locals use for collecting 
firewood, construction materials and other functions. In these new villages, women 
complain about the long distances they have to walk in order to collect firewood and 
fetch water. One woman from the relocated Pochala village stated that:  
 
In the old village, my home was situated between the river and the forest that we use for 
collecting firewood. It is like going from nose-to-mouth. I can do both anytime of the day even 
in the evening. But in this dry place, it takes half a day to fetch water and you need the whole 
day to collect firewood. The government keeps promising that there will be a hand water 
pump but there is nothing going on so far (FGD – 5 – P1, 06 Apr. 2012).   
    
This is even worse for women-headed households who have to provide labour for 
both the farm and household. It is just impossible for them to work on the farm, fetch 
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water, collect firewood and prepare food for their children at the same time. This is 
having a negative impact on girls’ education because in the end they have to assist 
their mothers in one way or another, which limits their time for education or they just 
drop out of school.  According to one NGO worker who is specialized on gender 
issues, large-scale land investments in general and the villagization programme in 
particular are negatively affecting women and girls in specific ways, which I am not 
able to discuss here due to it being beyond the scope of this thesis (Interview – 
6IND, 26 Mar. 2012).   
 
 
9.6. Conclusion  
 
As stated in the introduction section of this chapter, it might be too early at this stage 
to discuss the full-scale negative impacts of large-scale land acquisitions on the 
indigenous communities. However, based on the projects that have already been in 
operation for the last three to four years and on the regulatory framework, this 
chapter has discussed four major areas in which large-scale land acquisitions are 
already negatively impacting on and disrupting the livelihood and well-being of the 
indigenous communities. The villagization programme, in which local communities 
are relocated from fertile areas to marginal lands in order to make way for large-
scale land investors; environmental impacts, in terms of deforestation and likelihood 
of pollution of water resources as a consequence of agrochemicals use; escalation 
of existing tensions and transformation of grievances into open conflicts; and further 
marginalization and destitution of indigenous women are all identified as some of the 
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major areas in which large-scale land acquisitions are already impacting on the lives 
of the indigenous communities in the Gambella region.  
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Chapter Ten: Impacts of Large-Scale Land 
Acquisition on Ethnic Federalism  
 
 
10.1. Introduction  
 
If we are not in control of our land and do not have power on decisions related to our land 
then where can we exercise our right to self-determination and where is ethnic federalism in 




This is how one expert on federalism from the Gambella region responded to me 
when I asked him about the possible impacts of LSLA on the right to self-
determination and regional autonomy. The aim of this chapter is to establish the link 
between the preceding chapters and therefore answer the major research question 
of this thesis namely: Is the contemporary phenomenon of large-scale land 
acquisitions in Ethiopia redefining indigenous communities’ right to land and 
what are the implications of this redefinition for the ethnic federal system? 
 
Based on my field research findings, most of which I have already discussed under 
different themes in the preceding chapters, this chapter and, in fact, this thesis 
argues that large-scale land acquisitions in lowland regions of Ethiopia such as the 
Gambella regional state is altering the ethnic federal arrangement in fundamental 
ways. According to the comprehensive analysis in Chapters seven, eight and nine 
against the four principles of federalism identified in Chapter three, it is argued here 
that LSLA is shifting the power in favour of the federal government by undermining 
the core principles upon which most federal systems around the world are founded. 
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 This interviewee has an MA in federalism.  
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In addition, LSLA is also inadvertently delegitimizing the key ingredients (such as 
empowerment of ethnic identities) that necessitated the introduction of ethnic 
federalism to Ethiopia in the first place.  
 
Before I proceed to elaborate on these arguments, in the first two sections of this 
chapter I will reiterate in practical terms the connections between LSLA, indigenous 
peoples, and federalism discussed in Chapter three. In the first section, the meaning 
of land for the indigenous Anywa people of Gambella will be discussed.  Then, in the 
second section, I will discuss the relationship between territorial identities and the 
Ethiopian ethnic federalism system. Against this background, the last section then 
discusses the direct and indirect impacts of LSLA on ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. In 
other words, what is the impact on the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia of 
leasing out huge amounts of land (in the case of Gambella, 47% of the total land 
mass of the region) and forcefully evicting local communities?  
 
 
10.2. The Meaning of Land among the Anywa Indigenous 
People
61
   
 
While most of the existing literature on the contemporary LSLAs treat land only as a 
productive economic resource (Cotula et al, 2009; GRAIN, 2008; World Bank, 2011), 
for the Anywa indigenous people in Gambella land is something more than a 
productive economic resource. It encompasses culture, homeland, spirituality, 
natural environment, and other natural resources such as forests and rivers/water 
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 Here I only discuss the meaning of land among the indigenous Anywa people of Gambella for the 
sake of the thesis word limit and also since I have previously conducted in-depth research on the 
Anywa traditional religion.     
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resources. In order to understand the significance of land for the Anywa people, we 
need to look at the meaning of Land in the Anywa language. In the Anywa language 
‘land’ is translated as ‘ngom’. The term ‘ngom’ is a very broad and rich concept. It 
can be translated as ‘soil’, ‘territory’, and ‘homeland’.  Each of these terms is 
discussed as follows.  
 
 
10.2.1. Land (ngom) as ‘Soil’ among the Anywa Indigenous People 
 
Land (ngom) as ‘soil’ grows food and other important plants that are crucial for the 
Anywa livelihoods. In the Anywa mythology, ‘soil’ and ‘rain’ are the providers of life 
(Ojot, 2002). Soil also represents the continued attachment of the Anywa people to 
their ancestors, who were buried in the soil and therefore have become part of the 
soil. Hence, not every soil is the same. Soil from one’s own home village carries 
special meaning. The soil in your village is made up of your ancestors and one day 
you will also be part of that soil. That is how the Anywa justify their tradition that if an 
Anywa dies somewhere else, he/she has to be brought back to his/her home village 
because that is where his/her ancestors belong and to where he/she is supposed to 
return. In this respect, the Anywa people say, “we are the soil and the soil is us” 
(FGD – 3 – P2, 01 Apr. 2012).  
 
For the Anywa people, soil also represents ‘truth’ and ‘justice’. In the Anywa 
traditional conflict resolution and justice system, before disputants or alleged 
offenders explain themselves in front of the council of elders, they will be required to 
‘test’ the soil from the village as a symbol of swearing that what they are going to say 
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is true.62 The belief behind this ritual is that if you lie to the council of elders then you 
are not only lying to the existing people but also to the spirits of your immortal 
ancestors, from whom you cannot hide anything. Likewise, village chiefs are also 
required to test the soil before delivering a final judgement as a way of swearing that 
their judgment is fair and not influenced by any personal interest towards the 
disputants or alleged offenders. In a similar manner, in the Anywa political system, 
when chiefs and kings are crowned, they will be required to test the soil from the 
village to confirm that they will put the interest of the village before any other thing.  
All these ceremonies and rituals cannot be performed in any other place but only in 
one’s own home village where one’s ancestors have been buried. The soil that one 
tests should be from the village, not from any other place. In short, this conflict 
resolution and justice system cannot work anywhere else but requires that 
attachment to a certain geographical area (Ojot, 2002).   
 
 
10.2.2. Land (ngom) as ‘Territory’ among the Anywa Indigenous 
People  
 
When it comes to the meaning of land or ‘ngom’ as territory, this encompasses the 
natural resources, such as rivers and the living beings in them, forests and animals, 
woodlands and all the small and big creatures living and surviving in that 
environment. The territory does not only belong to the human beings but also to all 
living beings that inhabit it: they are all part of the territory. In this regard, in the 
Anywa culture people do not have right to destroy the forest, because it does not 
belong to them alone but also to the rest of the living beings dwelling in these 
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 ‘Test’ refers to the ritual among the indigenous Anywa people of touching the soil with their index 
finger and putting the finger on the tip of their tongues.  
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forests. As human beings have their ancestors buried in the soils of these territories 
and have became part of the territories, so do the animals, the trees, even the 
smallest insects. The concept of territory in the Anywa culture, therefore, it is not that 
of the human being controlling and commanding the way in which the territory and its 
environment has to be governed and exploited, but that the human being is only part 
of the bigger community of the living beings taking care of and benefiting from the 
territory and its environment. In this regard, the water resources have to be used in a 
way that does not disrupt the survival of the fish and other living beings in it, and the 
same is true with regard to the forests and other natural resources (FGD – 4, 05 Apr. 
2012; Ojot, 2002).  
 
 
10.2.3. Land (ngom) as ‘Homeland’ among the Anywa Indigenous 
People  
 
Finally, land or ‘ngom’ as a ‘homeland’ carries multiple political meanings related to 
freedom, peace and justice. Under this meaning, land represents the ultimate right to 
freedom, peace and justice in one’s own land. This applies not only to human beings 
but also to animals and other living beings that inhabit a particular territory. 
According to an Anywa woman in Gog-Jangjor village:  
 
There is nothing like homeland. Every person and every animal has its own homeland. In your 
homeland you can travel at night without fear of anything because the land you walk on 
knows you, the animals know you, including the birds they know you, and you know them too 
because you can recognize their singing. In your homeland you are all one family with other 
creatures. The dangerous animals like lions and snakes from your homeland do not harm you 




In fact, in Anywa traditional religion, like Hinduism, the people believe in 
reincarnation – i.e. the belief that after biological death the spirit/soul begins a new 
life in a new body that could be human, animal or spiritual being. However, unlike 
Hinduism, in which someone’s reincarnation depends on the moral quality of the 
previous life’s actions, in Anywa traditional religion someone’s reincarnation is 
already predestined to become their paternal family’s spirit. Whatever lifestyle 
someone pursues, after death their soul will turn into a particular animal, bird or fish 
depending on the spirit of their clan. Some clans’ spirits after death become lions, 
some become particular types of snakes, etc. Those animals are banned as non-
eatable and therefore cannot be killed by the villagers. This is different from village to 
village. For example, crocodiles are non-eatable in some villages because they are 
attached to the spirits of some clans, which is not the case in other villages where 
they are not attached to the spirit of any clan (Ojot, 2002). The point here is that 
enjoyment of freedom under the notion of homeland in the Anywa worldview also 
extends to other living beings that are considered as the natives of a particular 
village. Even for the animals that can be eaten, people are allowed to kill only what is 
proportionate to their consumption needs at a particular time. In short, homeland for 
the Anywa means a territory where one exercises full freedom and responsibility not 
only in one’s relation and interaction with other people but also with other living 
beings.     
 
Hence, based on the above discussion of the different meanings of land in the 
Anywa language and mythology, it is not difficult to imagine what the contemporary 




This is not only ‘soil grabbing’, but is also ‘territory grabbing’ and ‘homeland grabbing’ for 
us…what is being taken from people is not only a productive resources but also the overall 
wellbeing, culture and identity of the people (Interview – 2IND, 22 Mar. 2012).  
 
It is in this respect that this thesis is trying to broadly see land from the perspective of 
the indigenous peoples and then comprehensively determine the impacts of LSLA on 
the indigenous peoples’ rights and state-communities’ power relations.  
 
 
10.3. Federalism and Territory    
 
There has been a historical marriage between political federalism, land and territory. 
Many of the federal states in existence today embraced federalism first and foremost 
to accommodate territorial differences within their own national boundaries 
(Kymlicka, 2001). As discussed in Chapter three of this thesis, federalism as a 
system of governance emerged as a way of providing for self-rule/sovereignty for 
sub-state territorial units and at the same time shared-rule at the national level for 
these units (Elazar, 1987; King, 1982; Watts, 2008). The classical federal state of 
Switzerland evolved from a loose confederation of three independent states that 
wanted only to unite and coordinate their defences against outside enemies and to 
avoid war between the member states (Iff and Topperwien, 2008). Likewise, the 
founding fathers of American federalism had to grapple with the question of striking 
the right balance between territorial self-rule of the member states and shared-rule at 




Hence, although some federal states in existence today adopted federalism for 
administrative, service delivery and other purposes, the main reason behind the 
introduction of federalism in many states was to accommodate territorial differences 
(Kymlicka, 2001).  
 
For instance, in Nigeria, federalism was introduced during the first Nigerian 
Democratic Republic (1960-1966) to preserve territorial autonomy for the country’s 
three major ethnic groups, namely, the Muslim Hausa-Fulani of the ‘Northern 
Region’, the Christian Igbo in the southeast ‘Eastern Region’ and the religiously 
mixed Yoruba in the southwest ‘Western Region’ (Suberu, 2006).  The same is also 
true of India’s first linguistic federalism in which the country was divided into four 
kinds of states, as articulated in the 1950’s constitution (Bhargava, 2006).  Hence, 
the existence of a definable territory upon which certain groups’ rights to self-
determination and autonomy could be recognized has become one of the major 
characteristics of political federalism.  
 
In the case of Ethiopia, federalism was introduced to specifically accommodate 
territorially-defined ethnic diversities. This is clearly pronounced in the constitution’s 
Article 46:2, which states that federal sub-units “shall be delimited on the basis of the 
settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the peoples concerned.” 
Accordingly, out of the nine federal sub-units, six of them carry the same name for 
both the regional state and the dominant regional ethnic group.63 Hence, Ethiopian 
federalism is constructed on the basis of congruence between ethnic identity and 
specified territorial boundaries. Despite some challenges of locating each ethnic 
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 These regions are: Afar, Amhara, Harar, Tigray and Somali regional states.  
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group within neatly defined territories, Ethiopian federalism has employed ethnicity 
as its fundamental organizing principles. That is why it is now commonly referred to 
as ‘Ethnic Federalism’.  Therefore, although the relationship between federalism and 
territory is a well-known tradition among the well-established federations, the 
Ethiopian federalism’s unique emphasis on ethnic self-determination makes my 
argument here even stronger.   
 
 
10.4. Direct Impacts of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions 
(LSLA) on Ethnic Federalism   
 
By ‘direct impacts’, I am referring to official policies or practices that contradict or 
challenge some of the basic principles of federalism in general and the Ethiopian 
federal system in particular.  Although there could be many other such impacts, 
based on the theoretical discussions on federalism in Chapter three, this thesis 




10.4.1. Formalization and/or Institutionalization of Recentralization  
 
One of the impacts of the contemporary large-scale land acquisition on the federal 
system in Ethiopia is what I see as the formalization and/or institutionalization of re-
centralization of powers that are constitutionally assigned to regional governments 
by the federal government. The recentralization of political powers by the federal 
government has already been extensively discussed in Chapter six of this thesis. 
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Although recentralization attempts by the federal government are not a new 
development in the actual practice of federalism in Ethiopia, what makes the current 
recentralization methods related to LSLAs special is their formalization or 
institutionalization.  
 
Until recently, most of the recentralization methods employed by the federal 
government have been informal and covertly or openly implemented alongside the 
formal federalist structures. Despite their prevalence, these informal recentralization 
methods have not been institutionalized. In cases where they are institutionalized, 
like in the case of the Ministry of Federal Affairs, that is seen as an instrument of 
control by minority regions (Assefa, 2006; 154);  its objectives do not contradict or 
impinge on the constitutional division of powers. For instance, as quoted earlier in 
Chapter six, the powers and duties of the Ministry of Federal Affairs, according to 
Proclamation 256/2001, are to: 
  
1. In cooperation with regions, ensure that public peace and order is maintained. 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 48 and 62:6 of the federal constitution, facilitate 
the resolution of misunderstandings arising between regions.  
3. Give assistance to the regions, with particular emphasis on the less developed ones.  
4. Supervise and coordinate the executive organs (mainly the Federal Police Commission, the 
Federal Prison Administration, the National Urban Planning Institute and Addis Ababa and 
Dire Dawa city administrations).  
 
Despite any other limitations, looking at this list of functions, we do not see anything 
contradictory to the Ethiopian federal constitution nor to any other federal principle. 
In fact, the functions seem to have been designed in order to facilitate federalism 
and support regional states in the exercise and enjoyment of their right to self-
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determination. The major problem and criticisms against this ministry lie in its 
practices not really in its official objectives or claimed responsibilities (Aalen, 2002; 
Asefa, 2006; Young, 1999). Other institutions that the federal government has so far 
used to recentralize regional states’ powers have also been created under 
federalism-friendly mandates except that, in practice, they run completely different 
businesses.  
 
However, with the coming of large-scale foreign land investors, the federal 
government seems to have embarked on formalization and institutionalization of its 
recentralization efforts. In an attempt to attract more large-scale foreign investors 
and take control of the processes of large-scale land investments, the federal 
government had put in place new laws and regulations and created new institutions 
that seem contradictory to the ethnic federal arrangement that was introduced in 
1994. For the sake of brevity and in order to allow detailed analysis, here I discuss 
only the ‘Investment Incentives and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic 
Investors Council of Ministers Regulations No. 84/2003’ and the ‘Agricultural 
Investment Support Directorate (AISD)’.    
 
 
A. Investment Incentives and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic 
Investors Council of Ministers Regulations No. 84/2003 
 
According to this regulation, as discussed earlier in Chapter seven,  investors, 
whether foreign or  domestic, who export more than 50% of their products or supply 
at least 75% of their product to an exporter as a productive input are eligible for 
income tax exemption for five years or more (Article 4:1a, b). Likewise, according to 
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this regulation, all investors are allowed to import, free of custom duty, all 
construction materials, capital goods and spare parts for the establishment or 
upgrading of their enterprises (Article 8:1). In addition to these incentives, the land 
rental rates in Ethiopia are made extremely cheap, starting from $1.3 per hectare per 
year – the lowest rate in the country in the Gambella regional state – to $9 per 
hectare per year – the highest rate in the country in the Oromia regional state (See 
Table 4). These rates are extremely low not only compared to the global land value 
but also compared to other African states (World Bank, 2011).  
 
These financial incentives per se are not necessarily the problem for the federal 
arrangement. The question is about the legality of the regulation itself, whether the 
federal government has a right to enact it under the federal power-sharing 
arrangement or if this should have been left up to the legislative bodies of the 
respective regional states. On this question, according to my analysis of the literal 
text of the constitution and through comparison with other federal systems, it seems 
that it should have been the responsibility of the legislative bodies of respective 
regional states to decide about investment incentives. Since the power of land 
administration and collection of land rental fees belong to the regional governments 
as a matter of constitutional right not a delegated role, then it should have been also 
the regional governments who decide the tax rates and incentives related to taxation 
in this particular area. It is, in fact, paradoxical here that, while the regional 
governments are empowered to collect land rental taxes, the federal government 
decides when and how much investors should pay. In other federal countries like 
Switzerland, it is the responsibility of the Cantons to decide their tax rates, except for 
federal taxes.  In some Cantons, tax rates are decided by the Canton’s parliament, 
 297 
 
while in the majority of them it is decided by referendum – i.e. tax rates must be 
approved in a formal popular vote (Iff and Töpperwien, 2008).  
 
The Swiss experience raises another question for the legality of the body that issued 
the Ethiopian ‘Investment Incentives Regulation No. 84/2003’ – the ‘Council of 
Ministers’, which is a federal executive body not a legislative body. Therefore, the 
problem here is not only that the ‘Investment Incentives Regulation No. 84/2003’ is 
issued at the federal level when it should have been apparently the responsibility of 
the regional states, but also that it was issued by a body that does not have 
legislative powers. In this respect, this regulation seems to have defied two important 
federal principles, namely the constitutional division of powers between the federal 
and federal sub-units on one hand, and, on the other hand, the division of powers 
between the three organs of any federal democratic government – i.e. the legislative, 
the executive and the judiciary.   
 
 
B. Agricultural Investment Support Directorate (AISD) 
 
Most importantly, in 2009 the federal government created a central body known as 
the Agricultural Investment Support Directorate (AISD) at the federal level under the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MOARD) to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ 
for large-scale investors. Despite whatever good intentions there might be behind 
this initiative, its repercussions on the right to self-determination of regional states 
and, indeed, on the federal project at large are immense. According to the MOARD, 




1. To identify and delineate potential agricultural investment areas.  
2. Transfer agriculture investment lands to investors by evaluating their capacity based on the 
relevant agricultural investors. 
3. Creating conducive and attractive environment for investor to invest on agricultural sector. 
4. Providing the necessary technical and administrative support to investors (MOARD-General 
Brochure, 2009, p.2). 
 
Likewise, according to the same document, the major activities of the AISD are to: 
 
1. Formulate policies, strategies, rules and regulation that can accelerate the investment 
process and make them more productive. 
2. Identify potential agricultural investment land. 
3. Transfer investment land for the investors. 
4. Prepare general profile of investors. 
5. Introduce new technology to investors and provide technical back up to enhance their 
capacity.  
6. Formation of development clusters in the growth centres. 
7. Create favourable conditions for investors to promote out growers scheme or contract farming 
system.  
8. Link small scale/house hold producers with the agro processing industries. 
9. Collect, organize, and provide necessary information and advisory services to investors. 
10.  Creating conducive environment/conditions to share technologies and practices among 
investors and the surrounding farmers (MOARD-General Brochure, 2009, p.2).  
 
Looking at the mission statement and stated activities of this Directorate, one is left 
wondering about the role of respective regional states in the process of large-scale 
land investments. Both in the mission statement and activities of AISD, no reference 
is made to the constitutional division of powers and there is no mention of ‘regional 
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states’ at all.  For instance, although the Ministry of Federal Affairs is criticized by 
many for controlling minority regional states, its founding document clearly states 
that it will work in cooperation with regional states and without any prejudice to the 
relevant constitutional provisions. However, when it comes to the AISD, it neither 
recognizes the constitutional provisions that give land administration to regional 
states, nor does it identify the role of regional states in the implementation of some of 
its functions that obviously require cooperation of the respective regional states. For 
instance, identification of potential land for agricultural investment and the transfer of 
land to investors would obviously require the cooperation of the respective regional 
states in which those lands are located. Yet, the AISD’s founding document failed to 
recognize this fundamental constitutional right of regional states. To make things 
worse, the Directorate is even empowered to “formulate policies, strategies, rules 
and regulation that can accelerate the investment process and make them more 
productive” (MOARD-General Brochure, 2009, p.2). In my perspective, this makes 
AISD the first formal federal institution that has been created to recentralize 
constitutional powers that belong to regional states. Hence, with LSLA, we are 
witnessing a new era in the Ethiopian ethnic federal system – an era of formalization 
and/or institutionalization of recentralization of powers of the regional states by the 
federal government.  
 
After the creation of AISD, all the land lease agreements signed between the 
regional states and investors were nullified and new ones were negotiated solely 
between the federal government and respective large-scale investors (MOARD, 
2012). Some regional states such as Oromia and Amhara resisted the move on the 
ground that it violates their constitutional right to land administration (Lavers, 2012). 
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For instance, one respondent working for Amhara Investment Promotion Agency is 
quoted by Lavers as follows:  
 
It is somewhat self-contradictory. Regions are given full responsibility [for land administration] 
but the federal government is given responsibility for promoting investment for the whole 
country. The idea comes from the good intention to promote development but it makes 
regional departments unhappy. It does not make for good relations (Lavers, 2012, p.118) 
 
Another respondent from the Oromia Investment Commission is also quoted by 
Lavers as follows:  
 
The constitution does not allow this [centralised allocation of investment land] to happen. 
According to the constitution, land is administered by the regions, so to make the changes 
they [the federal government] need to change the constitution (Lavers, 2012, p.118). 
 
As discussed earlier in Chapter seven, in the case of the Gambella regional state, 
the delegation of this constitutional right was not transparent and was apparently 
concluded only between the regional governor and the federal government. Neither 
the regional council (the regional legislative body) nor the regional cabinet (the 
highest regional executive body) were consulted about the transfer of this 
constitutional right.  
 
In fact, even if the legislative bodies of these regions (Gambella and Benishangul-
Gumuz) had formally delegated their powers to the federal government, there would 
have been another constitutional problem. According to the federal constitution, 
although the federal government can delegate some of its powers downward to the 
regional states (Article 50:9), there is no provision in the constitution for upward 
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delegation of powers from regional states to the federal government. Hence, in 
theory, such a delegation of powers might have required, in the first place, the 
amendment of the federal constitution to provide for an upward delegation of powers. 
Because this is what makes federalism different from other power-sharing 
mechanisms, that under federal systems both levels of governments derive their 
powers from the constitution and those powers cannot be altered by any one of them 
without going through the process of constitutional amendment (Elazar, 1987).  
 
 
10.4.2. Increase of Unconstitutionalism and Loss of Legitimacy  
 
Some of the direct consequences of the above-discussed recentralization efforts by 
the federal government are the increase of unconstitutionalism and loss of legitimacy 
of the ethnic federal arrangement itself. As discussed earlier in Chapter three of this 
thesis, constitutionalism and legitimacy are among some of the basic features for 
realization of federalism. Given the importance of the constitution for the functioning 
of any federal system and for managing intergovernmental relations between various 
levels of governments, Watts argued that: 
 
Recognition of the supremacy of the constitution over all orders of government and a political 
culture emphasizing the fundamental importance of respect for constitutionality are therefore 
prerequisites for the effective operation of a federation (Watts, 2008: 157).  
 
In simple terms, constitutionalism is the idea that government should be limited in its 
powers and that its authority depends on its observation of these limitations (Belz, 
1998; Don, 1989). According to Musa (2008), if the culture of constitutionalism is 
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lacking in a federation then it would likely deteriorate into a situation in which one 
level of government is subordinate to the other, thereby undermining other key 
characteristics of federalism.  In Chapter seven, I have discussed how the process of 
LSLA has subordinated and restricted the regional government of Gambella and its 
lower structures to become only the implementing bodies of the decisions of the 
federal government. Despite efforts by some villagers (such as the Gumare and 
Kabu villages mentioned earlier in the introductory chapter) to assert their 
constitutional rights to land, their demands were suppressed and their leaders were 
accused of being anti-development and collaborators of anti-peace forces. Hence, 
the recentralization efforts by the federal government are not only challenging the 
principle of division of powers but are also threatening other important conditions for 
effective operation of a federation such as constitutionalism and legitimacy.  
 
Indeed, the current wave of seemingly unconstitutional legislations and institutions 
related to LSLA are not completely new in the post-1991 Ethiopian political 
landscape.  I have already discussed in Chapter six some federal institutions, 
policies and practices that seem to be unconstitutional, based on my literal reading 
of the text of the constitution. In fact, others including Assefa, a renowned Ethiopian 
constitutional lawyer, have challenged the constitutionality of some institutions, 
policies and practices of the regime (Aalen, 2002; Assefa, 2006; Pausewang et al., 
2002).  For instance, Assefa (2006) has challenged the constitutionality of an 
education policy issued by the federal government that covers areas about 
‘elementary education’ which, according to the constitution, fall under the 
competencies of the regional states. In a similar manner, some legal experts and 
international human rights lawyers and organizations have challenged the 
 303 
 
constitutionality of the recent federal legislations on ‘Mass Media and Freedom of 
Information Proclamation’, ‘Anti-terrorism Proclamation’ and ‘Charities and Societies 
Proclamation’ (Ross, 2010; UN News Service, 2012; Amnesty International, 2012).  
 
Against this background, the current wave of unconstitutionalism related to LSLAs 
can be seen as an extension of the already prevailing culture of unconstitutionalism 
in other areas of Ethiopian politics. However, what makes the current wave of 
unconstitutionalism related to LSLAs different from the previous ones is the 
centrality/importance of land – a political ‘hot potato’ to the predominantly rural 
Ethiopian populations. While a ban on the right to demonstration or restriction of 
freedom of speech might not mean much to the rural Ethiopian populations who 
have lived under different oppressive regimes, mass dispossession of farmers from 
their lands is a critical issue for a country like Ethiopia where over 85% of the 
population depend on agriculture. Hence, although there have been widespread 
allegations of unconstitutional policies and practices, the extension of those policies 
and practices to critical natural resources like land and water makes the nature of the 
current unconstitutionalism different from the previous ones.   
 
The problem of unconstitutionalism in Ethiopia is complicated and compounded by 
the lack of an independent constitutional court that can interpret the constitution 
when constitutional disputes arise between different levels of the government. Even 
under circumstances in which the division of powers between various levels of 
government is clearly delineated, disputes over the jurisdiction of powers are always 
bound to occur (Watts, 2008). Hence, it is vital under federal systems that neither 
level of the government is able to manipulate the constitution to its own advantage. 
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As discussed earlier in Chapter three, in other federal systems such as Germany this 
task of constitutional interpretation is assigned to an independent Constitutional 
Court. In India and the United States, this function is performed by regular courts in 
general and Supreme Courts in particular (Balakrishnan, 2010; Rogowski and 
Gawron, 2002). In other cases such as Switzerland, the role of constitutional 
interpretation is divided between the federal tribunal and the people. The federal 
tribunal is empowered to decide the constitutionality of the Cantons’ laws, while the 
people decide the constitutionality of the federal law through referendum (Iff and 
Töpperwien, 2008).   
 
Under the Ethiopian federal system (Article 62), as discussed earlier in Chapter four, 
this role is given to the second chamber – i.e. the House of the Federation (HOF). 
Any constitutional disputes arising in the court system are given to the Council of 
Constitutional Enquiry (CCE), a legal-political organ under the HOF. According to 
Article 82 of the federal constitution, the CCE is composed of both political and legal 
figures, namely, the President and the vice President of the Supreme Court, three 
members of the HOF, and six legal experts selected by the House of the Peoples’ 
Representatives (HPR). After deliberation on any constitutional dispute brought to its 
attention, this body (i.e. CCE) can then submit its recommendations to the HOF for a 
final decision.  
 
The composition of both the CCE and HOF puts the task of constitutional 
interpretation in the hands of the ruling political party. At the moment, members of 
the HOF are the executives of the regional states who are also members of the 
ruling party. The HPR (first chamber) is 99.6% controlled by the ruling party. 
 305 
 
Although the constitution claims the independence of the judiciary, the President and 
vice President of the Supreme Court and the judges in the courts system are 
appointed by the HPR on the proposal of the Prime Minister. Therefore, the ruling 
party controls all the branches of the government – i.e. the executive, the legislative 
(HPR), and the judiciary, including the task of judicial review. This, in general, shows 
that there is already a critical gap in the Ethiopian federal system which makes the 
realization of constitutionalism very problematic if not impossible.  
 
Against this background, it is not surprising, therefore, that there is an increase of 
seemingly unconstitutional institutions, policies and practices as direct 
consequences of the contemporary LSLAs. The problem with those seemingly 
unconstitutional institutions (such as AISD) and legislations (like Investment 
Incentives Regulation) for the federal project is that they will gradually erode the 
legitimacy of the federal project in general and put into question the commitment of 
the central elites to real devolution of power as promised in the constitution. While 
this has already been the case in urban areas and among the urban elites, the rural 
populations have been so far relatively less engaged in the opposition of the ruling 
regime. However, with the extension of those controversial institutions, policies and 
practices to areas that are critical to the rural population, such as the question of 
‘land administration’, ethnic federalism is poised to face another wave of serious 
legitimacy questions again, this time not only from the urban populations, but also 
from the rural populations who are grappling with mass displacement and loss of 




10.4.3. Non-Representation and Non-Participation   
 
Another way in which LSLA is affecting the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia is 
by challenging the federal principle of representation and participation. However, 
before I proceed to discuss how large-scale land investment is challenging these 
federal principles, let me briefly reiterate what I have already discussed in Chapters 
three and four about this principle and how it is addressed under the Ethiopian 
federal system. As discussed in Chapter three, representation and participation are 
some of the basic characteristics of federalism in general. 
  
Federation [is] to be most significantly distinguished from other forms of sovereign state by 
the fact that its structure is grounded in the representation of regional governments within the 
national or central legislature on an entrenched basis (King cited in Burgess and Gagnon, 
1993, p.94).  
 
This representation in federal systems is normally ensured through two chambers 
(bicameral system). The first chamber or lower house by and large represents the 
interests of a country as a whole and it serves as power base for the federal 
government (Van der Beken, 2007). The members of this house are normally elected 
by popular vote in proportion of the population size of each federal sub-unit. The 
second chamber or upper house, on the other hand, represents the interests of the 
federal sub-units as equal bodies (Sharman, 1987). That is why in almost all federal 
states – except for Ethiopia – all the federal sub-units are represented equally in this 




The Ethiopian second house, i.e. HOF, is organized differently from other federal 
systems in three fundamental ways. Firstly, unlike other federal systems in which 
members of the second chambers are representatives of the federal sub-units, in 
Ethiopia members of this house are representatives of ethnic groups (Article 61:1).  
Secondly, unlike in other federal systems in which all the federal sub-units are 
equally represented in this house regardless of their population sizes, in Ethiopia 
members of this house are selected/elected based on the population size of the 
respective ethnic groups (Article 61:2). Thirdly, and most importantly, while in other 
federal states this house plays a policy-making role by checking the powers of the 
first chamber against the interests of federal sub-units, in Ethiopia this house is 
barred from policy making. Rather, it plays a completely different role of adjudicating 
disputes between federal sub-units and judicial review, as discussed in the 
preceding section (Article 84). Therefore, Ethiopia does not really qualify to be called 
a bicameral (a legislative body having two branches or chambers) federal state 
because the second chamber is excluded from policy making. It is rather better 
described as a unicameral state since it has only a single legislative chamber.  
 
This unicameral arrangement has serious theoretical implications for the interests of 
minority regional states. In the first place, the unicameral arrangement, in theory, 
would mean that representatives of the minority regional states or ethnic groups 
have no chance of making their voices heard on issues critical to their 
constituencies. Even if the second chamber had been empowered to play a policy-
checking role, since representation in this chamber is also based on population size, 
it would have made no difference for minorities since they would have been still 
minorities in both houses. Therefore, when it comes to the representative decision-
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making process, there is already a critical theoretical gap in the Ethiopian federal 
system which keeps the minorities’ regional states in a disadvantaged position vis-à-
vis the dominant/majority regional states.    
 
This is demonstrated and exacerbated by the current processes of large-scale land 
acquisitions in minority regions. For instance, when the report about directing large-
scale investors to lowland (minority) regional states was discussed in the parliament, 
some of the representatives of minority regional states fiercely resisted the move and 
requested the parliament to consult the concerned regional states (Interviews – 1 
and 2GOV, 15 Mar. 2012). However, due to their negligible number, they were 
unable to influence the course of the deliberation despite the importance of the issue 
to their constituencies. Some of the minorities’ MPs who went public in criticizing the 
process of large-scale land investments in their constituencies were accused of 
being anti-development, stripped of their immunity and taken to prison. The 
representative of Benishangual-Gumuz regional state, for example, after openly 
criticizing the construction of the ‘Millennium dam’ and the villagization programme 
among his constituencies, was stripped of his immunity, accused of a corruption 
case from more than 10 years earlier and then taken to prison (Eden, 2011).  
 
To make things worse, when the task force to oversee the villagization programme in 
the minority regional states was formed at the federal level, none of the 
representatives of minority regional states were included in it. The members of the 
task force were all selected from other regions that were not affected by the 
villagization programme. Likewise, when the AISD was created, which mainly 
distributes land in minority regions to large-scale investors, none of the members of 
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minority regional states were recruited to it (Interviews – 1 and 2GOV, 15 Mar. 
2012). Therefore, the current phenomenon of LSLAs seems to be undermining the 
fundamental federal principle of effective representation of regional interests at the 
federal level.   
 
 
10.4.4. Further Marginalization of Minorities and Indigenous 
Communities   
 
The relationship between federalism and protection of minorities and indigenous 
communities has already been discussed in Chapter three of this thesis. Although 
not all federations embraced federalism to accommodate ethnic minorities, many 
federations in existence today adopted federalism as a response to national, ethnic, 
religious and linguistic diversities within their territorial boundaries (e.g. Canada, 
India, Nigeria and Switzerland).  
 
Under federal systems, protection of minorities can take place at both levels of 
government – i.e. at the federal and regional state levels. In places where minorities 
are territorially concentrated in one region, the boundaries of the federal sub-units 
can be drawn in such a way that minorities form a majority in one or more of the 
federal sub-units. Under this arrangement, federalism can provide extensive self-
government rights for a minority by constitutionally guaranteeing its ability to make 
decisions in certain policy areas without being outvoted by the larger society 
(Kymlicka, 2001). In this case, minorities can protect and promote their identities 
within their regional states where they enjoy sovereignty over some constitutionally-




On the other hand, simple autonomy (right to self-determination) alone may not be 
sufficient to respect and protect a minority’s interests at state/regional level. This is 
likely to be the case if the federal government, which reserves for itself jurisdiction 
over certain policy areas, is fully controlled by majority groups. Under federal 
systems, this could be mitigated by special representation arrangements for 
minorities at the federal government level so that their voice is heard in central 
decision-making with regard to issues/decisions that might affect their interests at 
regional/state level (Thomas-Woolley and Keller, 1994). This could be via allocating 
some seats in the parliament for minorities’ representatives or giving minorities’ MPs 
veto power over issues related to their constituencies (McDougal, 2009).  
 
The Ethiopian federal system contains features similar to the above-mentioned 
general mechanisms of minorities’ protection under federal states. As discussed in 
Chapter five, during the Derg regime the current Gambella regional state used to be 
a small district under the Illebabur province. Its constitutional designation as an 
autonomous regional state under this regime, at least in theory, was a big step 
towards the empowerment of the indigenous communities of the region.  
 
With regard to the representation of minorities at the federal level, according to 
Article 54 of the federal constitution, the Ethiopian federal system reserves 20 seats 
for representatives of minorities who might not fulfil the population requirement for 
representation in the HPR. Although the constitution does not specify who 
constitutes a minority or the procedures of electing those minorities to these seats, 
the fact that there is such a provision again shows some effort under the federal 
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arrangement to empower minorities through special representation in the federal 
parliament. But this is only a symbolic representation since it is not accompanied by 
adequate provisions that give special powers to these minorities over issues 
important to their constituencies. In other words, the special representation of these 
minorities in the federal parliament does not mean much in terms of decision/policy-
making.  
 
It has also been already discussed in Chapter six of this thesis how the federal 
government controls the lowland minority regions through informal channels and 
covert institutions. As John Young and Assefa Fiseha have respectively argued:  
 
A ‘two-tier system’ of federalism is emerging in Ethiopia. Although not mentioned in the 
Constitution, a distinction has to be made between the regional states of Tigray, Amhara, 
Oromia, SNNPRS and Harari, with their relatively greater level of political and economic 
development, and other four states (Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar and Somali), which 
are otherwise known as ‘emerging’ or ‘less developed states’ (Young, 1999, p.344).  
 
While the former states, at least until recently, have jealously guarded their autonomy and 
authority and have relatively greater administrative capacity, the latter are not yet capable of 
assuming full responsibility for local government [due to greater level of interference by the 
federal government in their local affairs] (Assefa, 2006, p.153).   
 
Therefore, to come back to LSLA and minorities, marginalization of minorities and 
minority regional states within the Ethiopian federal system then – both in theory and 
in practice – is not something that is brought by the current wave of large-scale land 
investments. LSLA is only reinforcing a trend that is already in motion. Here, ‘Political 
Ecology’ is a useful interpretative framework to situate the interaction between 
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LSLAs, indigenous communities’ right to land and the ethnic federal system in 
Ethiopia. Because, as discussed in Chapter two, according to the three assumptions 
of ‘Political Ecology’ developed by Bryant and Bailey (1997):  
 
 Firstly, benefits and costs associated with changes in the environment/land 
related policies are not equally distributed. Those changes do not affect 
societies in a homogenous way. The pre-existing political, social and 
economic differences account for unequal distribution of benefits and costs. 
 Secondly, this uneven distribution of costs and benefits inevitably reduces or 
reinforces existing social and economic disparities.  
 Thirdly, this unequal distribution of benefits and costs, and the reducing or 
reinforcing of pre-existing inequalities carries political ramifications, since 
there will be shifts in power relationships too.  
 
These assumptions are of great relevance to the dynamics between LSLAs and 
indigenous communities in the Gambella regional state of Ethiopia. Firstly, the costs 
and benefits associated with LSLAs in the Gambella regional state are not equally 
distributed, as already discussed in Chapters eight and nine respectively. Secondly, 
this unequal distribution of costs and benefits is only reinforcing the existing social 
and economic inequalities between the indigenous communities and highlanders in 
the Gambella regional state. Thirdly, the reinforcement of existing social and 
economic inequalities also alters the power relationship not only between the 
indigenous communities and highlanders but also between the Gambella regional 




Some of the major ways in which LSLA is shifting or contributing to the shift of power 
between the regional state of Gambella and the federal government have already 
been discussed under the preceding sections about ‘Formalization and/or 
institutionalization of recentralization’, ‘Increase of unconstitutionalism and loss of 
legitimacy’ and ‘Non-representation and non-participation in the processes of 
LSLAs’. All these shifts in power are mainly taking place at and were discussed 
under the framework of federal vs. regional state governments.  
 
However, LSLA is also extending the federal government’s controlling hand directly 
to the peripheral peasant. In other words, LSLA is also making the peasant 
completely dependent on the government. Given the historical fact that the rural land 
has been used by successive Ethiopian governments as a means of controlling the 
rural population, it would not be surprising if the current LSLA is being directed to 
peripheral regions partly to bring the rural population under the direct control of the 
centre. As Dessalegn argued: 
 
The commercialization of land has served as a political advantage to the state since it 
enhances its power vis-à-vis rural communities, and leads to the greater concentration of 
authority in the hands of the public agents and local administrations (Dessalegn, 2011, p.5).  
 
This seems to be what LSLA is doing in the Gambella regional state by reducing the 
land resource base and concentrating it in the hands of the federal government so 
that the farmer becomes dependent on the government’s decisions for his/her very 




The experience of Mr. Mango, a farmer in the Gambella regional state, illustrates 
very well the extent to which the government is now using the rural land to control 
the rural population. Mr. Mango used to be a civil servant in the Gambella regional 
state under the Ministry of Water Development, working as head of finance and 
administration. Because he joined an opposition political party he was demoted from 
his position. When foreign investors started to come to Gambella region, taking huge 
tracts of lands and starting to displace local populations, Mr. Mango became an open 
leading critic of the large-scale land investment and displacement of the local 
population. As a consequence, he was fired from his job for a different reason and 
he did not dare look for another job with the government. Instead, he went to his 
home village and started his life as a farmer and continued his open criticism of the 
government’s policies related to LSLAs. He thought that being a farmer would give 
him independence from the government and freedom to speak his mind. However, 
the regional government soon relocated the whole village he was staying in and 
instructed the chairman of the village not to allocate any land in the new settlement 
area to Mr. Mango. Then, after he was left with no livelihood, he fled to a refugee 
camp in South Sudan (Mango, interview with ARS, 26 Feb. 2012).  
 
There said to be many similar cases in which critics of LSLAs were fired from their 
government jobs and refused any piece of land, even in their home villages. As one 
former teacher who was fired from his job because he joined an opposition group 
and who is now making his life as a farmer said:  
 
Being a farmer has been a safe haven for opposition groups in Gambella because you don’t 
need anything from the government. But now the government also wants to control farming so 
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that there will be no safe place for opposition members in the region. You are either with the 
government/ruling party or you leave the country (FGD – 5 – P3, 06 Apr. 2012).   
 
This seems to be a key political impact of LSLAs in the Gambella regional state, by 
further marginalizing minorities and indigenous communities not only from the 
government-related jobs and opportunities, but also from natural resources that 
those communities have inhabited and used for centuries.  
 
 
10.5. Indirect Impacts of Large-Scale Land Acquisition on 
the Ethnic Federal System in Ethiopia    
 
In addition to the above-listed direct impacts of LSLAs on the ethnic federal system 
in Ethiopia, there are also other impacts that can indirectly challenge the ethnic 
federal arrangement in the country. By indirect impacts, I am referring to the kinds of 
impacts that might not be necessarily challenging any constitutional provision but 
can have significant implications for the exercise of right to self-determination.   
 
 
10.5.1. Internal Migration  
 
Ethiopia has a long history of both internal and international migration. Internally, 
there have been two major forms of migration namely ‘planned migration’ and 
‘autonomous migration’. While the former refers to migrations that were planned and 
carried out by the government, the latter refers to individual migration from one place 
to another without any government intervention (Warner et al., 2008). ‘Planned 
migration’ or villagization has already been extensively discussed in Chapter nine of 
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this thesis, and so this section focuses on ‘autonomous migration’.  
 
Historically, the major trend of ‘autonomous migration’ in Ethiopia has been the 
movement of the rural young to the urban areas in search of job opportunities and a 
better life. This could be temporary or permanent. In most cases, this type of 
migration has been taking place within each regional state and has also somehow 
respected ethnic boundaries (Fransen and Kuschminder, 2009). However, another 
important migration that is underway in Ethiopia is the movement of individuals from 
drought affected or overpopulated highland parts of the country to lowlands parts of 
the country that are agriculturally productive and sparsely populated. This type of 
migration is taking place across regional states and across ethnic and cultural 
boundaries. It is taking place autonomously, meaning without active government 
support, but is only in one direction – i.e. from highland regions of Ethiopia or 
majority regions to lowland regions or minority regions (Dereje, 2011).  
 
Nonetheless, there are different types of migrants from highland to lowland Ethiopia. 
In Gambella, for example, after it became a regional state in the mid-1990s, there 
were many new government jobs and most of the highlanders moved into the region 
for these job opportunities. Another wave of migrants is the daily labourers who 
moved into the region. In fact, some domestic investors have been bringing in 
thousands of daily labourers from highland parts of the country every year to work on 
their cotton farms.  Most of those daily labourers do not go back to their regions of 
origin, instead they permanently settle in the Gambella region (Interviews – 10 and 
11IND, 02 Apr. 2012). With the current wave of LSLAs, the number of those migrants 
has increased tremendously and is expected to increase further as more land is 
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leased to large-scale investors and as the current investors put into use their entire 
landholdings. According to the latest national census results, highlanders have 
become the second largest group in the Gambella region (CSA, 2007).  
 
This internal migration between regional states has a significant implication for any 
federal system that is meant to empower regional minorities or regional identities. 
The intention of drawing internal boundaries within multinational federal states is to 
make minority groups a regional majority so that they can vote on issues of their 
regional interests without being out-voted by the national majority groups (Kymlicka, 
2001). But if members of those national majorities infiltrate minority regions and 
make members of minorities a minority within their regional state, then there is no 
meaning in the establishment of a regional state for those minorities.  
 
Internal migration has indeed been used by many governments around the world to 
disempower regional minorities in order to build one culture, one language and, 
ultimately, one nation (Connor, 1972). National governments have often encouraged 
people from one part of the country – normally from the dominant society – to move 
into the historical territory of minorities or indigenous communities. Such policies can 
sometimes take place in the form of an organized settlement programme, as 
happened in Ethiopia during the Derg regime, or they can take place autonomously 
without direct government support. Kymlicka (2001) argued that such resettlement 
policies, whether planned or autonomous, are sometimes used as a weapon against 
indigenous communities, both to break access to their territory’s natural resources 
and to disempower them politically by turning them into a minority within their own 




For instance, according to Kymlicka (2001), in the United States, it would have been 
quite possible in the nineteenth century to create states dominated by minority 
groups such as the Puerto Ricans, native Hawaiians or the Navaho. At the time 
these communities were integrated into the United States, they formed regional 
majorities in their respective homelands. Nonetheless, a deliberate decision was 
made not to use federalism to accommodate the self-government rights of those 
indigenous communities. Instead, it was decided that no territory would be accepted 
as a state unless these indigenous communities were outnumbered within that 
territory. According to Kymlicka:  
 
In some cases, this was achieved by drawing boundaries so that Indian tribes or Hispanic 
groups were outnumbered (Florida). In other cases, it was achieved by delaying statehood until 
Anglophone settlers swamped the older inhabitants (e.g. Hawaii; the South-West) (Kymlicka, 
2001, p.98).  
 
In the Ethiopian case, the 1980s’ resettlement programme in which around 60,000 
settlers were brought to the Gambella region from the Northern part of the country – 
the dominant society – was interpreted by some as a part of the larger nation-
building programme to finally assimilate the seemingly different peoples of Gambella 
into the mainstream Ethiopian society and culture (Kurimoto, 1993; Interview – 2IND, 
22 Mar. 2012). After the fall of the Derg, most of those settlers went back to their 
regions of origin. Hence, when Gambella became a regional state under the new 
federal system in 1991, the indigenous communities were once again clearly a 




However, autonomous migration began again and the number of highlanders began 
rising. The first attempt by the regional government of Gambella to disincentivise 
internal migration was to make Anywa and Nuer languages the working languages of 
the regional government of Gambella both in order to develop the regional identity 
and to discourage abnormal internal migration. In fact, this was not the first attempt 
in the country to introduce a regional language as a working language. By that time, 
three regions (Tigray, Oromia, Amhara) were already using their respective regional 
languages as working languages. However, when Gambella wanted to copy what 
the majority states were already doing, the federal government intervened by 
dismissing the then regional state’s leaders, labelling them as ‘narrow nationalists’. 
The succeeding regional government officials who kept ‘Amharic’ as the working 
language for the Gambella regional government but introduced a range of 
‘affirmative actions’ for indigenous peoples in the region were also accused of being 
‘ethno-centric’ and were dismissed from their positions (Interview – 8GOV, 23 Mar. 
2012).    
 
However, the above-mentioned accusations (i.e. narrow nationalists and ethno-
centric) of the local leaders of Gambella by the federal government and the 
highlanders seem hypocritical. In other regions (e.g. Oromia, Amhara, Tigray), 
priority in regional job opportunities are given to the natives of the region.64 Hence, 
while highlanders in the Gambella region claim to believe in the right to live and work 
anywhere in the country, they do not seemingly support the same principle in their 
regions of origins and they have put in place extreme measures to discourage any 
                                                          
64
 For example, in the early years of 1991, many Amhara people were expelled from Oromia region 
simply because they were not Oromo despite the fact that they had lived and worked in the region for 
years (Andargachew, 1993). Additionally, one of my interviewee who had lived for 22 years in Jimma 
(Oromia region), married to an Oromo woman and with two children, claimed that he was dismissed 
from his job in 1993 simply because he was not an Oromo (Interview-9IND, 13 Apr. 2012).  
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immigration to their regions. The current one-way immigration from majority regions 
(highland) to minority regions (lowland), therefore, in my perspective, is not a matter 
of ‘unfortunate coincidence’ as Dereje (2005) argued, but a result of deliberate 
double standard policies that restrict migration to dominant (highland) regions on one 
hand and encourage downward migration (i.e. highland to lowland) on the other.   
 
This internal migration from highland to lowland regions has serious implications for 
the federal arrangement in general and for the minority regions’ right to self-
determination in particular. According to the results of the latest national census, 
conducted in 2007, ‘highlanders’ have become the second largest group in the 
region next to the Nuer, outnumbering the indigenous Anywa ethnic group (CSA, 
1994 and 2007).  
 
Figure 17: Ethnic Distribution in the Gambella Region 
 







































With the current LSLA, the number of highlanders flowing into the Gambella regional 
state is expected to tremendously increase over the coming years. This projected 
demographic shift will have direct impact on the regional politics as well. Since there 
is no long-term residence requirement for voting in the regional government, all 
highlanders – no matter whether they are permanent residents in the region or 
temporary daily labourers – are automatically eligible to vote. So far, although the 
regional constitution has reserved the regional executive positions for the indigenous 
peoples, no indigenous person can access these positions without the support of 
highlanders, due to the latter’s significant demography. In other words, no 
indigenous person can gain a regional executive position only on the agenda of 
promoting indigenous interests in the region (Interview – 11GOV, 28 Mar. 2012). 
Apart from their demographic significance, their monopoly over the regional 
economy and backing from the federal government and institutions, have made the 
highlanders the most politically strong group in the region (Dereje, 2006). Moreover, 
since elections are most often symbolic and, in practice, regional executive positions 
are appointed by the federal government, no indigenous person can attain this 
position by promoting indigenous interests that are perceived by highlanders as 
zero-sum game (Interview – 4GOV, 21 Mar. 2012).  
 
Unfortunately, the most important rights that indigenous peoples are concerned 
about are rights that seem to be at odds with the interests of highlanders. For 
instance, most of my FGDs’ participants, who are all indigenous peoples, tend to 
view LSLA unfavourably, citing its negative impacts on their livelihoods. However, 
most of my highlander interviewees seem to view LSLA as a good development for 
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the region because it creates employment (e.g. Interviews – 10GOV and 16IND, 27 
Mar. and 12 Apr. 2012).  Likewise, as stated earlier, while many indigenous people 
supported an initiative by some indigenous politicians to introduce Anywa and Nuer 
languages as working languages of the Gambella region, the highlanders and the 
federal government labelled those politicians as ‘anti-highlanders’ and ‘narrow 
nationalists’ and put them in jail (Interview – 8GOV, 23 Mar. 2012).   
 
To relate this to internal migration, had the indigenous peoples been a clear majority 
in their respective regions and had there been a genuine federal system, the 
indigenous communities could have adopted these policies too and restricted further 
immigration to their regions. But with an increasing number of migrants, the minority 
regions, particularly Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella, will have difficulty 
maintaining their regional identities and, in fact, their right to self-determination 
without causing significant discontent among the highlanders and opposition from 
the federal government. Such policies could have been possible in early 1990 when 
the number of highlanders in the Gambella regional state, for example, was still quite 
small. But the federal government objected to such policies even from the very 
beginning on the grounds that they were discriminatory to highlanders in the region, 
while at the same time allowing other regions to exercise those rights. Since all other 
regions restricted immigration to their regional states, Gambella and Benishangul-
Gumuz (and to certain extent Afar and Somali too) became the only ones with open 
doors to immigrants from other regions. Hence, internal migration is already affecting 
the political demography in minority regions and thereby challenges the viability of 




10.5.2. International Migration of Indigenous Communities to 
Neighbouring Countries  
  
The two major indigenous ethnic groups in the Gambella region, namely the Anywa 
and the Nuer, have both occupied both sides of the Akobo River, which became an 
international border marker between Ethiopia and Sudan at the beginning of the 
twentieth century (Collins, 1971). Despite the transformation of this river into an 
international border, movement of people between these two countries was 
unhindered as both the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments were unable to 
enforce border control. The absence of border control and the weak government 
structures on both sides were an advantage for the local communities to keep their 
relations and traditions without much external interference from either’s central 
government.   
 
Despite the division of these communities between the two countries, the 
communities from both sides have always maintained their unity and solidarity. For 
instance, if there is a failure of crops on one side, it is very common that people go 
across the river to get help from their neighbours. For the pastoralist Nuer 
communities, movement back and forth between these two countries is even part of 
their livelihood.  
 
However, since the early years of the last decade (2000s), as the tensions between 
the indigenous communities of Gambella and the ‘highlanders’ grew, some members 
of the indigenous communities decided to permanently move and settle on the other 
side of the river. In 2003, when the Ethiopian government massacred 424 indigenous 
Anywa civilians in the Gambella regional capital, over 10,000 indigenous Anywa 
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people migrated to South Sudan and were sheltered by the UNHCR and other NGOs 
in Alari Refugee Camp (HRW, 2005). While some of those refugees returned to the 
Gambella region, many integrated into the local communities and opted for 
permanent residence in South Sudan. In terms of security, indigenous people from 
the Gambella regional state found South Sudan to be more secure than the 
Ethiopian side, where they face constant harassment from the government’s military 
forces (HRW, 2005).   
 
The latest wave of international migration of the indigenous communities is related to 
the on-going LSLAs. As stated in the preceding chapter, in the year 2010, the 
regional state of Gambella launched what it called the ‘villagization programme’ 
aiming to resettle 45,000 households within three years. According to the regional 
government of Gambella, they managed to resettle 26,000 households in the first 
calendar year of the programme. Although there are no statistics to detail exactly 
how many, some of those resettled households migrated to refugee camps in South 
Sudan and Kenya, due to unbearable conditions in the new settlement areas. At the 
moment there are more than five thousand Anywa refugees in ‘Dadaab Refugee 
camp’ in Kenya and some hundreds in Alari refugee camp in South Sudan (HRW, 
2012). Most of those who go to refugee camps are women, children, and elderly 
people. Many young people prefer to go to Juba, capital of South Sudan, where they 
can find job opportunities. Therefore, the number of refugees could be much higher 






However, since 2007 and particularly when I was carrying out my research, many 
indigenous people started to flow to South Sudan for security reasons. Some of the 
farmers who were displaced in the Gambella region went into South Sudan to live as 
farmers there. With recent conflicts caused by LSLAs, again, many more indigenous 
people have left the Gambella region, some going to refugee camps in South Sudan, 
some to Juba and others to the refugee camp in Kenya. In its ‘10 May 2012 Weekly 
Humanitarian Bulletin’, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA-South Sudan) issued the following statement:  
 
Anuak refugees have arrived in the Alari camp, in Pochalla County, Jonglei State, following 
reports of violence last month between the government and alleged Anuak opposition forces in 
Ethiopia. Humanitarian partners are visiting arrival locations with the Government of South 
Sudan’s Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) to register new arrivals and identify 
protection needs. An initial assessment by UNHCR staff indicates that new arrivals numbered 
in the hundreds. 
 
The majority of new arrivals are located at Alari refugee camp. A nutritional assessment of 100 
children at the site found no malnutrition. Shelter and house hold goods were the most urgent 
needs, according to partners. Access to Alari is difficult because of heavy rainfall. The new 
refugees reportedly came from Ethiopia’s Abobo area, amid reports of torture, arrests and 
indiscriminate killings, and from Jor, where clashes were reported on 6 May 2012 (OCHA-South 
Sudan, 2012, p.2).  
 
The Ethiopian government responded to this statement by denying any migration of 
the indigenous communities to South Sudan and stating that there was no conflict in 
the region (Tesfa-Alem, 2012). This was despite the fact that they had earlier 
broadcasted through the national TV channel the killing of civilians and foreign 
nationals in the Gambella regional state by unidentified armed groups (ETV, 13 Mar. 
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2012).   
 
So far, this trend of international migration does seem to be increasing as the 
indigenous people feel more insecure with the influx of more large-scale investors 
and highlanders into the region and the big presence of the military forces. Taking 
into account the extent to which the federal government continues leasing out lands 
to large-scale investors and the continued forced displacement of the indigenous 
communities from their lands, more social unrest is expected, which will 
consequently keep driving out more indigenous communities. Therefore, the 
migration of indigenous communities to neighbouring countries and the abnormally 
rising internal migration of highlanders to the Gambella regional state have 
substantial ramifications for the right to self-determination of the indigenous 





This chapter has endeavoured to discuss the major impacts of large-scale land 
acquisitions on the ethnic federal system in Ethiopia. In the first section, I have 
reiterated the strong attachment of indigenous communities to their lands. This 
section argues that for the indigenous communities land is not simply a productive 
resource, but also incorporates the notion of homeland, culture, spirituality and 
communal identity. In the second section, the relationship between federalism as a 
form of government and territorial-based diversities has been discussed. This section 
argues that federalism as a form of government is founded on the concept of 




Against this background of strong connection between indigenous communities and 
land on one hand, and between federalism and territorial-based identities on the 
other, I have argued that the taking of huge tracts of land by foreign firms in 
Gambella indeed has great ramifications for the indigenous communities’ right to 
land and for the ethnic federalism itself. Those ramifications are made even worse by 
the fact that respective local communities are not involved in the negotiation 
processes of those concessions.  Hence, it is argued in this chapter that the 
contemporary trend of LSLAs in Ethiopia in general and in the Gambella region in 
particular are directly impacting the federal arrangement in four fundamental ways. 
Firstly, the recentralization of land administration by the federal government directly 
challenges the principle of division of powers that is enshrined in the 1994 federal 
constitution. Secondly, this recentralization also challenges other important federal 
principles such as the principle of constitutionalism and legitimacy. Thirdly, the way 
in which the federal government leases out lands without consultation with the local 
communities also directly violates the federal principle of representation and 
participation. Finally, by further marginalizing the indigenous communities, LSLAs 
undermine local empowerment, the very first reason why ethnic federalism was 
adopted in Ethiopia.  
 
In addition to these direct impacts, it is also argued in this chapter that LSLA is 
indirectly challenging the federal system by altering the demography in minority 
regions such as Gambella in favour of highlanders. The huge influx of highlanders to 
the Gambella region in search of job opportunities on one hand, and the 
unprecedented external migration of the indigenous communities to neighbouring 
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countries as a consequence of the mounting insecurities related to LSLA on the 
other, have significant implications for the right to self-determination of the 
indigenous communities of the Gambella region.  
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11.1. General Conclusion  
 
The overarching research question for this research is articulated in the introduction 
chapter as, is the contemporary phenomenon of large-scale land acquisitions 
in Ethiopia redefining indigenous communities’ right to land and what are the 
implications of this redefinition for the ethnic federal system? In an attempt to 
answer this question, I have used ‘triangulation’ as the research methodology for this 
research. The use of different theoretical frameworks – i.e. critical agrarian political 
economy, political ecology and political science – has proved essential in capturing 
different dimensions of LSLA that would have not otherwise been captured by one 
theory. Likewise, the combination of secondary data, interviews and focus group 
discussions has also generated rich and coherent data that would have not 
otherwise been generated by a single method. Hence, methodologically, 
‘triangulation’ has mitigated the weaknesses and intrinsic biases that come from 
single-theory or single-method studies and provided empirically grounded, 
convergent and comprehensive answers to the research question posed above.  
 
The issue of control over land in Ethiopia in general is as old as the modern 
Ethiopian state itself. Besides its functions as a productive economic resource, rural 
land has also been a ‘hot potato’ in Ethiopian politics for which regimes were either 
overthrown or brought to power.  For instance, the demise of Haile Selassie’s regime 
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in 1974 was partly precipitated by his feudal land policies, which were characterized 
by drastic power imbalance between the peasants and the landlords.  On the other 
hand, for the most part, it was the ‘land to the tiller’ slogan that rallied the university 
students and the public and thereby accelerated the Derg’s rise to power in the same 
year. Nevertheless, although the Derg’s 1975 land reform was hailed as a victory for 
the rural farmers, its ideological preoccupation with socialism and political control of 
both the urban and the rural population undermined its early successes and did little, 
if anything, to maintain rural support, which is critical for the survival of any regime in 
Ethiopia. As such, the Derg did not escape the fate of its predecessor as it lost rural 
support and was ultimately overthrown by the EPRDF in 1991. The current EPRDF 
regime, although it maintained the Derg’s ‘state land ownership’ policy, promoted 
small-scale farming as the engine of growth and industrialization of the country. 
Accordingly, it carried out extensive agricultural extensions programmes that aimed 
at modernising and increasing the productivity of small-scale farmers through the 
supply of appropriate technology, certified seeds, fertilizers, rural credit facilities and 
technical assistance (Lulit, et al., 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, those programmes were mainly targeting highland regions. The 
lowland regions and their indigenous communities have been to a great extent 
conspicuously missing from the national agricultural extension programmes. On the 
contrary, while the central government promotes small-scale farming in the highland 
regions, in the lowland regions like Gambella, since 2007 the central government 
has been promoting large-scale commercial farming as its development strategy. 
Hence, vast swathes of farmlands have been leased out to large-scale investors in 
the Gambella region and nearly half of the indigenous communities have been 
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uprooted from their farms through the villagization programme in order to 
accommodate the rising interest for farmland from both foreign and domestic large-
scale investors. Similarly, in order to ease the process of large-scale land 
acquisitions, land administration – a power allocated to regional states under the 
federal system – was recentralized by the federal government in 2009 to the 
detriment of the lowland regional states. Hence, I have argued in this thesis that 
LSLA is not only challenging indigenous communities’ right to land but it is also 
posing a threat to the ethnic federal system under which those rights are articulated 
and entrenched.  
 
In order to understand this power disparity between the centre and the regions, 
particularly the peripheral ones like Gambella, one has to look at the historical 
integration of those regions into the contemporary Ethiopian state. I have maintained 
in this thesis that the current power disparity – despite the adoption of federalism – 
between the centre and the peripheral regions such as the Gambella has its roots in 
the historical mode of integration of those regions into the Ethiopian state. In the 
case of Gambella, from the very beginning successive Ethiopian regimes have 
tended to be more interested in the resources and strategic location of the region 
than in the people who inhabited the region. As such, the indigenous peoples of 
Gambella were from the very beginning only weakly integrated into the Ethiopian 
state. Although the Derg took some measures to integrate the peripheral 
communities into mainstream Ethiopian societies by expanding education to these 
areas and employing members of those communities in civil service jobs, the Derg’s 
preoccupation with political control soon overshadowed its empowerment measures 
and greatly alienated the indigenous communities from the regime. In Gambella, the 
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resettlement programme that brought over 60,000 settlers from the highland parts of 
Ethiopia to the region; the cultural revolution programme that indiscriminately 
uprooted legitimate traditional leadership structures; and the de facto handover of 
the Gambella region to the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) only further 
cemented the narrative of marginalization and exploitation of the indigenous 
communities by the highlanders’ central government.  
 
In the light of these historical precedents, the current prioritization of large-scale 
commercial farming in the Gambella region, seemingly at the expense of the 
indigenous peoples, could be seen as a continuity of successive Ethiopian regimes’ 
continuing to value the region more for its natural resources and strategic location 
than for its inhabitants.  Undeniably, while the current ethnic federal system seems to 
have empowered the indigenous communities in the areas of social and cultural 
matters, it has fundamentally failed in areas of political and economic empowerment, 
as discussed in Chapter six. At the socio-cultural level, I argue, the Gambella 
regional state and its indigenous communities have indeed enjoyed a meaningful 
level of self-determination. The new ethnic federal system has helped previously 
marginalized and stigmatized ethnic groups regain ethnic pride and offered them the 
freedom and choice to express elements of their cultures. However, with regard to 
political self-determination, the new system only offered symbolic representation to 
the indigenous communities of Gambella and not real power. Although the regional 
political offices were virtually handed over to the indigenous communities, the federal 
government had created shadow structures – such as the Ministry of Federal Affairs, 
the central party advisors and the security agents – that actually run the political 
affairs of the region behind the formally elected officials. Hence, as far as political 
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self-determination or local empowerment is concerned, the Gambella experience so 
far seems to exemplify failure. On the economic front, the new system again seems 
to have failed the Gambella region and its indigenous communities. For instance, 
despite the constitutional provision for the regional governments to jointly levy and 
collect taxes on incomes from large-scale mining and all petroleum and gas 
operations and royalties on such operations, until now the regional government of 
Gambella has been virtually excluded not only from the benefits occurring from gold 
mining but also from the governance structures involved in those operations. Hence, 
economic marginalization seems to be even worse than political marginalization, 
where there is at least symbolic representation. That is why I chose one aspect of 
economic self-determination – i.e. LSLA – as a prism through which to critically 
investigate the state-communities relation (social contract) articulated under ethnic 
federalism.  
 
Proceeding to the actual implementation of LSLA, my analysis of the data collected 
from different sources in Gambella has indicated that the processes involved in the 
actual LSLAs do not recognize indigenous peoples’ land rights. From 2000-2006, 
when most of the large-scale land investors were domestic investors acquiring 
relatively small-scale amounts of land (below 5,000 ha), the involvement of the local 
communities through their immediate woreda representatives used to be strong. 
However, with the coming of foreign large-scale land investors in 2007/2008, the 
federal government recentralized the process of LSLAs, to the detriment of the local 
governments and their indigenous communities. This is reflected in the land lease 
agreements signed solely between large-scale investors and the federal government 
which, among other things, (1) do not recognize the existing land rights of the 
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indigenous communities; (2) do not ensure continued access to vital natural 
resources such as water, grazing land and communal forests for the indigenous 
communities; (3) do not make Environmental Impacts Assessment mandatory; (4) 
and do not involve the indigenous communities in the evaluation and monitoring 
mechanisms of those projects.  
 
Hence, contrary to the government’s and investors’ claims that large-scale land 
investments are bringing development to the local communities, my research 
suggests that those investments are in fact deepening the marginalization of the 
indigenous communities. This is reflected in Chapter eight where I critically reviewed 
the major claimed benefits of large-scale land acquisitions, namely (1) food security, 
(2) employment opportunities, (3) technology transfer and (4) increase in tax 
revenues for local governments. In the case of food security, the investment legal 
framework encourages export-oriented production and gives better incentives for 
those investors who export a higher proportion of their production. In practice, the 
major foreign large-scale investors so far have virtually exported all their production 
to their countries of origin or to other foreign countries. Hence, the claim that large-
scale land acquisitions will reduce food insecurity in Ethiopia seems to be empty 
rhetoric that is not supported by facts on the ground. With regard to job creation, my 
research has found that, in reality, nearly 90% of jobs created by those investors are 
temporary daily labourer jobs, which pay poorly and hardly sustain minimum living 
standards. Moreover, most of those jobs are also going to migrants from the 
highland parts of Ethiopia rather than to the indigenous communities. Likewise, 
evidence from the ground also disputes claims about technology transfer, since there 
is no policy that encourages such a technology transfer to take place and so far, in 
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practice, there is not even informal cooperation between investors and their adjacent 
local communities. Instead, small-scale farmers are defined as incapable and 
pushed out from their lands in order to give way to the ‘capable’ large-scale farmers. 
Finally, in relation to claims about financial benefits, although evidence has 
suggested an increase in tax revenue for respective woreda governments as a 
consequence of LSLAs, this increase in tax revenue has not been directed towards 
developmental activities of the respective woredas. Rather, some of my interviewees 
and participants of focus group discussions have stated that the increase in local tax 
revenue has increased corruption and competition over woreda cabinet positions.   
 
Moreover, in addition to the failure of those expected benefits, my research has 
found out that LSLA is already having some negative impacts on the indigenous 
communities. Some of the major negative impacts are the introduction of the 
villagization programme, which is akin to forced displacement; environmental 
impacts, in terms of deforestation and likelihood of pollution of water resources as a 
consequence of agrochemicals’ use; escalation of existing tensions and 
transformation of grievances into open conflicts; and further marginalization and 
destitution of indigenous women. Throughout my research, these issues have 
repeatedly come out as some of the major areas in which LSLAs are already 
negatively impacting on the lives of the indigenous communities in the Gambella 
region. 
 
Therefore, from the above discussions, it becomes apparent that LSLA in the 
Gambella region is indeed redefining indigenous communities’ right to land and 
related natural resources in fundamental ways. Despite the constitutional provision 
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that stipulates, “Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing and 
cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from their own lands” (Article 40:5), 
the federal government since 2007/2008 seems to have been doing exactly the 
opposite in the Gambella region.  
 
However, this redefinition is not only limited to the mere question of indigenous 
peoples’ right to land. I have argued here that it also shakes the foundation of ethnic 
federalism itself. When the EPRDF assumed power in 1991, it diagnosed many of 
Ethiopia’s problems in the light of the historical Amhara domination and rule over the 
rest of the other Ethiopian ethnic groups. This, the party argument goes, caused 
deep-rooted disparities among the Ethiopian ethnic groups which could only be 
corrected by giving every ethnic group the right to self-determination so that each 
ethnic group can manage their group resources in their own interests (Andreas, 
2003; Lavers, 2012; Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). Land is one of the key group 
resources and had historically been the symbol of the Amhara domination of other 
ethnic groups and regions. Hence, the new constitution deliberately gave land 
administration to the newly ethnically-delineated regions, demonstrating the new 
regime’s commitment to ethnic self-determination (FDRE, 1994, Article 52). Against 
this background, the current recentralization of land administration by the central 
government in lowland regions challenges the very foundation for which ethnic 
federalism was adopted in the first place, namely – ethnic self-determination and the 
management of groups’ resources in the interests of the respective groups.   
 
On top of challenging the very reason for which ethnic federalism was introduced in 
the first place, LSLA also seems to be challenging the four federal principles that I 
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have identified in Chapter three of this thesis. Firstly, the recentralization of the 
power of ‘land administration’ by the federal government directly challenges the 
federal principle of ‘division of powers’ that is enshrined in the 1994 federal 
constitution. The creation of the ‘Agricultural Investment Support Directorate’ (AISD) 
at the federal level to administer lands in lowland regions and facilitate large-scale 
land investments on behalf of lowland regions seems to violate the constitutional 
right of those lowland regions. Likewise, I have also argued that the enactment of the 
‘Investment Incentives Regulation’ by the ‘Council of Ministers’ looks like an 
infringement on the constitutional jurisdiction of the regional states and it also seems 
to violate the division of powers between the three branches of the government, 
since the body that enacted it is an executive body not a legislative one.  
 
Secondly, I have argued that these recentralization efforts also challenge another 
vital federal principle – i.e. ‘constitutionalism and legitimacy’. Aalen (2002) has 
argued that “federal governments have to be subjected to the rule of law and 
committed to the principle of constitutionalism” (Aalen, 2002, p.102). Others such as 
King (1982) and Burgess and Gagnon (1993) have argued that a federation cannot 
be legitimate if it is a result of or is maintained by coercion from above. Hence, the 
recentralization effort that apparently contradicts the federal constitution and the 
coercive methods used against local government officials in the process of LSLAs 
present a big challenge to the federal principles of ‘constitutionalism and legitimacy’.   
 
Thirdly, the way in which the federal government leases out lands without 
consultation with the local communities also directly challenges the federal principle 
of ‘representation and participation’. Finally, by further marginalizing the indigenous 
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communities, whether through deliberate villagization programme or unintended 
abnormal migration of highlanders to the region, LSLA undermines one of the 
political and moral justifications that necessitated the adoption of ethnic federalism in 
the first place, namely self-determination for ‘Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ of 
Ethiopia’. Therefore, the contemporary trend of large scale land acquisitions in 
Ethiopia is not only redefining indigenous communities’ rights, but also challenges 
the new social contract (i.e. ethnic federalism) between the post-1991 Ethiopian 
state and its peripheral minorities and indigenous communities.  
 
 
11.2. Areas for Further Research   
 
During the course of this research, other fundamental research questions have 
occurred that fall beyond the scope of this particular work and therefore would need 
further study. Firstly, while I was reviewing the literature on ethnic federalism in 
Ethiopia, I observed that no research has so far been conducted on ethnic 
federalism and natural resources in general. In other words, the question of natural 
resource management/exploitation vis-à-vis ethnic federalism is an area that is 
virtually not researched so far in Ethiopia. This might be due to the fact that until 
recently there has been no major extraction of natural resources in any of the 
regions of Ethiopia. However, this might change soon. According to the Ministry of 
Mines, only in the first quarter of the 2012/2013 financial year, the country has 
obtained gold worth more than $132.7 million in the Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia, 
Tigray, Gambella and SNNPRS regions (MOM, 2012). Nevertheless, the ways in 
which revenues from these resources are shared remain unknown. At the least, in 
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the case of the Gambella regional states, I have discussed it in Chapter six that the 
regional government is not only excluded from the benefits occurring from these 
resources but is also excluded from the governance structures involved in their 
extraction. Hence, there is a great need for further research to explore the 
management/extraction of natural resources and ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.  
 
Secondly, I have pointed out earlier that the concept of indigenous peoples is still a 
very young concept not only in Ethiopia but also on the African continent in general. I 
have also indicated that the concept is contested by many people who argue that the 
concept is not applicable in the African context. In Ethiopia, the concept of 
indigenous peoples has so far been closely associated only with pastoralists. I have 
seen that there is almost no research on the situation of shifting cultivators, 
gatherers and hunters. Hence, there is a need for further research to develop and 
enrich the concept of indigenous peoples in Africa in general and in Ethiopia in 
particular.  
 
Finally, in my analysis of the global processes and actors of LSLAs, I have found out 
that the attention is almost exclusively on foreign players and trans-regional land 
transactions. In another words, the available literature on large-scale land 
acquisitions so far is very much foreign-actors-centric. However, the experiences 
from the Gambella region show that national elites such as politicians, businessmen, 
ruling party’s cadres and former liberation fighters/generals are also greatly involved 
in acquiring lots of lands in peripheral regions. Therefore, there seems to be a need 
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Appendix – 3: Partial List of Large-Scale Land Investors in 
Gambella   














2,000 50 years 30 Birr Cotton, 
Sesame 
Ethiopia 
2 Bazel 10,000 50 years 30 Birr Cotton, 
Sesame 
Ethiopia 
3 BHO 27,000 25 years 111 Birr Rice, 
Sesame 
Indian 
4 Fiker Plc 2,000 50 years 30 Birr Cotton, 
Sesame 
Ethiopia 





2,000 50 years 30 Birr Sesame Ethiopia 





5,000 50 years 30 Birr Tea Indian 
9 Muluken 
Azene 
2,000 50 years 30 Birr Cotton, 
Sesame 
Ethiopia 
10 Ruchi 25,000 25 years 111 Birr Soya, 
Palm Oil 
Indian 
11 Sannati 10,000 25 years 158 Birr Rice, 
Pulses 
Indian 











3,000 50 years 30 Birr Sesame Ethiopia 
15 Verdanta 3,012 50 years 111 Birr Tea Indian 
16 Yemane 
G/Meskel 










Source: Abobo woreda, Gambella woreda, Godere woreda, Gog woreda, Itang 

























tonnes High. Indig. High. Indig. High
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Indig. 
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             










Appendix – 5: Interviews and Focus Group Discussions Guides  
 
1. Interview Guide for Government Officials (GOV) 
The following questions were presented to government officials both elected officials 
and civil servants at different government levels. Elected officials include 
parliamentarians, Gambella regional/kilil and woreda executives/cabinet. Based on 
the circumstances of each interviewee, some modifications have been applied.   
 
No Question Prompt  Variable  
1  What is your opinion on the 
Ethiopian federal system in 
general  
 
 What does the adoption of 
federalism in Ethiopia mean 
for minorities and indigenous 
communities? 
Advantages and 














2  How is right to self-
determination implemented 
in the Gambella region 
 
 What are the indicators that 
















3  How do you describe the 
relationship between the 
regional and federal 
government?  
 
 Is there federal interference 
in regional affairs? If yes 
 
 If yes, what is your view on 
these interferences vis-à-vis 
the federal framework? 
 









strengthen or  
weaken 
federalism  
Division of Powers 









4  Could you tell me about the 
federal advisors in the 
region? 
 
 What is your view on their 
(federal advisors) role in the 
regional government?  






distractive for the 





Federal advisors  
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5  Could you tell me about 
gimgemma? 
 
 What is your opinion on the 








6  Could you tell me about the 





 What is the relationship 
























GPDM and EPRDF 
relations  
7  What is your opinion on the 
capacity building 
programmes of the EPRDF?  
 
 What are the main contents 
of those capacity building 
programmes? 












8  What is your opinion on the 
current Large Scale Land 
Acquisitions (LSLA)? 
 
 Why large-scale agricultural 









on LSLA  
 
 
LSLA and minorities  
9  Was directing LSLA to 
lowland regions discussed in 
the parliament?  
 
 As a MP representing one of 
those regions were you 
consulted about the 
promotion of large-scale 
agricultural investments in 
your constituency? 
 
 In your opinion, do these 
investments have impact on 
the federal system? 
Reports, 
proposal, any 





























 Have you ever received any 
complaint from your 
constituencies about the 








10  Why did Gambella delegated 
its right to land 
administration to federal 
government? 
 
 How was this power 
delegated to the federal 
government? 
 
 Does the transfer of this 
power have implication for 




the federal land 
bank 
 




Delegation of the 





11  Why the Gambella region 
does not have its own land 
law up to now?  
 
 Without your (regional 
government) own land law, 
how are you leasing out 
lands to investors?  
 
 Does lack of regional land 
law affect LSLA process in 
the region? 
 
 Does lack of land law has 
any effect on the 
effectiveness of self-
government of the region 
As required by 
the constitution 
and federal rural 
land proclamation 
Regional land law 
  What is the process of 
acquiring land below 5000 in 
the region? 
 
 Do you need to report land 
leases below 5000 ha to the 
federal government? 
 
 Regional land lease 
process  
12  Is there monitoring and 
evaluation framework for 
investors? 
 
 If yes, what kind? How 
often? and what are the 










 What can you do for 
investors that do not meet 
the standards of your 






14  What are the functions of the 
regional water development 
bureau? 
 
 Do large-scale land 
investments affect the 
mandate of the water 
development bureau? 
 
 What is the role of the 
regional water development 
bureau in the process of land 
investment? 
 
 Is there framework for 
cooperation between 
different departments whose 










Any overlap or 



























15  What are the functions of the 
regional Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA)? 
 
 Do large-scale land 
investments affect the 
mandate of EPA? 
 
 What is the role of EPA in 
LSLA? 
 
 Do different levels of 
government and ministries 




 How are the provisions of the 
proclamations observed or 





Any overlap or 






































16  Could you tell me about the 
Gambella National Park? 
 
 Do large-scale land 
investments affect the 
National Park? 
 
 Is there any coordination and 
cooperation between the 
National Park authority and 





















17  What is the mandate of 
regional Mines and Energy 
Bureau 
 
 What is the cooperation 
between the federal Ministry 
of Mines and the regional 
Bureau? 
 
 Is there any framework of 
sharing benefits incurred 
from any potential 













Such as the 
current gold 
mining in Dimma 
woreda 





Regional relations of 
the Ministry  
 
 
Sharing of benefits 
/economic self-
determination  
18  What is the role of the 
woreda government in 
LSLA?  
 
 Which area is marked for 
LSLA, i.e. put in the federal 
land bank? 
 
 What is the procedure of 
formal handing over land to 
investor? 
 
 What is the method of 
measurement of land to be 
given to investors?  
 
 What benefits has the 
woreda government got from 
those investments? 
 







location(s) in the 
woreda 
 



















Find out the specific 
areas demarcated 
for land bank 
 
















  Who sets the land rental 
rates for investors? 
 
 Have LSLA increased the tax 

















Land rental rates  
 
 
LSLA and local 
government’s tax 
revenue  
19  What are the purposes of 
villagization?  
 
 How was it initiated? 
 
 Is it voluntary? 
 




 What are the procedures of 
these consultations? 
In general  
 
 

























20  Does LSLA affect women in 
special way 
 
 Does villagization affect 
women in special way 
 
 
 Are women included in 
consultations (if any) about 
LSLA and villagization 
programmes  












2. Interview Guide for Independents (IND)  
The following questions were presented to independent respondents who are made 
up of NGO workers, academics, pensioners and former state officials. Based on the 
circumstances of each interviewee, some modifications have been applied.  
 
No Question Prompt  Variable  
1  What is your opinion about 
the federal system in 
general? 
 
 What changes has 
federalism brought to the 
indigenous communities of 
Gambella? 
 
 How is the implementation of 
right to self-determination? 
 
 Are the regional leaders free 
to make policies in the 
interests of the indigenous 
communities in their own 
capacities?  
 
 How is language rights 
implemented? 
 
 What are the challenges of 
















Or do they have 

































2  Could you tell me about the 
federal advisors in the 
region? 
 
 What is your view on their 
(federal advisors) role in the 
regional government? 
Who are they 










Role of federal 
advisors 
3  What is the significance of 
land in your culture? 
 
 To whom does land belong 
to in your culture? 
 
 What other purposes do you 































LSLA and land 
values  
4  Could you tell me about 
GPLM?  
 
 How did GPLM allied itself 
with EPRDF? 
 
 What is GPLM’s contribution 





















5  What is the main cause of 
Anywa-Nuer conflict in your 
view? 
 
 How did these communities 
use to solve these conflicts? 
 
 Has the nature of those 
conflicts changed after the 
introduction federalism? 
 
 Does LSLA impact (reduce, 
increase, neutralize) those 



















conflicts in one 
away or 
another? 
History of conflicts 












lSLA to conflict 
dynamics in the 
Gambella regional  
6  What are the main causes of 
conflicts between the 
indigenous communities and 
the highlanders? 
 
 What is the role of the 




 What is the role of federal 
system in these conflicts? 
 












7  What is the role of traditional 











 Does the current system 
encourage traditional conflict 
resolution systems? 
 
 Are traditional elders 
consulted for the current 








If yes, how? 






Local consultation  
8  Could you tell me about the 
impacts of Derg’s revolution 
in Gambella? 
 
 What were the major 
changes in Gambella as the 
consequences of the Derg 
taking over the power? 
 
 What were the major 
difference between the Derg 
and Haile Selassie?  
 
 Could you tell me about the 
Derg’s Cultural-Revolution? 
 
 How was local 































between Derg and 









9  What is your opinion about 
the new Charities and 
Societies Proclamation?  
 
 Has it affected any of your 
activities in the region? 
 
 Does it have any impact on 
the LSLA? 
 
 Charities and 
Societies 
Proclamation 
10  Could you tell me about your 
organization’s project called 
“Participatory Forest 
Protection Project”?  
 
 
 Could you tell me about your 













 What is the local land 
management system among 
the Majang people? 
 
 Is LSLA affecting your work 
in one way or another? 
 
 Are the communities among 
whom you work affected by 
LSLA in one way or another? 
 
 Do you get any support for 
your work from woreda and 
kilil governments?  
 
 Could you tell me about the 
story in Gumare and Kabu 
villages?  
 
11  What is your experience with 
the Derg villagization 
programme?  
 




 Is there any link between the 
curren villagization 
programme and LSLA? 
 
 What is the difference 
between current villagization 
and the Derg’s villagization? 
 
 Are women affected in 
special way by the 
villagization programme? 
 
 Derg’s villagization 
programme  
12  What was the process of 
land investment before the 
coming of LSLA 
 
 Was the federal government 
a player in the land 
investment before the 
coming of large-scale 
investors? 
 






13  What are the major security 
challenges in the region? 
 
 Do indigenous and 
highlanders face the same 
security problems or are their 
security challenges different? 
 
 How do you see the role of 
both the regional and federal 
government in tackling those 
security challenges? 
 











to address security 
problems  
14  What is the relationship 





3. Interview Guide for Business owners (BSS)  
The following questions were presented to different kinds of business owners. The 
main respondents in this category are large-scale land investors (mainly farm 
managers) and wholesale crop distributors in different districts of the Gambella 
region. Based on the circumstances of each interviewee, some modifications have 
been applied.  
 
No Question Prompt  Variable  
1  How much land do you 
have? 
 
 What are the boundary 
markers of your farm or who 





 What do you plan to grow or 
already growing on the land? 
 
 How much of the land is 
already in actual production?  
 













In hectares  
 
 
In Kilograms or 
To verify size of 
land leases 
 







Crops grown  
 
 






 How much did you produce 
in the last production 
season? 
 














2  What kinds of processes did 
you go through to secure 
your current land lease?  
 
 Were the relevant structures 
and authorities efficient and 
cooperative?  
 
 Did you face any obstacles 
in the process of acquiring 
you current land?  
 
 Have you met the 
neighbouring communities 
(i.e., adjacent communities 
to your farm) before you 








If yes, in what 
ways and if not 
how?  
 




If yes, what was 
your first 
discussion with 




























 Have you conducted EIA 
before or after launching 
your project?   
 
 If yes, to which department 
have you submitted it and 
what was their reaction 
(comment, feedback) 
 
 If no, have you received any 
request for EIA from any 
department/authorities? 
 
Of do you have 
a copy?  
 
 


















4  Are you aware of the 
Pesticide Registration and 
Control Proclamation No. 
If yes, do you 
have a copy?  
Use of Pesticide 






 Are you using or intend to 
use any kind of chemicals in 
the future? 
 
 Have you received any kind 
or orientation from the 
government bodies 
concerning the kinds of 
chemicals you are allowed to 
and not allowed to use?  
 
 Do you get any expertise 
from the government 
concerning the use of 
chemicals?  
 
5  How do you describe your 
relationship with 
neighbouring communities?  
 
 Have you ever supported 
them in terms of lending your 
hardware or sharing your 
expertise with them? 
 
 Is technological transfer to 
local communities part of 
your programme?  
 
 If yes, what are the 
procedures and mechanisms 
in place to ensure 














6  How many indigenous 
people have benefited from 
job opportunities created by 







 Have you taken any 
measure to encourage 















Job opportunities  
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employment in your 
company? 
7  Who are the major food crop 
suppliers to Gambella 
region?  
 





 Do large-scale investors 
provide any food supply to 
regional food market? 
 
 Have investors impacted 























4. Focus Group Discussions Guide (FGD) 
The following questions were presented to Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
participants in different woredas and kebeles. Based on the circumstances of each 
FGD, some modifications have been applied to the following questions.   
 
No Question Prompt  Variable  
1  What is your opinion on the 
villagization programme? 
 
 Where you consulted about 
the villagization programme? 
 
 If yes, what kind of 
















The quality of 
consultation 
2  Have you been provided with 
social services promised in 
the villagization programme 
package?  
 
 If yes, which ones? If no 
have you ever complained to 
the concerned authorities? 
 

















Comparing former and 
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former villages and the 
current one? Are you now 
better off in the new villages? 
If yes or no, in what ways?  
 
 
current villages?  
3  How was Villagization 
carried out? 
 
 Was it voluntary?  
 
 Are you free to go back to 
your former villages?  
 
 What happened to your 
former farms? Are they taken 








was voluntary or not 
 
 
4  Do you think there is any link 
between the villagization 




 If yes, what do you think are 
the linkages?  
 
 Are some of the lands given 
to investors part of your 
traditional lands?  
 Link between 
villagization and large-
scale land investment 
5  What is your opinion on the 
on-going large-scale land 
investments? 
 
 Were you consulted 
concerning the coming of 
investors? 
 
 Has any of you lost your land 
because of investors? 
 
 If yes, have you ever 



















woreda or kilil 
level 














6  What do you make of the 
government’s claim that the 
lands they are giving to 
investors are unused lands? 
 
 Do you use those lands for 
different purposes?  
 
 Has the leasing out of those 
lands to investors affected 
your livelihoods in one way 
or another?  
 
 Where do you now go for 
collecting firewood, building 
materials and fetching 
water?  
 Local response to 






to local communities  
7  Has the leasing out of large-
scale lands to investors 
affected your food security? 
 
 If yes, in what ways? 
 
 Has the leasing out large-
scale lands to investors 










access to fish in 
the rivers  
Large-scale 
agricultural 
investments and local 
food security 
8  How do you describe your 
relationship with investors?  
 
 Are you getting any 
technological transfer from 
investors or do they share 
with you their expertise?  
 
 If yes, could you provide 
examples?  
 
 Local communities and 
investors’ relations 
9  Are large-scale agricultural 
investments contributing to 
conflicts or tensions? 
 
 If yes, could you give 
examples… 
 
 How do you describe your 
relationship as host 









who are coming to work on 
those large-scale farms?  
 
 Have there ever been 
incidents of violence of 
tensions between you and 
them?  
 
10  What is the role of traditional 
leaders in land 
management?  
 
 Were they consulted about 
villagization and large-scale 
agricultural investments?  
 
 Is there traditional roles 
undermined by large-scale 
land investors in one way or 
another?  
 
 Traditional leaders and 





11  How are conflicts resolved in 
your culture? 
 
 What is the role of the 
traditional leaders in conflict 
resolution 
 
 Could some of those 
practices also be applied in 
current conflicts and 
tensions?  
 Traditional conflict 
resolution mechanisms  
12  What is the significance of 
land in your culture? 
 
 For what other purposes 




 Do you make any difference 
between the land of your 
village and other lands? 
 
 Does the current large-scale 
land investments affect those 
other functions of lands? 
 





Significance of land in 




13  How are food prices over the 
last five years? 
 
 Where do you normally buy 
your maize from? Or who are 
the major providers of maize 
in your woreda? 
 
 
 Do land investors provide 
food items to local food 
market? 
 
 If yes which types of crops 
and if no why in your 
perspective? 
 
 Has the coming of investors 
affected food prices in one 





LSLA and local food 
market, supply and 
prices  
14  Have you or family members 
got any job in the farms? 
 
 If yes, what is the procedure 
of getting employed on the 
farm? 
 
 Are the wages on the farm 
enough to support 
yourself/family? 
 
 How do you compare 
working on those farms and 
working on your own farm? 
 
If yes, what kind 
of job? 
Job opportunities for 
local people on large-
scale farms  
15  What do you think the impact 
of large-scale land investors 
on environment? 
 




 What do investors do with 
the trees they cut down? 
 
 Has large-scale investors 
 LSLA and the 




affected wild life? 
16  What is the significance of 
forest to the Majangir 
people? 
 
 For what other purposes do 
the Majangir people use the 
forest for? 
 
 What are the impacts of 
large-scale agricultural 
investment on the Majangir 
people? 
 
 Could you describe in detail 
to me your complaint to the 
federal government 
concerning land lease 
agreement in your area? 
 
 
 LSLA among the 
Majangir people 
17  What is the traditional 
conflict resolution 
mechanism among the 
Majang people? 
 
 What is the role of the 
traditional spiritual leaders 
among the Majangir people? 
 
 Traditional conflict 
resolution among the 
Majangir People  
 
 
 
 
 
 
